Handbook
for
Joint Urban Operations

17 May 2000

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

17 May 2000

MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Given the increasing rate of global urbanization and a national security strategy of global engagement, the Armed Forces of the United States must prepare now for the likelihood of conducting joint urban operations in the future. Joint urban operations involve a variety of unique operational considerations such as extensive man-made construction, large noncombatant populations, and complex sociological, political, economic, and cultural interactions within those populations. To overcome these challenges, US military forces must be able to apply the full range of tools available to a commander tasked with conducting joint urban operations.

The *Handbook for Joint Urban Operations* is a primer on joint urban operations. It is intended to provide joint force commanders, their staffs, and other interested parties with fundamental principles and operational-level considerations for the conduct of joint urban operations. Although the Handbook is consistent with joint and Service doctrine, it is not a doctrinal publication. As a primer, the Handbook is intended to *inform*, rather than *dictate*, the actions of joint forces conducting urban operations.

When US military forces deploy to urban areas, American lives and national security will depend upon the ability of commanders and staffs to understand and address the unique operational considerations of joint urban operations as presented in this publication. I challenge military leaders to read this Handbook and to use it as a resource tool in preparing for the conduct of joint urban operations across the full spectrum of conflict.

C. W. FULFORD, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps
Director, Joint Staff

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Handbook would not have been possible without the guidance and advice of a great many individuals. The Joint Staff is very appreciative of the experts who gave their time, thought, and encouragement. While it is impossible to list everyone who gave so generously to make this Handbook possible, special thanks are offered to the following:

Ambassador Robert Oakley; GEN Wayne Downing, USA (Ret.); Gen Charles Horner, USAF (Ret.); GEN Glen Otis, USA (Ret.); LtGen Robert Johnston, USMC (Ret.); Lt Gen Norton Schwartz, USAF; MG Carl Ernst, USA (Ret.); Col Bob Stephan, USAF; LTC Frank Abbott, USA; LTC Mike Beans, USA; LTC Greg Gerovac, USA; LtCol Phil Gleason, USMC; LTC Bob Hahn, USA (Ret.); CDR Ed Harrington, USN; LtCol Mike Manuche, USMC; Lt Col Jeff Newell, USAF; LtCol Duane Schattle, USMC (Ret.); Maj Mark Sumner, USMC; Mr. Bob Ellithorpe; Ms. Rebekah Callard; Mr. Barak Cohen; Dr. Russell Glenn; Ms. Renee Lajoie; Mr. Steve Marsh; Ms. Cynthia Melugin; Mr. Paul Nagy; Mr. William Rosenau; Mr. Mil Tratensek; and the members of the Joint Urban Working Group.

Corrections or suggestions for improvement of this Handbook are welcome. Comments should be forwarded to the Joint Staff, J-8, Land and Littoral Warfare Assessment Division, Room 1D940, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-8000. The DSN telephone number is 225-4657, commercial (703) 695-4657, and fax extension 8031.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

HANDBOOK FOR JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- **Introduce the roles and challenges of military operations in urban areas**
- **Provide an operational context for joint urban operations (JUO)**
- **Outline planning considerations for JUO**
- **Examine case studies of urban operations**

JUO are planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features.

The Roles and Challenges of Military Operations in Urban Areas

The US military has a long history of conducting urban operations, from the Revolutionary War (Boston and New York), to armed intervention in Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion, to recent noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) in Sierra Leone and Albania, among others.

Historically Strategic Locations

Urban areas often evolve in strategically important locations. Many urban areas were originally situated to defend and/or exploit key geographical chokepoints or lines of communication, such as ports and overland trade routes. As these urban areas prospered, their populations and importance grew.

The Symbolic Value of Urban Areas

Urban areas often hold symbolic political, social, and/or cultural value. Military operations can target urban areas in order to exploit this symbolic value in order to attain broader campaign objectives.

The Concentration of Decision-Making Nodes and the Strategic Center of Gravity

Urban areas generally function as the social, economic, and political center of societies. Important commercial, state, and cultural sites, such as religious and cultural centers, government offices, embassies, factories, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), among others, are usually located in urban areas.

By definition, the two key characteristics that make urban environments more complex than other environments are man-made construction and density of noncombatants.

The Inherent Challenges of Joint Urban Operations

JUO deserve serious attention from US Armed Forces due to the significant physical challenges and unique social characteristics of urban areas. These inter-related challenges and characteristics may include, but are not limited to:

- Increasing rates of urbanization
- Challenging terrain, shores, and waterways
- Large presence of noncombatants
- Presence of civil government institutions
- Presence of NGOs
- Presence of local and international media
- Potential sources of host nation support (labor, construction materials, and medical supplies)
- Complex social, cultural, and governmental interaction that supports urban life
- Location of key transportation hubs

The Operational Context of Joint Urban Operations

The likelihood of US forces operating in urban areas will increase should US national interests continue to promote global engagement.

The Urban Area in War

When other elements of national power are either unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained military operations. In the event of war, including warfare in or for urban areas, American military strategy calls for decisive operations aimed at defeating the enemy, attaining key political-military objectives, and minimizing casualties to US and allied forces as well as noncombatants.

The Principles of War

The principles of war are the foundation of US military doctrine, and the joint force commander (JFC) should fully understand how the principles of war relate to JUO. The principles of war include: **objective, offensive, mass, economy of force**, **maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.**

The Levels of War

The levels of war help commanders plan operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks with regard to operational and strategic objectives. When operating

in an urban area, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across all three levels; in essence, tactical actions may have strategic consequences.

What is the desired strategic end state and how does the political-military control of an urban area contribute to that desired end state?

The strategic level is the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and then develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.

What operational objectives must be achieved in urban areas to support the overall campaign plan?

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. The decision to conduct urban combat is generally made at the strategic or operational levels of war.

What units and tactics are needed to achieve control (if control is required) of an urban area?

The tactical level is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

Types of Urban Operations in War

The specific situation and setting will dictate the military capabilities necessary for an urban operation.

Urban area analysis should examine the physical and cultural environment in order to anticipate and prepare responses to a range of contingency situations.

The JFC should recognize that a number of different JUO might be an integral part of the campaign plan, including **isolating, retaining, containing, denying,** and **reducing** an urban area.

Isolating

Isolating an urban area requires employing joint forces in a manner that isolates or cuts off an enemy force inside an urban area from other enemy forces or allies.

Retaining

Retaining an urban area is a defensive action in which the fundamental objective is to prevent an urban area from falling under the political and/or military control of an adversary.

Containing

Containing an urban area describes those actions taken by joint forces to prevent an adversary's forces inside an urban area from breaking out.

Denying

Denying an urban area is a defensive action taken outside the boundaries of an urban area in an effort to prevent approaching enemy forces from gaining control of the urban area.

Reducing

Reducing an urban area is an essentially offensive action intended to eliminate an adversary's hold over all or part of the urban area.

The Urban Area in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

MOOTW principles include: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. These basic principles help ensure success and minimize losses during JUO.

MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace. The use of military forces may help keep day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, promote US influence, and protect US national interests abroad. Such operations include: **arms control, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, maritime intercept operations, support to counterinsurgency, NEOs, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency.**

Planning Considerations in Joint Urban Operations

Categories of urban areas are classified as:

- *Villages (populations of 3,000 or less)*
- *Strip areas (industrialized zones built along roads, connecting towns or cities)*
- *Towns or small cities (populations of up to 200,000)*
- *Medium cities (populations of 200,000 to one million)*
- *Large cities with associated urban sprawl (populations in excess of one million)*

Characteristics of an Urban Area

A typical urban environment is characterized by a concentration of structures, facilities, and population and is the **economic, political, and cultural focus** of the surrounding area.

An urban area is as diverse as it is complex. In order to map an urban area, the JFC should consider five essential characteristics:

- Physical
- Infrastructure
- Commercial
- Residential
- Socio-economic

Defining and understanding an urban area as a system of characteristics prior to operational planning may require extensive intelligence gathering and reliance on special operations forces (SOF), including civil

affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP) units and human intelligence (HUMINT) assets.

Information/Intelligence Required for Joint Urban Operations

Intelligence supports all aspects of operations in urban areas and provides the basis for action throughout the range of military operations. The JFC should utilize all available resources to both **see** and **know** the urban operational area. Sources of intelligence should include a combination of human, electronic, and archival data.

HUMINT is essential to understanding and communicating with the local population and to developing situational awareness.

The urban area hosts a number of nontraditional human resources that the JFC should consult in order to determine, direct, and coordinate missions. CA, PSYOP, and SOF personnel, terrain analysts, military patrols, military engineers, NGOs, United Nations (UN) military observers, and others who may have direct contact with the indigenous population can provide specialized and detailed intelligence to the operators and planning staff essential to developing and fulfilling the JFC's intent.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) in Joint Urban Operations

Effective C4ISR employs a synergistic architecture linking joint task force command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Well-planned execution of operations with the appropriate C4ISR systems gives the JFC the advantage of making timely and effective decisions. The JFC should consider the following C4ISR implications of JUO:

- **Urban area features may impose communication limitations.** Joint force units operating over, under, around, or within a city may experience internal and external difficulties communicating in the urban environment (e.g., Line of Site [LOS] communications, blockage from imposing structures, frequency spectrum interference, etc.).
- **Urban infrastructure may offer opportunities to facilitate telecommunications.** Many urban areas

are technological hubs. JFCs requiring additional telecommunications capabilities may find important communications resources accessible in the urban area of operations.

- **Aerospace assets offer unique C4ISR capabilities** that include real-time intelligence and the relay of transmissions from forces within and around an urban area.
- **SOF may be able to offer unique C4ISR capabilities to the JFC in a JUO**. SOF are trained, equipped, and organized to undertake highly specialized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions that may prove useful in JUO.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

A JFC operating in an urban environment must be prepared to deter and defend against NBC weapons.

The threat of WMD occurs across the range of military operations and may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense operations present many unique challenges to commanders operating in an urban area. The greatest problem from a civil-military operational perspective is the decontamination of infrastructure, the decontamination and possible relocation of the civilian population, and the decontamination of joint forces. A clear understanding of the effects of WMD, along with the implementation of the principles of NBC defense, can significantly reduce these challenges.

When operating in an urban area, the JFC has a priority to protect friendly forces and noncombatants and safeguard strategic centers of gravity throughout the range of operations in urban areas. The JFC should employ active security and defense measures, conduct deception operations, and be prepared to provide logistic and medical support for probable NBC defense operations. Medical operations can support and protect US personnel and enhance mission capability. JUO may require medical specialists from Reserve Component units (RC) and/or individuals not found in the armed forces, especially during post-operational activity.

Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

The increased importance of noncombatants and the likelihood of media presence magnify the importance of CMO during urban operations. The ability to communicate and collaborate effectively with allied forces, governmental agencies, NGOs, international organizations (IOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), the media, and the public will be critical to the success of any JUO. One method to facilitate information exchange and build unity of effort is to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to coordinate civilian and military actions.

In addition, civil-military support activities, such as CA and PSYOP, can help fulfill specific military, political, and economic objectives. Civil-military support activities help to:

- Create an awareness of military goals and actions during an operation
- Secure support from the civilian population
- Forge positive relationships with host nation counterparts and government officials
- Promote specific opinions, emotions, attitudes, and/or behavior of a foreign audience in support of US or coalition objectives

Public Affairs (PA)

Military means alone may be insufficient to meet national or coalition objectives.

PA is important because news media can significantly affect the execution of military operations, and particularly JUO. This is due to the complex relationship among information, the public (international and domestic), and policy formulation. The mission of joint PA is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audiences, and to ensure that public information is consistent with national and operational security.

Interagency Communication and Coordination

Commanders and military planners may have to integrate and coordinate their activities with those of other organizations addressing needs that are beyond the capabilities of military forces, including pre-hostility, combat, and post-hostility responsibilities.

Such organizations may include governmental agencies and their components, such as the US State Department and the US Agency for International Development; as well as a variety of NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

The JFC has a number of tools to establish the infrastructure for interagency cooperation: the country team, CMOC, executive steering group (ESG), liaison sections, humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC), joint force assessment team, and political advisor (POLAD).

Multinational Coalitions and Urban Operations

The effectiveness of multinational operations will be improved by establishing rapport and harmony among multinational commanders.

Coalition urban operations are normally fraught with doctrinal, cultural, and language differences that challenge the overall coordination of the mission and the ability to achieve unity of effort. Lack of understanding and misperceptions can result in unanticipated and counterproductive constraints on the operation. Respecting multinational partners and their ideas, cultures, religions, and customs is essential to the success of any JUO. In addition, the JFC should ensure that missions are assigned appropriately with regard to each multinational partner's capabilities and resources.

Operating as a Joint Team

The JFC should understand the preeminent need to conduct JUO as a joint team. Urban areas present multi-faceted challenges to military forces. This is exacerbated by the fact that a single JUO may include missions as varied as humanitarian assistance and combat. Operational and environmental complications will require the application of diverse capabilities that transcend typical Service boundaries. This means that the JFC should: **plan** for JUO with the full range of joint assets in mind; **train** interactively from the task force level down to the lowest tactical level with these joint assets; **use** the most appropriate combination of joint assets; and **cooperate** with all relevant military, government, and nongovernmental agencies.

The availability of non-lethal weapon systems offers a greater range of options to forces operating under challenging urban conditions. ROE must be clearly articulated and understood to establish the role of non-lethal weapons as an additional means of employing force, for the specific purpose of limiting the probability of death or serious injury to noncombatants or, in some circumstances, to enemy combatants.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

The proximity of forces, number and location of noncombatants, media presence, and other factors can rapidly alter tactical and operational conditions. The JFC should determine ROE and legal restrictions/requirements in advance in order to understand the limits of command responsibilities to keep order, maintain essential services, and protect the local populace from acts of violence.

ROE dictate **when, where, against whom,** and **how** force can be used. These directives recognize an individual's inherent right of self-defense and the commander's authority and obligation to use all necessary means for unit and individual defense. ROE should be tactically sound, flexible, understandable, enforceable, consistent with core combat capabilities, and disseminated at all levels.

Establishment and maintenance of logical and effective ROE are crucial to force protection, given the complexities of the urban environment, and are critical to mission success. Inappropriate, unclear, or poorly written ROE may result in unnecessary collateral damage and the death or injury of noncombatants, seriously hampering an operation. This is largely due to the close proximity of noncombatants and their property to military forces during joint operations in urban areas. Additionally, many MOOTW take place in urban areas, which often raise a variety of controversial political-military issues.

A good legal advisor is a force multiplier and is essential to the JFC's ability to accomplish the mission in a lawful manner.

Legal Issues

Urban operations are likely to involve significant legal issues. For example, issues such as curfew, evacuation, forced labor, civilian resistance, and protection or use of property should be considered by the JFC. The JFC's staff judge advocate (SJA) should be familiar with the laws related to legal assistance, military justice, administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, and operational and international law. The entire campaign plan should be reviewed for compliance with domestic and international law. The SJA will be the most vital resource in the process of understanding the myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations that can complicate JUO.

Logistics

A logistics element, such as a water purification company, may precede other military forces or may be the only force deployed for an urban operation. The JUO concept of sustainment is to "push" supplies and material to employed units until the urban objective is secured, then transition to a "pull" concept whereby engaged units obtain required replenishment stocks from designated sources of supply, and finally, to transfer responsibilities to a logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP) as soon as possible. In the urban area, overtasking of resources may become a major factor. The J4 can help de-conflict these potential problems and coordinate individual component logistic requirements.

Case Studies of Urban Operations

These case studies represent the broad spectrum of urban operations and highlight the specific challenges that a JFC may face when operating in an urban area.

The complexity of joint operations, the increasing capabilities of today's forces, and the lethality and accuracy of modern weaponry exacerbate JUO operational considerations. Analyzing military history in the context of modern operational principles allows leaders and planners to apply the lessons learned from past conflicts to help solve the military problems of today.

Because urban areas complicate military operations, the JFC should devote special attention to the unique challenges that future JUO may present.

The case studies were chosen for their relevance to JUO and were researched using a rigorous methodology that focused on the key planning considerations that influence JUO. The case studies are by no means comprehensive operational histories; rather, each case study highlights a few of the major observations most applicable to future JUO.

The Battle for Grozny

The Battle for Grozny is an example of a high-intensity urban battle and provides significant lessons on the inherent difficulties of isolating an enemy in a city and the challenges of maneuvering in, around, above, and/or below an urban area.

The invasion of Panama City

During the invasion of Panama City, US forces demonstrated the importance of HUMINT in urban battlefield preparation and the utility of SOF as precision strike forces in urban areas.

Operations in Port-au-Prince

Operations in Port-au-Prince illustrated the importance of understanding the political, social, and geographic realities in the urban area and demonstrated how the threat of force can be used effectively to achieve diplomatic solutions during humanitarian crises.

Operations in Mogadishu

Operations in Mogadishu demonstrated the importance of understanding the political, historical, and cultural context for violence in an urban area before defining operational objectives. It also demonstrated the need for synchronization of the command and control architecture in the rapidly changing urban fight.

The British experience in Belfast

The British experience in Belfast illustrates the ways in which a city can be divided by race, ethnicity, or religion and the complications that factionalism in an urban area can pose to a JFC.

Operations in Sarajevo

Operations in Sarajevo illuminated the successful application of aerospace power to help modify, control, or support a force defending an urban area.

The NEO performed in Monrovia

The NEO performed in Monrovia, Liberia in 1996 is an example of an operation that has become an increasingly frequent feature of the landscape of US military actions in the post-Cold War era.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

To ensure the US military has the ability to effectively operate on the urban battlefield, the CINCs and Services must continue to expand their present efforts of study and understanding of the urban environment and must develop an integrated approach that optimizes key warfighting capabilities for future operations on urban terrain.

Defense Planning Guidance: FY 2000–2005

A. Scope and Purpose

In light of the wide range of recent operations conducted in urban areas, the US Armed Forces have focused their attention on the unique challenges of joint urban operations (JUO). To meet these challenges, the US military has begun to rigorously examine urban operations from an operational level—the perspective most applicable to the joint force commander (JFC) who must lead US military personnel in these complex undertakings. **This Handbook is a primer on joint urban operations. It provides JFCs, their staffs, and other interested parties with fundamental principles and operational-level considerations for the planning and conduct of joint urban operations. Although the handbook is not a doctrinal publication, it is consistent with joint and Service doctrine. Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations," when published, will provide joint doctrine for JUO.**

JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," states that a JFC will consider the following prior to and during a joint operation: preparation of the theater, isolation of the enemy, movement to attain operational reach, special operations, protection of forces and their freedom of action, control of space, and constant assessment of the physical environment. The application of each of these fundamental considerations in JUO is significantly different from their application in other operational environments. This is true for two reasons.

First, urban areas complicate military operations in ways that other environments do not. The three-dimensional, man-made geography and the presence of large noncombatant populations in urban areas present unique challenges to a JFC undertaking an urban operation. These challenges include impediments to maneuver and the application of firepower, due to the density of man-made construction and the possible need to minimize collateral damage. In the urban environment, a JFC must develop and employ innovative concepts and capabilities to overcome these challenges. For example, non-lethal weapons may be particularly useful in the urban setting by providing the commander with the flexibility to adapt a more fluid approach to urban areas and allowing subordinates the freedom of action to employ measured military force to accomplish their mission.

The influence of the complex social, cultural, and political systems, which guide the daily lives of urban inhabitants, compounds the physical difficulties associated with urban operations. For example, failure to understand the nuances of social interaction between the noncombatant populace of Mogadishu and the various clans that vied for control of the urban area seriously hampered the United Nations' (UN) ability to negotiate between these elements during UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II). The JFC should recognize that military involvement with noncombatants can create both opportunities, such as improved human intelligence (HUMINT), and dangers, such as civilian hostility and violence.

Each urban area has its own distinctive geographic, political, military, diplomatic, economic, demographic, and cultural characteristics. It is important to note that each of these factors changes from an operation in one urban area to another. For example, in the initial forced entry plan into Port-au-Prince during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY in 1994, the US specifically targeted the urban area's telecommunication nodes to impede the communication ability of Haitian leaders. Such an action would have meant little during American involvement in Mogadishu, wherein Aideed supporters lacked access to telecommunications systems and often used drums to send messages throughout the urban area.

Second, the inherent complexity of urban areas yields numerous decisive points that a JFC can exploit in order to threaten the enemy's center of gravity. A JFC may accomplish objectives in an urban environment through a wide variety of means. A JFC responsible for evicting an enemy force from an urban area could consider choosing from a number of decisive points, or any combination of these, upon which the enemy depends. For example, the JFC could cut off an enemy's power supply by shutting down specific parts of an urban electric grid in a manner that affects the enemy while maintaining the supply of power in noncombatant areas.

When targeting decisive points, the JFC must be aware of the significant concerns regarding the proportionality of applied force and its impact on noncombatants. Fortunately, the JFC can choose from a diverse joint Service arsenal to accomplish mission objectives. Among many other options, the JFC could: strike telecommunication nodes with air assets; use psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) units to influence the urban area's populace; employ non-lethal technology against key facilities to disrupt normal operations; and/or, if circumstances require it, insert ground forces into the urban area to confront the enemy. Again, it is imperative that the objectives, and the means used to achieve them, meet the test of proportionality (i.e., incidental injury or collateral damage must not be excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by an attack).



Figure I-1. Selected Post-Cold War Joint Urban Operations

Joint Urban Operations

Joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features

Figure I-2. Joint Urban Operations

B. Basic Terminology

JUO are all joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. By definition then, the two key characteristics that make urban environments more complex than other environments are man-made construction and the density of noncombatants. JUO include all joint military operations conducted within, in the immediate vicinity of, and/or in the airspace of a designated **urban area** (to include the space underneath urban areas comprising sewers, utility and subway tunnels, etc.).

Technically, urban areas denote plots of land wherein population density equals or exceeds one thousand people per square mile (approximately three square kilometers), and in which an average of at least one building stands per two acres of land. This broad definition encompasses the shantytowns of developing countries, villages, small towns, suburbia, aggregate networks of urban areas such as Los Angeles County, and major metropolitan areas such as Tokyo. **However, a better practical definition for a JFC is that an urban area is any locale in which man-made construction and a large noncombatant population are the dominant features, have important operational and tactical implications, and may have strategic significance.**

The Urban Area

- Population density equals or exceeds one thousand people per square mile (approximately three square kilometers)
- An average of at least one building per every two acres
- A practical definition: any locale in which man-made terrain and a large noncombatant population dominate operational considerations

Figure I-3. The Urban Area

JUO encompass the full range of military operations, from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to major theater wars, including actions such as ground forces entering an urban area to defeat an enemy force, humanitarian assistance for noncombatants within an urban area, and/or air strikes against forces trying to capture or subdue an urban area. For example, during the US military campaign in the Persian Gulf War, aerospace power was used to destroy command and control (C2) assets in Baghdad; Patriot missiles were used to defend Tel Aviv from Scud attacks; and ground forces were used to evict Iraqi forces from Khafji.

C. The Role of Urban Areas in Military History

The US military has a long history of conducting urban operations, from the Revolutionary War (Boston and New York), to armed intervention in Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion, to recent noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) in Sierra Leone and Albania. Military leaders have traditionally viewed urban areas as high-value objectives to be held against or captured from enemies for several reasons:

- Urban areas historically evolve in strategic locations
- Urban areas often hold symbolic value that military forces can exploit to produce political effects
- Influential governmental/societal decision-making nodes are generally concentrated in urban areas

Historically Strategic Locations

Urban areas often evolve in strategically important locations. Many urban areas were originally situated to facilitate defense and/or exploitation of key geographical chokepoints and lines of transportation and communication, such as ports and overland trade routes. As these urban areas prospered, their population and strategic importance grew. Some of these urban areas have survived and have become extensive urban areas, supporting suburbs, residential areas, financial districts, etc. These urban areas still have the ability to dominate sea and land lines of communication, enhancing their value as military objectives. For example, Budapest, the capital of Hungary, owes its location in part to the long-held strategic value of the fertile basin that it occupies on the west bank of the Danube River.

Due, in part, to the urban area's critical geographical value, the Soviet Red Army fought to seize Budapest from German forces during World War II. The role of strategic geography in the Battle of Budapest cannot be understated: the urban area was the gateway to routes to key locales, such as Vienna, southern Bavaria, and southwest Hungary, where Germany held its last crude oil plants in Europe. The geographical value of the urban area, in turn, made Budapest politically important to the Russians and helped reinforce the German decision to defend Budapest at great cost.

The Symbolic Value of Urban areas

Urban areas also often hold symbolic political, social, and/or cultural value. Military operations can target urban areas in order to exploit this symbolic value to attain broader campaign objectives. While Budapest was strategically significant, its value as a political symbol to both Nazi Germany and the USSR made it one of the most contested territories during the war. Germany tried to hold the urban area at great cost because, as the capital of Germany's sole remaining European ally, it represented one of the Nazi's last political footholds in Eastern Europe. Its loss would have significantly undermined Nazi political and military credibility and morale.

Similarly, Stalin believed that the seizure of Budapest, along with the capture of Vienna, would increase his bargaining power at the upcoming Allied Summit in Yalta. He regarded Soviet occupation of these important urban areas, both commonly viewed as European political and cultural capitals, as essential to enhancing the USSR's apparent contributions to the war effort. In both cases, Budapest's symbolic value was an overriding factor in the decisions to conduct urban operations.

Non-state actors, such as terrorists, provide another example of the symbolic importance of urban areas in military operations. They can exploit the social, political, and/or religious importance of an urban area by striking high-visibility urban targets. Hamas' repeated bombings of civilian Jewish targets in Jerusalem is an example of this phenomenon. Tupac Amaru's capture of the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru in 1997 is another example.

The Concentration of Decision-Making Nodes and the Strategic Center of Gravity

Urban areas generally function as the social, economic, and political centers of societies and often represent strategic centers of gravity. Important commercial, state, and cultural sites, such as religious and cultural centers, government offices, embassies, factories, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), among others, are usually located in urbanized areas. This concentration of important societal centers increases the importance of urban areas in military campaigns. Urban areas facilitate formal and informal civilian and military interaction and can offer ready access to important resources, such as labor, water, technology, information, etc. Moreover, military forces can exploit the critical nodes within an urban area to influence a larger campaign effort and control the enemy's center of gravity. For example, during the planned 1994 invasion of Haiti, the US military focused on Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince. Due to the concentration of key governmental command and communication nodes within the urban area, control of the Haitian capital would, in effect, result in control of the country.

D. The Inherent Challenges of Joint Urban Operations

Military leaders historically have perceived urban areas as strategically significant locations. Changes in the strategic environment, such as global media, post-Cold War international political turbulence, and the emerging importance of non-state actors, have complicated the planning and execution of urban operations in significant ways. The combination of these two factors has made it impossible to ignore the challenges of operating in an urban area.

Accordingly, JUO are often unique in light of the significant physical challenges and complex social characteristics of urban areas. These inter-related characteristics may include, but are not limited to:

- Increasing rates of urbanization
- Challenging terrain, shores, and waterways
- Presence of noncombatants
- Presence of civil government institutions
- Presence of NGOs
- Presence of local and international media
- Potential sources of host nation support (labor, construction material, and medical supplies)
- Complex social, cultural, and governmental interaction that supports urban habitation
- Location of key transportation hubs

Increased Rate of Global Urbanization

Demographic and population trends indicate that the world is urbanizing. Consider the following indicators of urbanization:

- Over the past forty years, the number of urban dwellers has more than tripled, growing from 737 million in 1950 to about 2.5 billion in 1993

- In 1970, there were only three urban areas in Asia with more than eight million inhabitants; at current rates of growth, Asia will contain more than seventeen urban areas with more than eight million inhabitants by 2010
- While it required 150 years for the population of New York City to reach eight million people, Mexico City and Sao Paulo each gained that many citizens in 25 years
- According to UN estimates, the urban population of developing countries increases by about 150,000 per day; projections indicate that if this trend is constant, three-fifths of the world's population—five billion human beings—will live in urban areas by 2015

Given the current rate of urbanization, the potential of US forces operating in urban areas is likely to increase. Urbanization can enhance political stability by generating industrialization and economic growth which can yield jobs, a higher overall standard of living, and an educated, relatively satisfied populace that is unlikely to foment civil unrest. On the other hand, poorly regulated urbanization can result in a weak infrastructure, a fragile economic base, and a general lack of resources, making it difficult to absorb new inhabitants. Accordingly, this can encourage the creation of a restless, hostile population with few options for improving its standard of living and in which rival socio-economic classes and ethnic groups exist in close proximity to one another.

In addition, rapidly growing urban areas can magnify and aggravate pre-existing intra-state cleavages, spreading unrest and potentially facilitating regional instability. Disturbances in a single key urban area can affect an entire nation, and possibly even other regions. Under the right conditions, this has the potential to result in an explosive situation. Urbanization is especially problematic in the developing world, wherein the resources necessary for urban growth are relatively scarce, intra-state conflict is more frequent, and the rate of urbanization is disproportionately large.



Figure I-4. Population Projections Through 2050

Events in the urban area of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh, India during the early 1990s illustrate how conditions within an urban area can generate trans-regional violence. The Hindu and Muslim communities of India had often launched terror attacks against each other, mirroring ethnic antagonism in other parts of the country. However, ethnic tension came to a head in 1992 with the destruction of the Babri Masid Mosque in Ayodhya by a local Hindu group. This singular act exacerbated national Hindu-Muslim rivalry, causing a massive wave of violence that spread throughout India. Of the 1,500 lives consumed by this violence, 95 percent were killed in urban areas. The violence struck Ahmedabad and Bombay most seriously, with acts of murder, rape, and arson occurring months after the demolition of the Mosque. Surat, Calcutta, Bhopal, and Bangalore suffered from similar atrocities.

Urbanized Terrain

Urban areas, from major metropolises to suburban developments to shantytowns, share some common physical attributes that influence military activity. Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of a "natural" landscape coupled with man-made construction. This combination of natural terrain and artificial infrastructure provides a variety of places for opposing forces to hide and strike, hinders observation and communication, and impedes fire and movement. Adversaries may be able to exploit these characteristics to thwart the advanced

technological capabilities and superior training of the US military, negating, to some degree, precision strike and dominant maneuver capabilities. The JFC should consider the importance of unit boundaries, troop exposure, and weapons effects; however, the challenge of planning and conducting joint urban operations goes well beyond terrain consideration.

The Presence of Noncombatants in Urban Areas

What most distinguishes urban areas from other operational environments is that urban areas can be viewed as dynamic organisms that exist for and by virtue of the people that inhabit them. As in all organisms, urban areas are composed of "systems of systems"— multiple, inter-related systems of streets, buildings, governments, communications, law enforcement, culture, transportation, etc. Striking any one of these systems can have unintended collateral effects on another, inter-related system, just as striking one building within the closed confines of an urban area can impose collateral damage on a nearby "friendly" building.

The JFC should understand how interconnected electric power, water distribution, sewer, and sanitation systems can affect noncombatants in an urban area. The same infrastructure that serves the JFC's operational area also sustains the lives of urban-dwelling noncombatants. The residents of an urban area depend upon this infrastructure for survival. Damage to urban power, water, and transportation systems may dramatically affect the livelihood, if not the lives, of local inhabitants. Infrastructure damage could potentially create a refugee situation that the commander would have to address immediately, as well as increase the cost of rebuilding the country's infrastructure during post-conflict operations.

In some cases, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, the safety and well being of the urban area and its inhabitants are fundamental objectives of the operation. The JFC may be required to protect infrastructure and the lives of noncombatants for a variety of practical reasons. In a situation in which the JFC may be required to engage enemy forces in combat within an urban area, callous treatment of noncombatants may discourage civilians from providing US forces with invaluable HUMINT assistance and may

even encourage civilians to support anti-US forces within the JFC's area of responsibility (AOR). Furthermore, local and international media coverage of US forces may focus on the suffering of innocent civilians, jeopardizing domestic and international public support for the JUO or bringing undesirable international pressure to bear on US policy.

The adversary may not hesitate to use human shields or human barriers to delay, deny, or deter the JFC's maneuvering and targeting efforts. In this case, non-lethal weapons may provide a more flexible means of response in order to protect friendly forces, influence the actions of the enemy and noncombatants, and minimize collateral damage. Further, the JFC should consider using non-lethal weapons if restrictions on lethal weapons are implemented due to noncombatant and collateral damage considerations.

The JFC should also consider extensive coordination with civil government, local and international NGOs, and other social and cultural institutions. These organizations may help facilitate relations between the host nation, the military, and the local populace and can be potential sources of host nation support (labor, construction material, medical supplies, etc.). **How** and **to what extent** the JFC protects the urban infrastructure and noncombatants will vary depending upon the JFC's mission and campaign plan. **However, JFCs must always be cognizant of the interdependence between the urban area and the lives that it sustains.**

Vignette: Collateral Damage and the Use of Force

Hue, Vietnam: Tet Counter-Offensive

The battle for Hue illustrates the tension inherent in modern urban combat between minimizing one's own casualties and minimizing collateral damage. In the battle for Hue in 1968, the US clearly made the decision in favor of low US casualties, eventually lifting all restrictions on the use of firepower except for the prohibition of targeting historically significant buildings and religious shrines. Ultimately, this decision contributed to extensive collateral damage in Hue and failed to prevent extremely high US casualties in the high-tempo urban battle. In part, this was due to the enemy's defensive use of the urban area's imperial fortress, which forced US Marine Corps and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces into costly house-to-house fighting. Hue illustrates how the defender's use of urban terrain features can provide a significant advantage in the urban environment. Although tension between minimizing one's own casualties and minimizing collateral damage is inherent to all combat, the advantage of the defender in urban combat may significantly exacerbate that tension, presenting extremely difficult trade-offs for the JFC. The difficulties experienced by the Marines and the ARVN in Hue demonstrate the challenge and importance of finding the right balance between those trade-offs.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CHAPTER TWO

THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

The commander charged with making decisions needs to understand the operational and strategic implications of a tactical struggle in an urban area.

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
MCWP 3-35.3, April 1998

A. Overview

Joint operations in an urban area are three-dimensional in nature, encompassing military activity in, above, beneath, and/or around urban areas, and are conducted during war or MOOTW. **The JFC may have to conduct a variety of operations in urban areas to support overall campaign objectives**. During the formulation of the campaign plan, the JFC should consider whether the political-military control of either all or part of a particular urban area supports national and/or theater strategic objectives. If it is concluded that national and/or theater strategic objectives necessitate the military control of an urban area, the JFC should determine what degree of control is required over the urban area to successfully execute the campaign plan.



Figure II-1. Urban Operations in Context

In the past, the criterion for victory during combat operations in an urban area was the defeat of the enemy; during urban MOOTW, it was the successful completion of the assigned military task. Today, there are additional criteria for victory and/or mission success in an urban area. Foremost among these is the heightened emphasis on keeping collateral damage to the urban area's civilian populace and infrastructure to an absolute minimum. In order to meet some of these new challenges when operating in an urban environment, the JFC may need to employ innovative capabilities, such as non-lethal weapons and/or precision guided munitions, to reduce the probability of fatalities, permanent injuries, and/or physical destruction.

Another criterion important in JUO that the JFC must consider is the health and safety of the joint force. The prevalence of disease and poor sanitation conditions in many of the developing world's urban areas could serve as an additional constraint on the employment of joint forces in a particular urban area. The JFC may need to provide special water purification systems, medical supplies, housekeeping materials, and hygiene procedures to ensure adequate living accommodations for a joint force operating in an urban environment.

B. The Urban Area in War

When other elements of national power are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained military operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. In the event of war, including warfare in or around urban areas, US military strategy calls for decisive operations aimed at defeating the enemy, attaining key political-military objectives, and minimizing casualties to US and allied forces and noncombatants.

For example, urban areas figured prominently in the planning and conduct of the Gulf War. The liberation of Kuwait City was one of US Central Command's (CENTCOM) key theater military objectives. Forty-five targets were struck in Baghdad as part of coalition air operations directed at Iraqi political military leadership and command and control. As well, Iraqi Scud attacks against Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Haifa required the coalition to deploy *Patriot* missile systems to defend those urban areas and conduct a vigorous counter-Scud air campaign. Finally, the Iraqi capture of the undefended, evacuated border town of Khafji compelled the coalition to expel Iraqi forces from that urban area in fierce ground combat while destroying Iraqi reinforcements from the air.

The Principles of War[1]

The additional considerations of joint operations in urban areas do not negate the **principles of war**—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. They are the foundation of US military doctrine, and the JFC should understand how the principles of war relate to JUO:

- The **objective** of an urban operation should be clear from the beginning, and it should directly contribute to the national strategic objective, as defined by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and to the theater strategic objectives as defined by the appropriate combatant commander. Urban areas have been key objectives in recent major US military operations. For example, the urban areas of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Hatien were the decisive points during

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the US intervention in Haiti. Gaining control of the country meant first gaining control of these key urban areas and critical facilities in them, such as the Presidential Palace, the International Airport, police and military headquarters, and key communications centers.

- **Offensive** action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. The importance of offensive action in urban areas is underscored by the need to retain the initiative while maintaining freedom of action. The Israeli offensive that resulted in the expulsion of Jordanian forces from the urban area of Jerusalem in 1967 highlights the value of carefully planned and focused offensive actions in an urban area.

- The purpose of **mass** is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the desired place and time to achieve decisive results. Massing effects in urban combat, rather than concentrating forces, may enable even numerically inferior joint forces to achieve decisive results. For example, US forces employed massing effects during combat operations to liberate Kuwait City in 1991. Long-range artillery and bombers targeting strategic points in and around Kuwait City, along with the threat of an amphibious attack, were used to concentrate combat power without having to send ground troops into the urban area.

- **Economy of force** is the measured allocation of available combat power needed to successfully execute distinct tasks in an urban area. In Operation JUST CAUSE, the US intervention in Panama, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) had an obvious advantage in the amount of force it could bring to bear, but it ensured economy of force by selecting to strike critical centers of gravity, the vast majority of which were in dense urban terrain. US commanders followed sound doctrine to ensure that appropriate force was applied against these decisive points. In addition, CA forces were used as a force multiplier

to create synergy among NGOs, the host nation, and US government agencies.

- The challenge of **maneuver** in a JUO is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the application of military force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects friendly forces. Surface maneuver in many urban areas will be slow and difficult. For example, the surprise attack by the North Vietnamese on Hue during the Tet Offensive (1968) involved house-to-house combat and lasted for a month. The North Vietnamese lost 45,000 men, over half of the strength they committed. The JFC should account for the increased risks of maneuver in an urban area when planning and executing JUO.
- **Unity of command**, regardless of the environment, means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in JUO in pursuit of a common purpose. The absence of unity of command is cited as one of the critical weaknesses of US forces that operated in the urban area of Mogadishu during US joint force and multinational operations in Somalia in 1993.
- **Security** in urban warfare results from measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. In urban operations, this principle may also apply to security of noncombatants. Noncombatants may be involved in rioting, harassing, attacking, and/or looting. At times, sectors of the population may direct violence against US forces. In such circumstances, non-lethal weapons may provide commanders with an ability to influence the situation favorably and reduce the risk of noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. Effective security requires prudent risk management, rather than over-cautiousness, and can enhance freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. For example, the rapid deployment by strategic airlift of theater-based SOF to Monrovia, Liberia during Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in 1996, and their augmentation by a theater-based Army airborne infantry company, guaranteed the

security of the US Embassy, US citizens, and the joint force during the ensuing NEO.

- **Surprise** can help the commander shift the balance of combat power during JUO in the hopes of achieving success well beyond the effort expended. The JFC will need to be familiar with the three-dimensional characteristics of the urban area, and units should use these characteristics to their advantage. For instance, helicopters may use buildings for concealment and ground forces may use buildings and underground passageways to move to unexpected attack positions. Forces within an urban area which are essentially non-mobile, such as headquarters and logistics staging areas, can use landline communications to avoid many of the traditional signatures which intelligence systems can track. On the other hand, the JFC should be aware that an adversary may be more familiar with the urban area and be able to better hide observers and report on opposing troop movements. For example, during the battle for Grozny, Chechen forces were well acquainted with all access routes into and within the urban area and used small, highly mobile units to ambush and trap Russian troops.
- **Simplicity** contributes to successful JUO through clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders that minimize misunderstanding and confusion. For example, the British operational strategy during prolonged operations since 1969 in the urban area of Belfast has maintained simplicity by focusing on three objectives—attrition, deterrence, and reassurance—throughout the campaign.

The Levels of War[2]

Modern warfare on open terrain—the preferred form of combat for modern military forces—is a complex and challenging undertaking, requiring tremendous resources, training, and organization. Further, warfare in, above, and/or around a major urban area, with its high population density and wide range of urban construction and supporting infrastructure, might negate the traditional

strengths enjoyed by modern military forces on open terrain. Therefore, before committing forces to operations in an urban area, the JFC should consider the relative importance of that urban area to specific campaign objectives as well as determine how particular operations in the urban area, if undertaken, would relate to the three **levels of war.**

The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels of war, in general, are: **strategic, operational**, and **tactical.** They apply to war, MOOTW, and to all joint or single-service operations conducted in, above, and/or around an urban area. Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types of forces are not associated with a particular level. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.

Ideally, the JFC chooses the time and place for combat operations. The levels of war construct helps commanders plan operations, allocate resources, assign tasks, and maintain the appropriate perspective on urban operations with regard to operational and strategic objectives. The JFC's ability to do this is largely a function of the abilities of the joint force to maintain the initiative and shape events. Advances in technology, information, and media reporting, along with the compression of time-space relationships, contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. Commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels and change the course of an operation. In essence, tactical actions may have strategic consequences.

The Strategic Level

The strategic level is the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance and then develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. The combatant commander is usually associated with this level of war at the theater strategic level. At the strategic level of war, the JFC should ask: **What is the desired national or multinational strategic**

end state and how does the political-military control of an urban area contribute to that desired end state?

The Operational Level

At the operational level, campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. A campaign plan is a series of related military operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. It requires the synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces to attain national and multinational strategic objectives. The campaign plan must identify the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.

The focus at this level is on operational art—the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Success in combat requires mastery of the ability to wage a decisive campaign that takes advantage of US strengths and capitalizes on the enemy's weaknesses. Operational art translates the JFC's strategy into operational design, and ultimately tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. The decision to conduct urban combat is generally made at the strategic or operational level of war.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in prioritizing their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking combat, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements with relative attrition as the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation.

At the operational level, the JFC should ask: **What operational objectives must be achieved in urban areas to support the overall campaign plan that is required to achieve strategic objectives? What activities and events, and sequencing of these events, are needed to achieve operational objectives? What resources and application of resources are required to bring about and sustain these activities and events? What degree of political and/or military control of the urban area is necessary, if it is necessary at all?** History has shown that some urban battles were required to achieve strategic objectives. The decision to accept or reject battle in an urban area is one of many operational considerations faced by the JFC during the planning and conduct of a joint campaign.



Figure II-2. Urban Operations: Levels of War

The Tactical Level

At the tactical level of war, the JFC must decide how to employ units in order to meet mission objectives. Decisions at the tactical level include determining the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to achieve these mission objectives. Combat engagements are normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat, and can include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer, involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces, and could affect the course of a campaign. At the tactical level, the JFC should ask: **What units and tactics are needed to achieve control of an urban area at the degree required (if control is required) to support the campaign plan?**

Operational Effects on Urban Areas During War

When developing strategic plans and appropriate tactics, the JFC should recognize that there are a number of different operational effects on urban areas that might be an integral part of the campaign plan. These include, but are not limited to, **isolating, retaining, containing, denying,** and **reducing** an urban area. Military history offers numerous examples of these types of effects on urban areas.

- **Isolating** an urban area involves employing joint forces in a manner that isolates or cuts off an enemy force inside an urban area from other enemy forces or allies. US Marines and US Army paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division did this in Operation POWERPACK, the US armed intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965–1966. During the course of Operation POWERPACK, US troops established a line of communication (LOC) in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic's war-torn capital, which split rebel forces and prevented them from mounting an insurgency in the Dominican countryside. This ultimately prevented the rebels from taking over the country through military aggression.

- **Retaining** an urban area is a defensive action in which the fundamental objective is to prevent an urban area from falling under the political and/or military control of an adversary. The struggle of the Soviets to prevent the capture of the urban area of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) by the Germans during World War II is one of the most famous examples of this type of urban campaign. This type of operation can also occur during MOOTW, an example being NATO's efforts to prevent Bosnian Serb forces from exerting military control over the urban area of Sarajevo.

- **Containing** an urban area describes those actions taken by joint forces to prevent an adversary's forces inside an urban area from breaking out. In 1989, US forces in Panama took control of the airport, seaports, and key Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) strongholds within and around Panama City in order to contain the PDF and prevent the arrival of reinforcements.

- **Denying** an urban area is a defensive action taken outside the boundaries of an urban area in an effort to prevent approaching enemy forces from gaining control of the urban area. The combination of lengthening German supply lines, the early onset of winter, and Soviet defensive efforts were all elements of the successful denial of Moscow to German forces in 1941.

- **Reducing** an urban area is an essentially offensive action intended to eliminate an adversary's hold over all or part of an urban area. Following the Allied landings at Normandy during the Second World War, the US Army's first broad experience with urban combat occurred during the capture of Brest. Brest's port facilities were considered essential to supporting further Allied operations in France. The campaign to reduce Brest started on 21 August 1944, and its German defenders held out until the end of September. Another example would be Russian military operations to regain control of key sections of the urban area of Grozny from Chechen rebels in 1995 and again in 1999–2000.

C. The Urban Area in MOOTW[3]

The United States acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests, and achieve strategic aims in a variety of ways depending upon the nature of the strategic and operational environment. MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace. Such operations include: arms control, combating terrorism, consequence management, DoD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities (MSCA), nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency, NEOs, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency. MOOTW are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces, units deployed from another theater or the continental United States (CONUS), and/or a combination of both. By definition, they do not necessarily involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

Basic Principles

MOOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. There are six principles that must be considered in order to achieve the desired objectives of MOOTW, and all are applicable to MOOTW in urban areas. Application of these principles helps ensure success and minimizes losses by focusing on aspects of MOOTW that deserve careful consideration. They are as follows:

- The JFC should direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable **objective.** In order to understand the principle of objective, the JFC must appreciate what constitutes mission success. The JFC should be aware of changes in the urban environment and/or political atmosphere that might necessitate a change in military objectives. An objective could be the physical object of an action taken, such as the seizure of a building, or something less concrete, such as limiting excessive US casualties

incurred during a given operation in order to prevent the abandonment of the mission.

- **Unity of effort** in every operation ensures that all forces are directed to a common purpose. In a JUO, unity of effort can be complicated by a variety of international, foreign, and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. The JFC must strive to achieve consensus between all pertinent actors and establish procedures for liaison and coordination to ensure unity of effort.
- **Security** is essential and requires denying hostile factions the opportunity to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. The JFC must enhance freedom of action in a JUO by reducing the vulnerability of military forces, civilians, and/or participating agencies to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Furthermore, the JFC should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. The JFC should require all personnel to stay alert even in a non-hostile operation and be ready to transition to combat should circumstances change.
- **Restraint** in JUO helps prevent collateral damage by balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and political objectives. Due to the presence of the media and international attention that JUO often receive, excessive use of force can potentially damage the legitimacy of an operation. In addition, the JFC may be required to maintain the viability of the urban area. For example, excessive collateral damage to the urban infrastructure could potentially result in a refugee crisis or urban migration. Restraint is best achieved when rules of engagement (ROE) address all anticipated situations and are consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Due to the political sensitivities involved in MOOTW, ROE are often more restrictive than in wartime. ROE are a measure of restraint.

- **Perseverance** allows for a measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. The JFC should assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of long-term political and military objectives. In a JUO, this may involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts. The JFC should keep in mind that in MOOTW, the military may not be the primary player and strategic gains may only be accomplished over the long-term. For example, Operation PROVIDE PROMISE (1992-1996) consisted of an airlift/drop of humanitarian relief supplies into Sarajevo and other key urban areas throughout Bosnia. The airlift began on 3 July 1992 and was an on-going, four-year effort to protect the urban area of Sarajevo and maintain an air bridge into Bosnia to deliver humanitarian assistance.

- **Legitimacy** is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or correctness of a set of actions. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. Conversely, if an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element in JUO due to the impact that urban operations may have on the noncombatant population residing in the operational area. The reporting (positive or negative) of the local and international media may also affect the perceived legitimacy of the operation.

Types of MOOTW in Urban Areas

The types of urban operations are extensive and represent the wide range of MOOTW in which US forces may be involved. Some operations in urban areas may be conducted for only one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are peacetime military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A NEO, such as Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, the joint NEO in Monrovia, Liberia in 1996, is another example of a military operation conducted in an urban area for a

single purpose. Military operations in urban areas also can have multiple purposes, such as operations in Somalia in 1992 and 1995 (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF, RESTORE HOPE, and UNOSOM II) which combined humanitarian assistance efforts with peace enforcement operations. JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," includes the following as types of MOOTW:

- **Arms control.** Normally associated with supporting international agreements controlling nuclear weapon systems, arms control also can include efforts to control and/or collect conventional weapons during a peace operation, such as the one US joint forces were involved in during operations in Mogadishu in 1993.
- **Combatting terrorism.**[4] This includes anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). As the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 attests, joint forces will need to take effective measures to combat terrorism during JUO.
- **DOD support to counterdrug operations.**[5] In counterdrug operations, joint forces support federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States. For example, USSOUTHCOM, while not the lead player, supports counterdrug operations in Peru. The command's roles include detection and monitoring; sharing intelligence; providing logistics support, communications, and planning assistance; and training and equipping host nation counterdrug forces. Many of these support activities are based in or coordinated from urban areas, such as the ground-based radar facility in Iquitos that USSOUTHCOM established to help detect drug traffickers.
- **Enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations.** These are operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of

certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. While not normally associated with urban areas, the conduct of this type of MOOTW could require the extensive and dedicated surveillance of an urban port area. For example, during the course of more than three years, both NATO and WEU effectively enforced both economic sanctions and an arms embargo during Operation SHARP GUARD. Maritime forces, under Combined Task Force 440, prevented all unauthorized shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and all arms from entering the former Yugoslavia.

- **Enforcing exclusion zones.** An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a given geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), and/or on land and can include parts of or all of a designated urban area. For example, US air forces were critical to enforcing the no-fly exclusion zone over Bosnia, specifically the airspace over numerous urban areas in that nation.
- **Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.** These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. For example, during the Berlin Airlift in 1948–1949, US and Allied forces continued to conduct airdrops of food and supplies in order to sustain democratic West Berlin despite Soviet attempts to blockade the urban area.
- **Humanitarian assistance.**[6] These operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. US joint forces have been integrally involved with delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance in numerous urban areas, particularly during operations in Mogadishu and in urban areas throughout Bosnia.

- **MSCA.** These operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of civil authorities. US military assistance during the riots in Los Angeles in 1992 would be an example of this type of MOOTW.
- **Nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) rendered to a nation by US forces. US military forces provided critical support for the counterinsurgency in 1989 in key urban areas across El Salvador during the "final offensive" of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Ongoing US operations in Colombia are another example.
- **Noncombatant evacuation operations.**[7] These operations relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Examples of NEOs conducted in urban areas in the post-Cold War era include: Operation URGENT FURY in Salines, Grenada, in 1983; Operation EASTERN EXIT in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1991; Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in Monrovia, Liberia, in 1996; and Operation SILVER WAKE in Tirana, Albania, in 1997.
- **Peace operations.**[8] Peace operations are military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and are categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations. Though the US military provided humanitarian assistance throughout the famine-ravaged country of Somalia, the urban area of Mogadishu became the focus of a major peace enforcement operation that required joint forces to operate in a challenging urban environment.
- **Protection of shipping.** US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens, and their property against unlawful interference (violence) in and over international waters. Protection of shipping operations that could be conducted in urban areas include harbor

defense, port security, countermine operations, and environmental defense. During the Persian Gulf War, the threat of Iraqi mines affected almost all naval operations. After Operation DESERT STORM began, the principal mission of mine countermeasures was to clear a path to the Kuwaiti coast for naval gunfire support and a possible amphibious landing. The dense minefields left US forces vulnerable to missile, artillery, and small boat attacks from fortified beaches and ports along the Kuwaiti coast and prevented the free movement of ships up and down the coast.

- **Recovery operations.** Recovery operations are conducted to locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. Operations in Mogadishu demonstrate that recovery and possible combat search and rescue (CSAR) in an urban environment are more complex than in other environments. During urban operations, the time necessary to get rescue assets in position leaves personnel at risk. There may be few available landing zones in an urban area, and rescue teams may have to fight their way to the site—negotiating unfamiliar urban streets, enemy fire, and noncombatants blocking recovery efforts.
- **Show of force operations.** These are operations designed to demonstrate US resolve. They involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue might be detrimental to US interests. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, September 1994–March 1995, and VIGILANT WARRIOR in Kuwait, October–November 1994, are examples of show of force operations.
- **Strikes and raids.** Strikes are offensive operations intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used to uphold international law or to prevent nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy

installations. For example, operations in Panama City in 1989 show the effectiveness of strikes and raids in an urban environment.

- **Support to insurgency.** An insurgency is an organized movement designed to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. US support to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion is an example.

General Planning Considerations for MOOTW in Urban Areas

JFCs and their staffs prepare plans for MOOTW in urban areas in a manner similar to planning for MOOTW in other environments and for war. The mission analysis and command estimate are vital to MOOTW in urban areas. Of particular importance in the planning process is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation for all potential threats. Command and control during MOOTW in urban areas is overseen by the JFC and subordinate commanders and should remain flexible in order to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Commanders should plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations in urban areas or to evacuate the urban area.

Intelligence and information gathering needs to be multi-disciplined and utilize fused intelligence from all sources within the military. This should include space-based intelligence, HUMINT, counterintelligence, mapping, charting, and geodesy. Intelligence collection in urban MOOTW requires a focused understanding of the political, cultural, and economic factors that might affect the operation. The JFC must understand the values by which people define themselves in order to establish a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive do in fact have the intended effect. Effective information gathering will facilitate information operations, psychological operations, and counterintelligence operations.

Coordination with NGOs, PVOs, and interagency operations within the urban area allows the JFC to gain greater understanding of the situation and the urban society involved. One method to facilitate information exchange and build unity of effort is to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to

coordinate civilian and military actions.[9] CA teams may establish the core of the CMOC, provide assessment of the civil infrastructure in the urban area, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as a liaison between the military and the city government and various other groups. In coordination with the CMOC, PSYOP may provide a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected target groups within the urban area. The JFC also may use public affairs, including media reporting, to influence the public opinion that may ultimately be a principal factor in the success or failure of the urban operation.

MOOTW in urban areas present unique challenges. For example, they are more likely to involve legal issues. Furthermore, a logistics element, such as a water purification company, may precede other military forces or may be the only force deployed for MOOTW in an urban area. Medical operations may also support MOOTW in an urban area to protect US personnel and enhance mission capability. JUO involving MOOTW may require Reserve Component (RC) units and individuals not found in the active armed forces, especially during post operational activity. Post operational activities in an urban area following a MOOTW may include: transitioning to civil authorities, marking and clearing mines and booby traps, eliminating financial obligations, and executing deployment activities, among others.

In addition, issues such as curfew, evacuation, forced labor, civilian resistance groups, and protection or uses of property should be considered by the JFC. The JFC should be prepared to answer the following types of questions. For example, can the commander impose and enforce a curfew for the urban area? How does the JFC get the word out to the civilian populace? Does the joint force have to provide medical support? How do they handle looting, protests, demonstrations? Do they establish a prison? If the government is defunct, what currency does the commander use? How is it established? How does the JFC deal with existing government officials?

The JFC should anticipate operational challenges and always be prepared for direct or indirect opposition to the spectrum of operations that may have to be conducted in urban areas. The ability of the JFC to employ innovative tactics and

capabilities, such as non-lethal weapons, in these conditions, may provide operational flexibility in accomplishing tasks.

---

[1] JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
[2] Ibid.
[3] JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War."
[4] JP 3-07.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism; Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness."
[5] JP 3-07.4, "Joint Counterdrug Operations."
[6] JP 3-07.6, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance."
[7] JP 3-07.5, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations."
[8] JP 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations" and "Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations."
[9] A doctrinal layout of a CMOC organization can be found in the "Handbook for CMOC Operations."

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CHAPTER THREE

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS[1]

In one moment in time, our Service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All in the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war.

General Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant, USMC

Urban area analysis should examine the various structures and functions of the physical and cultural environment in order to anticipate and prepare responses to a range of contingency situations. As military leaders examine urban operations, it becomes clear that the kinds of combat and peacekeeping capabilities required for JUO will depend upon the particular situation and setting at hand. Whether conducting a humanitarian relief supply mission or enforcing a no-fly zone, the JFC should acquire a thorough knowledge of the urban area prior to identifying operational tasks and should identify the objectives, weapons, training, tactics, and organizational requirements that will integrate joint forces to successfully accomplish the mission.

A. The Urban Area

Urban areas generally denote plots of land wherein population density equals or exceeds one thousand people per square mile and in which an average of at least one building stands per two acres of land. A typical built-up urban area is characterized by a concentration of structures, facilities, and populations and is normally the **economic, political, and cultural focus** for the surrounding area.

Categories of built-up areas are classified as:

- Villages (populations of 3,000 or less)
- Strip areas (industrialized zones built along roads connecting towns or cities)
- Towns or small cities (populations of up to 200,000)
- Medium cities (populations of 200,000 to one million)
- Large cities with associated urban sprawl (populations in excess of one million)

Whether a modern metropolis or a shantytown in a developing country, every built-up, urban area has an identifiable system of urban characteristics that constantly are interacting and changing. The JFC should attempt to identify key characteristics and develop an operational plan that leverages US strengths against critical nodes, choke points, and/or LOC with minimal impact on the urban area and its population. By understanding the urban area and developing an operational-level situational awareness, the JFC should be able to shape, modify, and/or control adversary behavior by applying asymmetrical strengths against key enemy centers of gravity. In MOOTW, the JFC should effectively engage appropriate centers of gravity while stabilizing and supporting missions that maintain peace and restore a semblance of normalcy to the urban area.

Characteristics of the Urban Area

From the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, and industrial parks of the modern world to the sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form urban areas in less-developed regions, an urban area is as diverse as it is complex. In order to map an urban area, the JFC should consider five essential characteristics:

- Physical
- Infrastructure
- Commercial
- Residential

- Socio-economic

These characteristics should be regarded as interdependent, ever present, and frequently overlapping. By layering the components and developing a comprehensive awareness of the urban area, the JFC can determine specific actions, timelines, and resource commitments.



Physical information is the most basic characteristic for defining an urban area

Infrastructure, Residential, and Commercial information may or may not affect one another

Socio-economic information impacts some portion of all other urban area characteristics and is critical to understanding the urban area

Urban characteristics should be viewed as interdependent, frequently overlapping parts of a non-linear whole

Figure III-1. Urban Characteristics

Understanding the Urban Area

Physical information is the most basic characteristic for defining an urban area and includes all essential features such as structural dimensions, composition, and spacing of: airport or landing facilities, ports or waterways, buildings, streets, highways, bridges, tunnels/sewers, railroads, telephone wires, power lines, zone specific combustibles, natural barriers, and surrounding vegetation. This layer should also provide information on climate, elevation, and surface composition.

- The physical urban area can be divided into four basic levels: building, street, subterranean, and air. Operations may include engagement on all levels at any given time, and military forces, when taking positions in, above, beneath, and/or around an urban area, may have to negotiate a variety of obstacles.
  - > The JFC should develop three-dimensional operational plans that allow for efficient air-ground-maritime mobility and effectively convey information on appropriate features to subordinates in three-dimensional terms.

During the night of 3-4 October 1993, US soldiers in Mogadishu found that the sheer number of laser traces caused confusion during attempts to provide fire support. Ground contacts were asked to make figure eights with their lasers so that pilots could distinguish them.

- The correlations between physical characteristics and military considerations include choke points, landing platforms, lines of sight, mobility, fields of fire, observation, obstacles, cover, concealment, indirect fire siting, fire hazards, command and control, rubble potential, weapon range, building markings, etc.
  - > Selection of landing zones is at times difficult. Air defense, pathfinder, access and egress, and a myriad of other doctrinal considerations should be fully examined in support of operations likely to include ground, naval, and air representation.

- The physical diversity of the urban terrain can fragment units, compartmentalize encounters, disrupt spans of control/communication, and complicate fire support, surveillance, airlift, and transportation.
  - > Technical procedures or techniques to overcome disruptions in a soldier's vision, communications, and/or global positioning system (GPS) should be established and known to all military personnel involved in urban operations.

During operations in Somalia, because of Somalia's limited infrastructure, a temporary base was established by the Marines along with important engineering support to enable additional forces and their equipment to join the effort. Once a stable center of operations was established, troops moved to outlying areas and began the process of restoring order.

Infrastructure information includes water distribution facilities, medical services, sanitation procedures, waste treatment plants, environmental hazards, communication capabilities, media and information dispersal (including telecommunication networks), power generation substations and offices; US embassies, diplomatic organizations, NGOs, other government and non-government facilities, police, and military.

- The infrastructure of urban areas in developing countries is markedly inferior when compared to that of major metropolises. An estimated 25 to 50 percent of urban inhabitants in developing countries live in impoverished slums and squatter settlements, with little or no access to adequate water, sanitation, or refuse collection. The lack of even the most rudimentary facilities and utilities has health and disease implications for inhabitants as well as US forces operating in the given environment.
  - > The JFC needs to determine the location and numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons; requirements for water, food, sanitation, housing, medical services, heating supplies, etc.; infrastructure restoration demands; facilities, supplies, and capabilities necessary to respond to starvation, disease, epidemics, weapons effects, and/or the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
  - > Combat Service Support (CSS) must provide for supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, engineering, and other support services.

EC-130 *Compass Call* aircraft jammed commercial radio and TV stations, as well as Panamanian Defense Force radio nets during the initial entry for Operation JUST CAUSE.

- Targeting and/or controlling key infrastructure components, such as electrical power generator plants, telecommunication nodes, and command and control centers, can deter and/or isolate enemy aggression and have a cascading effect against other remaining key nodes and systems.
  - > The JFC can gain operational advantage by targeting certain infrastructure components. Such decisive engagement includes precision air strikes, electronic disruption of adversary communications, or insertion of SOF or conventional ground forces to seize a key facility or structure.

Figure III-2. Understanding the Urban Area

Understanding the Urban Area, cont.

Commercial area information includes business centers (stores, shops, restaurants, food/craft marketplaces, trading centers, business offices) and outlying industrial/agricultural features (strip malls, farms, food storage centers, mills) as well as environmentally sensitive areas (mineral extraction areas, dump sites, chemical/biological facilities).

- The interplay between public and private activities often makes it difficult to distinguish between commercial and residential areas. In some urban areas, community and economic activity are intricately interwoven in the urban fabric. Local populations sometimes congregate to take part in the daily market, religious, social, and cultural activities.
  - > These centers of activity must be examined in terms of noncombatant considerations, symbolic and cultural value, local communications and networking, and as a potential center for political gatherings and organization.
  - > The JFC should have an understanding of the commercial system and how it effects operational decisions.

Looting and black market activity in Somalia had significant impact on the level of control necessary to distribute relief supplies throughout the country. If the JFC had a more accurate sense of the extent to which illegal commercial activity would disrupt the relief supply distribution effort, sufficient negotiations/force could have been massed and applied to the critical nodes of black market trade.

Residential area information includes all housing quarters—from squatter settlements to the suburbs—and all community facilities such as churches, schools, museums/cultural centers/monuments, public transportation facilities, police/fire stations, and hospitals.

- Residential areas are characterized by a variety of building materials, archetypes, and layouts (compact versus sprawl).
- The JFC should recognize that during fighting in, around, under, or over less substantial buildings, weapon rounds and fragments pose a considerable threat to noncombatants and friendly soldiers.
  - > The JFC should consider non-standard use of capabilities and the application of non-lethal coercive force when operating in populated areas.
  - > The JFC should consider designating protected zones in residential areas and charge ground forces (combat and combat support units) with establishment, supervision, and/or defense of such zones.

Effects of munitions on various building materials are still poorly documented. Spalling, debris, and flying glass tend to cause more friendly casualties than enemy fire.

Both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft over-flights were employed in the former Yugoslavia in an intimidation role—an application that capitalized on the threat, rather than the actual use, of firepower.

Socio-economic information includes demographics, ethnic/cultural information, historical background, political/religious tension and conflict (ruling and opposition parties), anachronistic customs and behaviors, relative levels of corruption, suspicion of government, criminal unrest, ascribed traditions and norms, and levels of political mobilization and polarization.

- Urban areas usually contain mixed populations that often are divided along ethnic and/or socio-economic lines. Lower-income neighborhoods tend to be compartmentalized and marginalized.
  - > In order for the JFC to develop effective PSYOP and CA plans, intelligence resources need to identify expectations that may differ according to economic strata, cultural backgrounds, or other factors.
  - > At a minimum, all military personnel need to be thoroughly and topically briefed on the cultural peculiarities, ethnic tensions, and political climate of the urban area.

- Establishing contact and influencing members in specific areas will depend on a number of factors including the homogeneity of the local population, sectional antipathies, factional differences, relations with authority figures, and susceptibility to propaganda.
  - > The effectiveness of television, radio, leaflets, billboards, loudspeakers, and other mediums in dispersing information and propaganda will depend on the availability of electricity, appliances, and levels of literacy.

During the battle of Grozny, two Chechen fighters took a building in Grozny and seized Russian prisoners after two of their comrades had been killed. They executed two of the prisoners and then released the others. Their behavior was predictable given the ancient system of retribution, *adat*, culturally ascribed by clan tradition. Ethnic and religious traditions, beliefs, and volitions, such as those seen in Chechnya, can become mental force multipliers that over the long term can outlast weaponry and manpower. If aware of these factors, the JFC can account for them during operational planning.

Soon after peace operations began in the Dominican Republic, the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion deployed with various types of broadcasting and printing facilities. Loudspeaker trucks proved to be very effective in imparting information. The unit also ran a radio station powerful enough to reach the interior of the island.

Figure III-2. Understanding the Urban Area, cont.

Air Considerations and Planning Factors

- Challenges of urban close air support and air interdiction (fratricide, enemy identification, collateral damage, terminal attack control)
- Urban air navigation challenges, especially over large urban areas
- Flight hazards of high-density wires, antennas, and obstructions
- Difficulties in achieving undetected ingress
- Reduced flight visibility due to smog/industrial haze
- Urban lighting effect on aircrew night optical devices
- High-density radio frequency effects on aircraft communications, instrumentation, and navigational aides
- Increased threats to flight, including high-density small arms fire
- Aircraft ground security
- Unique challenges of urban personnel recovery
- Landing zone (LZ) and fast rope

Figure III-3. Air Considerations and Planning Factors

Defining and understanding the urban area prior to operational planning may require extensive intelligence gathering and reliance on SOF, including CA and PSYOP units. The JFC should optimize intelligence resources and capabilities in order to map the urban area as a dynamic, multidimensional landscape that is highly interactive. A mutually supportive combination of human, electronic, and archival data should allow the JFC to thoroughly identify and analyze an adversary's dependencies. This is central to the JFC's ability to shape and control behavior through an "operational effects" orientation.

Information/Intelligence Required for Joint Urban Operations[2]

The role intelligence plays in successful urban operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence supports all aspects of a campaign and provides the basis for action throughout the range of military operations. During JUO, the JFC relies on comprehensive intelligence to determine the socio-political environment, terrain features, adversary capabilities, mission objectives, and operational concepts. Intelligence gathered at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels allows the JFC to decide which forces to deploy; when and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. Gaining and maintaining intelligence dominance during

a JUO enhances the JFC's flexibility; provides additional air-ground-maritime solutions appropriate to the situation at hand; identifies key enemy vulnerabilities; and helps the JFC clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved.

The JFC is responsible for identifying intelligence resources and establishing intelligence support. The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) are the primary intelligence organizations which provide support to the joint warfighter during a JUO. National and theater/regional command levels can use the JIC, while the JISE supports the joint force element. At the national command level, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities in support of joint operations and facilitates efficient access to available DoD information.

In addition, the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) is tasked to provide tailored national-level, all-source intelligence to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. Requiring minimal command support, the NIST provides a vital link from commanders operating in an urban area to the joint resources of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the NMJIC. The reach-back provided by the NIST directly supports the JFC during a JUO. NIST capabilities include: expediting time-sensitive requests for information, coordinating indications and warning support, coordinating special assessments, providing video teleconferencing and electronic mail for analyst-to-analyst discussions, de-conflicting reporting from the different analysis producers, providing immediate access to national databases, coordinating imagery support from theater and national levels, and coordinating targeting and battle damage assessment support.[3]

Intelligence	Definition
TECHINT *Technical Intelligence*	Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign materiel. Technical intelligence begins when an individual Service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it to strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. The item is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary's technological advantage.
IMINT *Imagery Intelligence*	Intelligence derived from visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media.
SIGINT *Signals Intelligence*	A category of intelligence comprising , either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.
MASINT *Measurement and Signature Intelligence*	Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time depend ence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted.
HUMINT *Human Intelligence*	A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.
OSINT *Open Source Intelligence*	Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public.
CI *Counterintelligence*	Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. The four functions of counterintelligence are operations; investigations; collection and reporting; and analysis, production, and dissemination.

Figure III-4. The Seven Primary Intelligence Sources

Sources of intelligence should include a mutually supportive combination of human, electronic, and archival data. Collection and production of SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, TECHINT, OSINT, and CI provide the JFC with the intelligence needed to apply available forces wisely, efficiently, and effectively. Fusing imagery, signal, and electronic intelligence with archived data and ground-based human intelligence, the JFC can capitalize on information superiority and identify and analyze the adversary's nodes critical to the ability to operate effectively across the three-dimensional urban environment. For example, timely and accurate local area weather forecasts play a significant role in the development of a comprehensive intelligence plan. Precise local weather forecasting enables the JFC to anticipate what assets will provide the needed coverage for intelligence collection and assists the JFC in requesting, allocating, and tasking intelligence platforms. During all JUO, whether a combat situation or a humanitarian effort, intelligence organizational resources, methodologies, and products should be established and exercised regularly. All resources should be flexible and applicable to a range of military options and scenarios.

The Importance of HUMINT

If you don't understand the cultures you are involved in; who makes decisions in these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness in their values and in their taboos—you aren't going to be successful.

George Wilson, *Air Force Times*

Experience in JUO clearly demonstrates that HUMINT is essential to understanding and communicating with the local population and to developing situational awareness. The urban area hosts a number of non-traditional human resources that the JFC should consult in order to determine, direct, and coordinate missions. SOF (including CA and PSYOP personnel), terrain analysts, military patrols in local villages, military engineers, UN military observers, and others who may have direct contact with the indigenous population can provide specialized and detailed intelligence to the operators and planning staff essential to developing and fulfilling the JFC's intent. These human assessments can address specific requirements relating to the local population and ramifications of joint force plans and actions.

Historical and cultural information and analysis are essential to understanding the proclivities of adversaries, their method of operation, and how they interact with their environment. This understanding is important to mission success. The JFC should know the disposition of the local population: is it friendly, neutral, or hostile, and what factors would change this disposition? By dividing the urban area into sectors based on information gathered (hostile versus non-hostile, armed population versus indifferent population), the JFC can deploy the tactics appropriate to deterring aggression and accomplishing mission objectives. For instance, it may be necessary to maximize the use of PSYOP or political actions in one part of an urban area; to launch an assault in another section; and finally, to use precision strikes to destroy installations with minimal collateral damage in other parts of an urban area.

Leveraging Civilian Intelligence Resources

The intelligence environment during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was complex and involved numerous, nontraditional resources. Civilian agencies (nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations) were relied upon for their network of influential contacts, compiled historical and specialty archives, and established relationships with local leaders and business people. They understood the infrastructure of the region and had expertise in military, political, cultural, and economic issue areas. Civilian organizations analyzed a wide spectrum of threats, including the former warring factions, criminal activities, extremists, civil disturbances, and terrorism, along with monitoring equipment storage sites and barracks, human rights violations, mass gravesites, and potential "hot spots" caused by resettlement and inter-ethnic conflicts.

***Lessons From Bosnia*: The IFOR Experience**

Figure III-5. Leveraging Civilian Intelligence Resources

An accurate picture of potential threats is fundamental to the success of an operation, as changes in the behavior of the local populace may force an adjustment in the operational plan. Hostile activities can impede forward movement, destroy logistics stockpiles, or close airports and seaports. Moreover, the behavior of noncombatants can either assist or derail military operations. The JFC should identify civilian needs, in-place authorities, those willing to assist friendly forces, and those sympathetic toward adversarial objectives in order to gauge potential reactions of population segments to the urban operation.

The JFC should construct an intelligence architecture that can monitor tactical military capabilities as well as provide current and predictive information on the intentions of both combatant and noncombatant populations. Failure to use all intelligence assets in the analysis of political, economic, and social instability may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of the instability and, in turn, initiate and/or prolong urban conflict. Often present in the urban area prior to military involvement, civilian agencies may maintain an array of critical contacts, historical and specialty archives, and relationships with local leaders. By exploiting intelligence capabilities across Service and agency boundaries and sharing information among echelons of command, the JFC can better predict threats to mission success and ensure that adequate force protection measures are implemented.

All attempts to collect information from NGOs, PVOs, and other civilian organizations should be characterized by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the purposes for which information will be used, so as to avoid undermining cooperative efforts. During a JUO, recognition of the civilian organization's willingness to share information must be respected and accepted in order to continue positive interaction between the military and the organization, as well as the organization and the people it is serving.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) in Urban Operations[4]

Effective C4ISR employs a synergistic architecture linking joint force command and control, communication, and computer (C4) nodes with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. An efficient C4ISR architecture should supply the joint force with a continuous automated flow and processing of information through rapid and secure voice, data, facsimile, and video communications. Well-planned execution of operations with the appropriate C4ISR systems gives the JFC the advantage of making timely, effective decisions. During an urban operation, the JFC may need to give special consideration to the challenges of communicating in an urban area.

C4ISR Capabilities of Aerospace Assets

Overflying aircraft and satellites can provide real-time intelligence and relay transmissions from forces within or around an urban area. These airborne ISR resources can be as sophisticated as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), EP-3 Aries II electronic warfare and reconnaissance aircraft, or Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or as technologically simple as a video camera in a scout helicopter. However, imagery assets have only a limited capability to detect the activities inside buildings and cannot detect activities underground.

Figure III-6. C4ISR Capabilities of Aerospace Assets

For example, joint force units operating over, under, around, or within an urban area may have difficulty communicating with other joint force units due to interference from urban area structures. Although JFCs may face similar challenges in other types of operational environments, such as jungles or mountains, the density of these urban structures exacerbates interference. On the other hand, urban infrastructure can

also offer opportunities to facilitate telecommunications. Because urban areas are generally technological hubs, JFCs requiring additional telecommunications capabilities may find important communications resources accessible in the urban area of operation.

Urban Telecommunication Considerations

Joint force units operating over, under, around, or within a city may have difficulty communicating to other joint force units due to interference from city structures. The density of these urban structures exacerbates the impact of this interference on the ability to communicate as compared with other environments. Therefore, communications system, operational, and technical considerations must be addressed prior to beginning an urban operation.

System

- Radio Frequency (RF) signals may be degraded
- Communications systems may need more power to "blast" through buildings
- LOS communications may be limited
- Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) communications may be difficult to support
- Specialized communications architectures may be needed due to the different capabilities of NGOs assigned to CMOC

Operational

- Conventional systems may be inadequate
- Situational awareness may be required to conduct Close Air Support (CAS) operations
- There may be need for:
  - Redundancy (for frequency bands)
  - Cellular phones (to possibly leverage civilian infrastructure)
  - Tactical satellite communications to offset LOS shortfalls
  - Retrans (more retrans locations; requirement to constantly move the locations)
  - Standardized message formats (to pass data)
  - Special communications planning (retrans, relays, antenna siting, etc.)
  - Utilization of visual signals and other means of communications to supplement radio communications

Technical

- Changing message formats
- Difficulty maintaining situational awareness (due to decreased capability of GPS in urban areas)
- Improperly formatted data
- Incompatible transmission media (civilian agencies)
- RF interference with host nation telecommunications infrastructure

Figure III-7. Urban Telecommunication Considerations

Combat Camera

Combat camera can be used to:

- Visually document for NCA what joint forces are accomplishing, versus relying on potentially inaccurate media reports
- Provide JFCs with an effective means to refute enemy claims of collateral damage, excess force, etc.
- When combined with gun camera tapes from US Air Force, US Navy, and US Army aviation, combat camera can provide a rapid means by which a joint force can tailor tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate to the urban scenario at hand

Figure III-8. Combat Camera

In addition, SOF may be able to offer unique C4ISR capabilities to the JFC during an urban operation. SOF are trained, equipped, and organized to undertake special reconnaissance (SR) missions that may prove useful in JUO. For example, a JFC may consider utilizing SOF assets to relay critical information across the urban terrain. JUO commanders should identify any specialized

units and/or equipment required for urban operations as early as possible.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)[5]

The threat of WMD occurs across the range of military operations and may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. A JFC operating in an urban environment must be prepared to deter and/or defend against adversary nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons use or mishap. NBC defense operations present many unique challenges to commanders operating in an urban area. The greatest problem from a civil-military operations' perspective is the decontamination of infrastructure, the decontamination and possible relocation of the civilian population, and the decontamination of military forces. A clear understanding of the effects of WMD, along with the implementation of the principles of NBC defense, can significantly reduce these challenges.

An NBC defensive strategy demands effective orchestration of the joint force and resources in providing direction, intelligence, and employment to counter enemy NBC war making capabilities. Avoidance, protection, and decontamination are the primary principles of NBC defense during a JUO. NBC defense should include planning and coordinating strategic intelligence to determine enemy NBC capabilities and vulnerabilities; proliferation, intentions, and indications; and warning measures. When operating in an urban area, the JFC's first priority is to protect friendly forces and noncombatants and safeguard strategic centers of gravity throughout the range of JUO. When operating in an urban area, the JFC should employ active security and defense measures, conduct deception operations, and be prepared to provide logistical and medical support for possible NBC defense operations.

B. Civil-Military and Interagency Support in the Urban Area

Civil-military operations (CMO) and public affairs (PA) require collaboration among US forces, governmental agencies, NGOs, international organizations, PVOs, and in many instances, the media, in order to carry out broad-based objectives. In a JUO, this interagency, multi-organizational involvement necessitates a range of civil-military activities to garner support from the local populace and enhance the effectiveness of the military operation while minimizing friendly and noncombatant casualties.

In an operational sense, the problem of achieving maximum support and minimum civilian interference with urban operations will require the intentional cultivation of popular goodwill and the coordination of intelligence efforts, security measures, and operational efficiency.

Civil-Military Operations

The ability of the JFC to communicate effectively with staff, multinational coalitions, and humanitarian organizations will be critical to CMO success in an urban operation. Military support activities, such as CA and PSYOP, may be used to help achieve specific military, political, and economic objectives. Moreover, through support, assistance, advisement, coordination, and strategic planning, CMO may help commanders understand the unique economic, cultural, social, and military characteristics of the urban environment. For example, CA and PSYOP personnel may be able to help address the local population and enemy forces respectively, while PA personnel may interact with US forces as well as national and international media representatives. During an urban operation the JFC should remember that CA, PSYOP, and PA are force multipliers and should be fully integrated—information disseminated by one organization should be available to all sources.

Civil Affairs[6]

CA serves as a link between military and civilian operations by securing support from the civilian populace for military involvement; forging positive relationships with host nation counterparts and government officials; and assuring civil or indigenous understanding of and compliance with controls, regulations,

directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain US objectives.

CA activities during a JUO may include advising civilian authorities and the public on their relationship with military forces, strengthening host government legitimacy, and/or preventing or reducing violence by bridging critical gaps between the civilian and military sectors. In addition, CA units may coordinate and facilitate the operations of in-country agencies in order to help re-build or build the infrastructure of the urban area, including schools, health facilities, agricultural works, houses, etc. To do this, CA functional specialists may coordinate with other units, local authorities, officials, relief organizations, and additional US and international agencies and provide information on where additional manpower, experience, and equipment can be obtained. CA units also help determine the goods and services available in-theater that might be of use to the JFC during a JUO.

Individual Service CA Capabilities

- US Army—US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) maintains four regionally aligned civil affairs commands/brigades under the Army Reserve Command United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). In addition to psychological operations groups, USACAPOC includes one Army Active Component (AC) CA battalion consisting of regionally oriented companies and is structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to military operations until RC CA assets can be deployed. Unlike the RC units which comprise nearly 97 percent of the Army's CA forces, the AC battalion is not designed or resourced to provide the full range of CA specialty skills.

- US Marine Corps—USMC commands, with reserve augmentation, have the capability to plan and conduct CA activities in contingency or crises response operations. The USMC does not maintain AC CA units. CA activities are carried out using all assets from within a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). CA activities are limited to the minimum essential civil-military functions necessary to support

the assigned missions. USMC RC CA units consist of two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) that are organic to, and augment the capability of, the MAGTF.

- US Navy—Neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard maintains CA units. However, Navy construction battalions, legal officers, Coast Guard law enforcement, search and rescue personnel, medical personnel, harbor defense, etc. have the capabilities to support and/or complement CA activities.
- US Air Force—The Air Force does not maintain CA units. However, USAF AC, RC, and National Guard Commands have a variety of functional organizations, including legal, supply, health service support, engineer, security forces, and construction resources with capabilities that support and/or complement CA activities.

Psychological Operations[7]

The principal objective of PSYOP is to promote specific opinions, emotions, attitudes, and/or behavior of a foreign audience in support of US or coalition objectives. Personnel assigned to PSYOP include regional experts and linguists who understand the political, cultural, ethnic, and religious subtleties of the urban area, as well as functional experts in technical fields such as broadcast journalism; radio operation; print, illustration, and layout operations; and long-range tactical communications. PSYOP assets can assist the operational commander in overcoming some of the fundamental challenges of an urban environment. For example, assistance may include non-PSYOP military information support to missions such as humanitarian assistance, refugee control, and NEOs. Whether in a combat operation or MOOTW, PSYOP gives the operational commander the ability to reach a target audience in an urban area with specific messages designed to elicit desired responses.

Public Affairs[8]

All they need to do really is quietly let people know truth. There is no need to bang the big drum. Official reports should stick to the absolute truth—once you start lying, the war's as good as lost…All this talk of guiding public opinion and maintaining the national morale is so much empty puff.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, 1884–1943

Censorship today is virtually impossible, with backpack satellite-broadcast systems and telephones that allow reporters to file their copy from anywhere in the world.

James Adams, Washington Bureau Chief, *London Sunday Times*

The mission of joint PA is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audiences. News media representatives and military journalists will conduct first-hand and after-the-fact reporting of joint operations, and the information they are given must be consistent with national and operational security.

PA is important because news media can significantly affect the execution of military operations, and particularly JUO. This is due to the complex relationship among information, the public (international and domestic), and policy formulation. Much of the public's knowledge of national activity is informed by the news media. Although the degree to which this connection succeeds in shaping US government policy is arguable, news media conveys information that can affect urban operations. PA helps manage the flow of information from the event to the public via the media.

Failure to do this can hamper the JFC's ability to conduct an urban operation. For example, because the Russian military refused to communicate with reporters during Russia's battle against Chechen separatists in Grozny in 1994, the media primarily reported the perspective of Chechen rebels. This encouraged local support in Grozny for the Chechens and allowed the rebels, who lacked sophisticated command and control equipment, to openly broadcast operational guidance to their forces.

On the other hand, successful engagement of the media can serve as a force multiplier. For example, the US military's openness and responsiveness to the media during peacekeeping efforts in urban areas such as Brcko and Sarajevo have helped explain the challenges and successes of US forces in the Balkans to the public. This helped maintain political support for Balkan operations both domestically and internationally, as well as encouraging the morale of US soldiers serving in the Balkans.

Thus, support for operations and the military itself may rely to a great degree on how media represent US forces' conduct in operations. It is the JFC's responsibility to manage the flow of information that media receive and subsequently present to the public. Consequently, PA guidance is essential to a JFC planning and/or undertaking military operations. It is particularly important in JUO.

Fundamental aspects of urban areas magnify the importance of PA in JUO. This is due to:

- **The increased importance of noncombatants in urban operations.** As previously discussed, noncombatants play an important role in JUO. Media reporting can strongly influence noncombatants in urban areas of operation, as the previous example of the Battle of Grozny demonstrates.
- **The increased likelihood of media presence in urban areas.** Urban areas tend to be more accessible than other military areas of operation. This is due to the close vicinity of airports, ports, and major surface throughways into most urban areas versus the relative lack of access into jungles, deserts, etc. These increased points of access make it easier for media representatives to enter an urban locale and report on a JUO.
- **Urban areas tend to have the technological resources required by news media.** Technological resources enable the media to report easily from within urban areas, often in ways that a joint force has

difficulty controlling, such as mobile satellite links and cellular telephones. This can jeopardize operational security (OPSEC).

For these reasons, it is important that JFCs undertaking JUO recognize the importance of working with the media to ensure the dissemination of accurate and timely information to the general public, military personnel, civilian employees, and family members. The following considerations should help facilitate this:

- It is likely that media representatives will seek to interview Service members, making every soldier, sailor, Marine, and airman a potential spokesperson. Thus, commanders should disseminate PA guidance throughout the joint force. The JFC should use every opportunity to allow the media access to unit personnel and create an open channel of dialogue.
- The JFC should keep in mind that voids in information supplied to the media by the military may be filled with hostile propaganda and/or media speculation. By proactively assisting news media representatives, commanders help reporters understand the joint force's role and produce coverage that enhances confidence in US policy and the US military. Nevertheless, JFCs must balance OPSEC and other operational requirements with PA needs.
- PA, CA, and PSYOP messages must be coordinated early during the planning process. A continual exchange of information must exist during execution. Although PA, CA, and PSYOP messages may be different, they must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three will be lost. Although each has specific audiences, information will often overlap between audiences. This overlap makes de-conflicting messages crucial. Under no circumstances will PA personnel engage in PSYOP activities, or vice versa. The JFC will establish separate agencies and facilities for PA and PSYOP activities. At no time will PSYOP personnel address the media, unless related to coverage of the PSYOP function.

- The ability of the news media to transmit instantaneous and often live reports must be considered when planning an operation. Failure to adequately plan can create a situation that endangers news media representatives and the operation itself.
- Joint and multinational PA activities require personnel, transportation, communications, and technical resources. These assets are essential to the conduct of PA operations. The goal is to anticipate and respond to fluctuating coverage and to tailor resources to ensure no loss of efficiency. As part of this resource planning, facilities must be designated for the functioning of the PA infrastructure and for the news media. In addition, it is likely that the peacetime staffing of an organization's PA office will be inadequate to respond to the inevitable increase in news media and public interest, so contingency planning must address the need for rapid expansion of the PA staff.

Interagency Communication and Coordination[9]

What's the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.

General John M. Shalikashvili

Military means alone may be insufficient to meet national or coalition objectives in JUO. Commanders and military planners have to integrate and coordinate their activities with those of other organizations addressing needs that are beyond the capabilities of military forces, including pre-hostility, combat, and post-hostility responsibilities.

JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume 1," states that "interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informal entities of the US Government as well as nongovernmental organizations." The JFC has a number of tools to help facilitate interagency communication in the

urban environment. The JFC should maintain a good working relationship with a variety of nongovernmental and governmental agencies.

Examples of such entities are numerous and varied. The JFC will find the State Department, US Agency for International Development (USAID), or the UN among those agencies frequently and actively involved in a crisis region. Nongovernmental organizations—such as the Peace Corps, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, or Africare—may be engaged in the theater as well. Organizations such as these often have been immersed in the conflict long before the joint force arrives and often remain long after the joint force departs. Many of these organizations possess a vital understanding of the complexities of the crisis at hand, have a legitimate role to play in the urban environment, and can serve as an asset to the JFC.

A successful operation in the urban environment will combine the strengths, interests, and institutional knowledge of the appropriate agencies, departments, and organizations involved in the region. Achieving this critical "unity of effort" among all the players at the operational level, however, can be elusive. Institutional and organizational biases in policies, procedures, and techniques may serve to work against the collective goal of creating and maintaining cohesion. Furthermore, NGOs and PVOs do not operate under the military or governmental aegis, making command and control with these actors hard to facilitate. Thus, effective interagency coordination at the operational level requires a deliberate, well-planned effort by the JFC and his staff. Organizational and planning initiatives in the early stages of an operation—including the recognition of mutual objectives—will enable close and constructive dialogue between all agencies involved.

11 Steps for Organizing Interagency Coordination at the Operational Level

1. Identify all agencies, departments, and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation
2. Establish an authoritative interagency hierarchy, considering the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility
3. Define the objectives of the response effort
4. Define courses of action for both theater military operations and agency activities while striving for operational compatibility
5. Solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear definition of the role that each plays in the overall operation
6. Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities
7. Identify the resources required for the mission and determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources, reducing duplication and increasing coherence in the collective effort
8. Define the desired end state and exit criteria
9. Maximize the mission's assets to support the longer-term goals of the enterprise
10. Establish interagency assessment teams
11. Implement crisis action planning

(JP 3-08)

Figure III-9. 11 Steps for Organizing Interagency Coordination at the Operational Level.

To be used in the planning stages of an urban operation, these steps provide the organizational framework necessary for ensuring that interagency considerations are accounted for and that common pitfalls are avoided, including problems such as incomplete operational coordination, interagency logistics confusion, and *ad hoc* command arrangements. In addition to this framework, the JFC has a number of tools with which to establish the infrastructure for interagency cooperation.

- **The Country Team**—The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission,

and comprised of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission.

- **Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)**—An *ad hoc* organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other US government agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international groups. With no established structure, its size and composition are situation-dependent.

- **Executive Steering Group (ESG)**—Composed of the principals from the joint force, the ambassador's staff, and the relevant NGOs and PVOs, the ESG interprets and coordinates theater aspects of strategic policy. The ESG can provide for a high-level exchange of information and serve to assist in resolving difficulties among the various organizations.

- **Liaison Sections**—Serving as the focal point for communication and information exchange with external agencies and the host nation government, Liaison Teams can centralize direction over planning, coordination, and operations. Composed of designated liaison officers, their primary role is to foster better relations and understanding between participating forces, agencies, and local governmental entities.

- **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)**—A temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination phases of a humanitarian assistance operation. Normally composed of representatives from USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), US Public Health Service, US Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs and PVOs, and international and regional organizations. The HACC's responsibilities diminish upon the creation and implementation of the CMOC.

- **JTF Assessment Team**—Deployed to the joint operations area to facilitate the mission analysis process (when feasible), the JTF Assessment Team is a US government-only entity that can provide valuable preliminary assistance in determining the scope of the mission, the type of force required, and the availability of in-country assets. It is normally constituted of Joint Staff (or unified command) personnel, logistic, engineer, medical, legal, and chaplain expertise, as well as CA officers and USAID/OFDA officials.
- **Political Advisor (POLAD)**—Assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the CIA liaison officer, or any specifically assigned person, the POLAD may provide the JFC with diplomatic considerations, enable informal linkage with embassies, and supply information regarding policy goals and objectives of the Department of State. Specifically, when crisis action planning becomes necessary, the POLAD communicates with the appropriate ambassador(s) as part of crisis assessment and helps to bring together US national resources within the host country.

While the size and scope of each CMO in the urban environment will determine the extent to which some or all of these teams and centers will be needed, the need for interagency coordination will most likely be present in all urban contingencies. This is due to the changing nature of modern military operations and the inherently complex dynamics of the urban environment that necessitate an enhanced role for interagency coordination. Compensation for organizational and operational differences, agreement of command and control arrangements, and an overall unity of effort among all involved actors is crucial to operational success. Only through effective, thoughtful planning by the JFC can proper coordination be realized in the urban environment.

C. Multinational Coalitions and Urban Operations[10]

JUO in regional crises may involve coalitions different from familiar, long-standing alliance structures. Joint forces should be prepared to plan and

conduct urban combat operations and urban MOOTW with forces from other nations. When assessing the theater strategic environment, geographic combatant commanders must consider international security agreements, formal and informal command relationships with allies, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, and regional interrelationships. UN resolutions may also provide the basis for use of military forces in urban areas.

Coalition urban operations are accompanied by doctrinal, cultural, and language differences that challenge the overall coordination of the objective and the ability to achieve unity of effort. Lack of understanding and misperceptions can result in unanticipated and counterproductive constraints on the operation. In all JUO—particularly in the case of multinational coalitions—differences in cultural and national perspectives should be factored into every aspect of the urban operational plan to **ensure unity of effort in achieving a common mission.**

When operating in an urban environment, it is imperative that sound and effective command relationships are developed. For example, in Somalia, Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operations were successful, in part, because unity of effort was maintained—the US set the agenda and coalition partners agreed to the mission objectives and followed the US lead. A common understanding of command relationships will facilitate the required unity of effort. Multinational directives should delineate the degree of authority that may be exercised by a multinational commander and the procedures necessary to ensure the effectiveness of command relationships. Ideally, the coalition or alliance will designate a single military commander to direct the multinational efforts of participating forces.

The effectiveness of multinational operations will be improved by establishing rapport and harmony among senior multinational commanders. During a JUO, respecting multinational partners and their ideas, cultures, religions, and customs is as essential as assigning missions appropriate to each multinational partner's capabilities and ensuring that they have the necessary resources to accomplish those missions. Liaison centers can facilitate the dispersal of information, ease communications, and encourage cultural sensitivity.

During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the communication and coordination between affected agencies and coalition forces were critical to the success of the initial humanitarian intervention. From day one, liaison and advisory teams started to work through communication issues, and the combat intelligence team (CIT) became involved in the operation. A CMOC served as the clearing-house for all information to and from the humanitarian agencies to the multinational coalition force, providing information on operations through daily briefings, responding to emergency requests in a timely manner, and keeping track of other activities as required (food, logistics, shipment arrivals); further, all patrols were debriefed.

Intelligence Considerations in Multinational JUO

Sharing of intelligence between coalition forces is essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. The JFC should:

- Adjust for national differences
- Determine requirements for special intelligence arrangements
- Seek full exchange of information
- Provide for complementary intelligence operations
- Establish a multinational intelligence center with representatives from all coalition nations
- Designate liaisons to address issues of culture, language, doctrine, and operational intelligence requirements
- Recognize issues of releasability and classification of intelligence

Figure III-10. Intelligence Considerations in Multinational JUO

The JFC should tailor coalition forces to ensure that communications, processing capability, and down-links are available for effective dissemination of mission objectives, intelligence, operational plans and procedures, tactics, and rules of engagement. Mission considerations for multinational forces include:

- Provide SOF Liaison Elements (SFLE) to US and coalition forces
- Assign missions that are commensurate with each multinational force's political commitment and military capability
- Consider command and control issues including: language, force capabilities, cultural and historical backgrounds, religious beliefs, logistics, training, and political goals and objectives

- Evaluate multinational leadership, self-discipline, commitment, knowledge, and capabilities (individual, unit, equipment) prior to mission assignment
- Determine logistical support requirements, capabilities, and responsibilities (to include medical)
- Determine what is an acceptable degree of risk for commitment of each unit in a multinational force for specific missions
- Treat all contingents as legitimate partners
- Centralize planning and decentralize execution

Vignette: Multinational Coalitions and Joint Urban Operations

Beirut, Lebanon: US Multinational Force (USMNF)

US Multinational Force (USMNF), consisting of forces from France, Britain, and the United States, was originally created to assist the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) evacuation from Beirut following Israel's 1982 invasion. The US Marines were well-trained to execute such an operation, as were their coalition partners. Nonetheless, due to the political sensitivity of the mission and the unique requirements of the evacuation, Ambassador Habib personally initiated an intensive planning process involving regular and extensive discussions of operational issues within the coalition. This process provided a central hub for information-sharing, decision-making, and arbitration, and resulted in exceptional coordination. Unfortunately, this high level of coordination did not continue through the presence phase of MNF operations. Significantly, there was no specific individual, such as Habib, to orchestrate planning and operations. As a result, the three MNF contingents conducted actions in their respective areas in accordance with directions received from the national authorities of each nation. Although a Military Committee was created, chaired by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) representative and comprised of representatives from each MNF contingent and the LAF general staff, the committee functioned as no more than a conduit for the flow of information, rather than as a central point for coordinating military activities. Moreover, there were no Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) representatives on the committee (despite IDF occupation of sections of Beirut), and contact with the Israelis was restricted to diplomatic channels. The lack of combined coordination and shared doctrine presented problems as the situation in and around Beirut deteriorated. MNF contingents were increasingly confronted with harassment and attacks, and Lebanese forces under fire began requesting assistance. The MNF national contingents responded differently to such requests—this disjointed effort produced negative consequences. Although all three partners assisted the LAF, explicit US support through naval gunfire contributed to the perception of USMNF bias and made it the main target for opponent hostilities. Moreover, lack of coordinated response among MNF partners may have signaled questionable commitment levels to the combined operation, providing hostile factions with an incentive to exploit an already ill-defined mission.

D. Operating as a Joint Team

JFCs should understand the preeminent need to undertake JUO as a joint team. Urban areas present multi-faceted challenges to military forces. This is exacerbated by the fact that a single JUO may include missions as varied as humanitarian assistance and combat. Operational and environmental complications will require the application of diverse capabilities that transcend typical Service boundaries. This means that JFCs should:

- **Plan** JUO with the full range of joint assets in mind
- **Train** interactively from the joint task force level down to the lowest tactical levels with these joint assets to fully exploit the possibilities of cooperation; whenever possible, include representatives from international organizations in training events to gain a better understanding of their capabilities, concerns, and limitations
- **Use** the most appropriate combination of joint assets available when executing a JUO
- **Cooperate** with all relevant military, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies throughout the execution of JUO to overcome the potential limitations of command and control arrangements

Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama offers an example of how appropriate consideration of these factors may benefit a JUO. Prior to the deployment of Joint Task Force South, the US spent two years planning the operation and three months fine tuning it. US forces trained by extensive rehearsals and nearly half of the operational forces were in place in Panama before 16 December 1989.

The complex plan called for careful synchronization of both SOF and conventional forces in order to develop a maximum disruptive effect. Planning and operations were fully integrated across all four Services, while the sequencing of forces took full advantage of land, naval, air, and special operations capabilities. Following the capture of Noriega, SOF, including PSYOP and CA personnel, were attached to units to work with the local population and serve as

advisors, translators, liaisons, and assist in refugee control. This proved highly effective and aided in reestablishing law and order, promoting stability, and assisting in the establishment of a new Panamanian government. The success of JUST CAUSE serves to illustrate how planning, training, cooperation, and using the most appropriate combination of joint assets available foster a sense of a joint team which is absolutely necessary to the conduct of a successful JUO.

Trained and ready forces that are rapidly and strategically deployable are required for response to spontaneous, unpredictable crises. Such forces are usually drawn from the active force structure and are tailored joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In many cases, RCs are required to facilitate deployment of such forces or provide capabilities that are necessary for a robust, versatile joint force. During the planning and implementation of JUO, JFCs and their subordinates should be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of both AC and RC forces with respect to their ability to operate effectively in urban areas and contribute to the joint team.

E. Other Joint Urban Operational Planning Considerations

There are a number of basic planning considerations that must be weighed when coordinating operations during JUO. The proximity of forces, number and location of noncombatants, media presence, and other factors can force a JFC to rapidly alter tactical and operational conditions. Commanders and staffs at the strategic and operational levels must anticipate possible contingencies, unforeseen directives, and changes in mission throughout the operation. Given the challenges of the urban operating environment, the JFC should give special consideration to **rules of engagement, legal issues, and logistics** during a JUO.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

US Foreign Policy may succeed or fail on the basis of how well rules of engagement are conceived, articulated, understood, and implemented.

Naval Justice School

As a defender of international law, democratic rule, and human rights, the US must pay special attention to the way it employs force. This is particularly true in JUO such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, where a premium is placed on the avoidance of human fatalities and minimizing collateral damage.

ROE dictate **when, where, against whom**, and **how** force can be used. Development and modification of, training with, and broad dissemination of clear and concise ROE are crucial to force protection and mission success during urban operations. ROE are issued by a competent military command authority, always recognize an individual's inherent right of self-defense, and never prohibit using whatever means necessary for personal and unit self-defense. ROE must also recognize the commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means to defend joint force units and other designated individuals. ROE are normally incorporated into every operational plan and operational order and ensure all operations are carried out in accordance with national policy goals, mission requirements, and the rule of law. Every military member has a duty to understand, remember, and apply ROE, and failure to comply with ROE may be punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Questions regarding ROE should be promptly elevated up the chain-of-command for command resolution.

In all circumstances, ROE should be tactically sound, flexible, understandable, enforceable, consistent with core combat capabilities, and disseminated at all levels. Because ROE may be modified during urban operations due to changes in threat or in the political situation, the development, distribution, training, and modification of ROE must be timely and responsive to changing mission and threat parameters and be in line with Service-specific core combat capabilities. Further, ROE should provide sufficient flexibility to respond to a variety of situations. **Key ROE considerations for JUO include: US**

policy, international law, threat, commander's intent, operational considerations, and tactical capabilities.

Vignette: ROE in a Multinational Force

Beirut, Lebanon: US Multinational Force (USMNF)

The ROE for the USMNF presence in Beirut were restrictive throughout the mission, despite escalating hostilities that threatened the force and its ability to carry out its mission. The restrictive ROE reflected the assumed permissive environment and the desire to emphasize the peaceful nature of the mission. In addition, restraint on the part of the USMNF was meant to bolster the perception of USMNF neutrality and to signal confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) ability to manage hostilities. Stringent ROE also would prevent noncombatant casualties that could undermine local and international support for the mission. As such, the US Marines were required to carry unloaded weapons and were prohibited from firing into areas where the potential for civilian casualties was high. When the force did return fire, it had to be in self-defense and strictly proportionate in response. As hostilities escalated and direct attacks on the USMNF increased, the ROE were modified slightly to allow loaded weapons while patrolling and to permit naval gunfire in support of the LAF, the latter of which had the unfortunate effect of diminishing perceived American neutrality. In general, however, the ROE were maintained, severely limiting USMNF response options to the attacks. These limitations enabled hostile factions to attack the USMNF from civilian areas with relative impunity, undermining the force's ability to protect itself and to carry out its "presence" responsibilities. Significantly, successive commanders interpreted mission activities in light of the escalating hostilities and restrictive ROE very differently. The third commander sought to maintain outward presence by continuing his reliance on patrols to gain valuable information, promote goodwill with the local population, and signal the commitment to the mission. In contrast, the final Marine Amphibious Unit commander modified the strategy, electing to reduce patrols and "hunker down" in the compound. Although his intent was to diminish the vulnerability of his force, the shift in course may have actually increased force vulnerability by reducing HUMINT capability, undermining local perception of US commitment, and providing a ready target for terrorist attack. The lesson from USMNF in Beirut is that ROE should complement, rather than shape, how a force executes a mission.

Vignette: Selective ROE

Beirut, Lebanon: Operation PEACE IN GALILEE

During Operation PEACE IN GALILEE, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were confronted with a large noncombatant population that was intentionally exploited by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to shield its fighters and assets. Following a failed attempt to convince all civilians to leave West Beirut, the IDF adopted a two-tiered approach aimed at isolating noncombatants from combatants and influencing noncombatants to support PLO withdrawal. The ROE for this approach were also two-tiered and involved a highly selective combination of non-violent manipulation and force. At best, the strategy achieved only marginal success in influencing civilian behavior. The fate of noncombatants did, however, dramatically diminish the overall political success of the operation by challenging the morality of the means employed by the PLO to achieve military victory. The two-tiered approach distinguished between Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, the latter of which were considered PLO sympathizers and therefore legitimate targets. The approach, enabled by the existence of geographically distinct population enclaves, was intended to exploit Lebanese-Palestinian divisions and to provide a safe haven within the city to signal that survival through withdrawal from high threat areas was an option. Accordingly, areas populated largely by Lebanese were subject primarily to non-violent methods of influence, such as manipulation of basic services (electricity, water) and intermittent denial of access to fuel and food. Bombing in these areas was tightly controlled, with strict ROE for target selection and weapons' release. In contrast, the IDF exercised far less target discrimination in the southern suburbs and refugee camps populated almost exclusively by Palestinians. By the end of the campaign, these areas received intense ground, aerial, and naval bombardment, resulting in high civilian casualties. Although the ostensible purpose of the bombings was to strike military targets, the attacks were also meant to pressure those parts of the urban population that supported the combatants. Indeed, IDF bombings were accompanied by psychological measures such as low-level flyovers, dropping of flares, and sonic booms that were intended to frighten the populace and break its will to resist. The two-tiered approach may have succeeded in dividing some loyalties within the city, but little evidence indicates that Lebanese pressure on the PLO was intense or effective in provoking PLO withdrawal. More importantly, the actual and perceived treatment of noncombatants by the IDF created a political backlash to the operation within the international community and within Israeli society that, in many ways, offset the military gains. The Israeli experience demonstrates the inherent difficulty in separating combatants from noncombatants in an urban environment, the risks associated with manipulating noncombatants for operational purposes, and the hazards of harming civilians in the modern media age. In future JUO operations, the JFC may be unable to differentiate or separate combatants from noncombatants and must find ways to selectively influence various audiences. As the IDF case shows, the stakes are higher in a combat situation because failure to adequately distinguish noncombatants from combatants could result in excessive civilian casualties. At the same time, the JFC must be aware that even non-violent efforts to manipulate noncombatants may be politically sensitive. Finally, public relations are critical to operational success when operating in an environment with noncombatants. The JFC must work closely with the political advisor and public affairs staff to understand the potential political consequences of various courses of action and to aggressively shape the public image of the operation with a mind to influencing key audiences—domestic public opinion, international public opinion, the opponent, noncombatants, local factions, etc.—in order to garner or maintain support for the operation.

ROE must be clearly articulated and understood to establish the role of non-lethal weapons as an additional means of employing force, for the specific purpose of limiting the probability of death or serious injury to noncombatants or, in some circumstances, to enemy combatants. ROE are most effective when they are disseminated, understood, and rehearsed by all units involved in an urban operation. In coalition urban operations, allied forces must understand the ROE, and any differences between the ROE and instructions from allied headquarters must be resolved. Allies can still contribute to JUO even if their ROE vary somewhat from US ROE, as long as all participants coordinate and agree upon the variations.

During a JUO, rifle, machine gun, and other weapons rounds and fragments may pose a greater threat to noncombatants and friendly soldiers. Collateral damage inflicted upon homes, hospitals, and civilian infrastructure may lead to disease and starvation, creating a potential refugee situation. Likewise, extensive damage to urban infrastructure may make rebuilding financially overwhelming for a friendly host nation, a defeated enemy, and/or international aid sources. In these circumstances, the availability of non-lethal weapons systems may offer a greater range of options to forces operating under these conditions.

Additionally, the JFC may want to consider employing non-lethal options to gain advantage over those who rely exclusively on lethal options. The degree of provocation required to employ non-lethal options is substantially less. This may result in a more proactive posture and quicker response, as well the diminished likelihood of having a situation escalate to a point where deadly force is required to resolve the conflict. The JFC should keep in mind that demonstrated restraint may greatly diminish the anger and remorse felt when deadly force is required after non-lethal options have been applied and failed. Non-lethal weapons can facilitate post-incident stabilization by reducing populace alienation and collateral damage.

Legal Issues

A good legal advisor is a force multiplier and is essential to the JFC's ability to accomplish the mission in a lawful manner. The JFC's Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be familiar with the laws related to legal assistance, military justice, administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, and operational and international law. The entire campaign should be reviewed for compliance with domestic and international law. The SJA will be the most vital resource in the process of understanding the myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations.

In the role of operational advisor, the SJA develops and oversees execution of a legal services support plan; drafts general restrictive orders; provides advice and assistance in the development, interpretation, and modification of ROE; and advises various staff sections and boards as requested on the entire range of operational and politico-military issues.

During JUO, the JFC should consider having the SJA draft a *General Order* to establish basic policy for the joint force regarding prohibited activities while deployed.

The SJA also can assist in other areas including:

- The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
- Targeting
- Disposition and treatment of refugees
- Disposition and treatment of displaced persons, detainees, evacuees, or expelled civilians
- PSYOP and CA
- Local culture, customs, and government
- Military and political liaison
- Claims
- Administrative and criminal investigations

- Environmental requirements
- Contingency contracting
- Legality of landing fees
- Interpretation of transit agreements

In multinational operations, coalition partners should be integrated into the planning process to ensure all legal requirements are identified. The SJA should be prepared to conduct liaison with local police forces, local authorities and court officials, and international organizations. Special attention should be given to the detention of local nationals or others who attack or disrupt the joint force as these situations can become politically complicated and culturally sensitive. In the likelihood of injured people and/or damaged property during JUO, the SJA should implement a compensatory claims system. In MOOTW, the JFC should direct the SJA to consider the following:

- Staffing a multinational task force law office
- Coordinating the efforts of attorneys from different nations and/or the UN
- Having foreign claims authority and sufficient assets to investigate and adjudicate claims
- Establishing civil administration if directed by the NCA
- Assisting with legal issues when dealing with NGOs and PVOs

Logistics[11]

> *Logistics sets the campaign's operational limits.*
>
> JP-1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States"

JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," defines logistics as the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. The art of logistics is the way in which the JFC integrates the strategic, operational, and

tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.

Due to the Service-specific nature of much of the equipment and supplies used in JUO, individual Services are responsible for the implementation and execution of logistic functions for their own forces, unless it is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or through common, joint, or cross-servicing assignments. The JFC reviews the requirements of the Service component commands and establishes priorities in order to utilize supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively.

During multinational operations, logistics is a national responsibility. In an urban environment, units will deploy with unit basic loads and be self-sufficient in all classes of supply except Class III – bulk fuels and POL – and Class IV – construction material. Logistics elements may be required to deal with a number of non-military entities (contractors, host nation organizations, and NGOs) during urban operations. A National Support Element provides full spectrum operational level logistics support to US forces and mission-essential common item support for US and multinational forces under certain conditions.

The JFC's objective is to minimize the logistical footprint through contracting, host nation support, inter-Service support agreements, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, and local purchase whenever possible. The concept of sustainment is to "push" supplies and material to employed units until the urban objective is secured, then transition to a "pull" concept whereby engaged units obtain required replenishment stocks from designated sources of supply, and finally to transfer responsibilities to a logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP) as soon as possible. In the urban area, overtasking of resources may develop (such as overuse of the main road to bring in tanks and HMMWVs or conflicted airspace use by the Services). The JFC can use the J4 to de-conflict these potential problems and coordinate the Services' logistic requirements.

JFC logistics plans in JUO should:

- Focus engineer effort on obstacle clearance and maintaining LOC, initial force beddown, and construction of initial security/force protection components
- Utilize field expedient procedures for field services
- Emphasize on-site exchange of maintenance secondary items
- Define vehicle/equipment recovery procedures
- Address considerations for protecting the environment
- Describe circumstances where controlled substitution is authorized
- Establish mobility and transportation policies, i.e., units will be self-sufficient, using organic assets
- Identify LOC and coordinate with engineers for maintenance and Military Police for security
- Establish medical policies to include evacuation plans and holding timelines
- State the surface and rotary-wing medical evacuation policy and procedure
- Cover mortuary affairs processes based on operational considerations
- Enumerate the evacuation, temporary interment, and mass burial policies

F. Conclusion

Although JUO may occur in the context of a wide variety of greater campaigns and major operations, they share unique characteristics that may challenge a joint force. This chapter should assist the JFC in gaining a practical perspective of the challenges posed by these characteristics. Understanding these

factors and how they affect each other in campaign planning and execution may help a future joint force avoid some of the pitfalls and mirror some of the successes of the historical urban operations discussed in Chapter Four of this Handbook.

---

[1] JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."

[2] JP 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations;" JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations;" JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

[3] JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

[4] JP 6-0, "Joint Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations;" JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations."

[5] JP 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC). Defense;" JP 3-12, "Joint Nuclear Operations."

[6] JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

[7] JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."

[8] JP 1-07, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations."

[9] JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," Vol. I and II. JP 3-08, Vol. II, presents a comprehensive list of US Government, NGOs, PVOs, regional and international agencies.

[10] JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Coalitions."

[11] JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations."

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDIES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldier will fight in the future.

Ardant du Picq

While history cannot guarantee valid answers to every military question, past events frequently illuminate present problems. Analyzing military history in the context of modern operational principles allows leaders and planners to apply the lessons learned from past conflicts to help solve the military problems of today. The complexity of joint operations, the increasing capabilities of today's forces, and the lethality and accuracy of modern weaponry complicate operational considerations—such as unity of effort, legitimacy, and restraint—that the JFC must contend with when planning a joint urban operation. By applying the experience and knowledge demonstrated in case histories, the JFC can better shape operational success.

This chapter will review selected US and foreign military experiences in urban operations conducted throughout the late-Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Because urban areas complicate military operations in ways that other environments do not, the JFC should devote special attention to the unique challenges that future JUO may present. The following case studies highlight many of these challenges, some of the innovative ways military forces have responded to them, and various lessons learned.

The case studies were selected for their particular relevance to future JUO and were researched using a rigorous methodology that focused on the key factors that influence JUO from an operational perspective. The case studies are by no means comprehensive operational histories; rather, each case study highlights a few of the major observations most applicable to future JUO. The seven case studies represent the broad spectrum of urban operations and highlight the specific challenges that a JFC may face when operating in an urban area:

- The Battle for Grozny is an example of a high-intensity urban battle and provides significant lessons on the inherent difficulties of isolating an enemy in a city and the challenges of maneuvering in, around, above, and/or below urban terrain.
- During the invasion of Panama City, US forces demonstrated the importance of HUMINT in urban battlefield preparation and the utility of SOF units as precision strike forces capable of penetrating densely populated urban areas.
- Operations in Port-au-Prince illustrated the importance of understanding the political, social, and geographic realities of the urban area and demonstrated how the threat of force can be used effectively to achieve diplomatic solutions during humanitarian crises.
- Operations in Mogadishu demonstrated the importance of understanding the political, historical, and cultural context for violence in an urban area before defining operational objectives and the value of recognizing the limitations of humanitarian intervention. Operations also demonstrated the need for synchronization of the command and control architecture in the rapidly changing urban fight.
- The British military's experience in the urban area of Belfast illustrates the ways in which a city can be divided by race, ethnicity, or religion and the complications that factionalism in an urban area can pose to a JFC.
- Operations in Sarajevo illuminated the successful application of air power to support a force defending an urban area.
- The NEO performed in Monrovia, Liberia in 1996 is an example of an operation that has become an increasingly frequent feature of the landscape of US military actions in the post-Cold War era.



Figure IV-1. Case Studies of Urban Operations

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Grozny, Chechnya
1991–1996

Timeline: The Battle for Grozny

- 6 September 1991
  - General Dzhokhar Dudayev dissolves the Supreme Soviet legislature in Grozny
- 27 October 1991
  - Dudayev elected President of Chechnya
- 8 November 1991
  - Following Dudayev's mini-coup against the Communist *nomenklatura* in the republic, Russian President Yeltsin declares a state of emergency and sends Interior Ministry (MVD) troops to "restore order" in Chechnya. The Chechen people block the airport; the troops pull out three days later
- January 1992
  - The Parliament of the Chechen Republic calls for the ousting of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputies from Chechno-Ingushetia
- February 1992
  - Dudayev seizes a large cache of weapons from Russian military bases and arms depots in Grozny and forms an army of independent Chechens
- March 1992
  - The Parliament of the Chechen Republic passes a constitution confirming its independence from the Russian Federation
- April 1992
  - Dudayev decrees that all Russian military units stationed on the Republic's territory "must be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Chechen Republic"
- June 1992
  - Russian troops are hastily removed from Chechnya under pressure from the local population, leaving behind 80 percent of their heavy arms and 75 percent of their smaller arms
- December 1992–January 1993
  - Russia drafts a treaty ordering the separation of powers between Russia and Chechnya
  - The treaty is repudiated under pressure from Dudayev
- May–July 1993
  - Attempts at negotiations between Russia and Chechnya fail
  - Chechen armed forces dissolve the Parliament
  - All remaining opposition leaders are driven out of Chechnya, leaving no remaining groups in Chechnya with which Russia can negotiate a settlement
- 2 April 1994
  - Dudayev dissolves the newly-elected regional parliament, alienating most of the influential Chechen leaders
- 26 November 1994
  - Chechens loyal to Moscow attack Grozny; the tank assault fails
- 29 November 1994
  - The Russian Security Council decides to send federal troops to secure Chechnya's borders
- 11 December 1994
  - Yeltsin sends 40,000 troops into Chechnya, starting a military campaign to crush Dudayev's independence movement
- 31 December 1994
  - The Russian assault on Grozny begins the all-out war in Chechnya
- January 1995
  - Russian troops and armor move into central Grozny after intense artillery fire; rocket and tank bombardment reduces the capital to ruins
  - The Russian army meets fierce resistance from the Chechen populace
- February 1995
  - Chechen rebels abandon Grozny but fighting continues in surrounding villages
- 30 August 1996
  - A fragile peace accord is brokered, postponing a decision on the status of Chechen independence until 2002

Figure IV-2. Timeline: The Battle for Grozny



Figure IV-3. Map of Grozny, Chechnya

Russian operations in Grozny illustrate the importance of understanding the political, social, and geographic realities in the urban environment before initiating a campaign. The Russian Security Council drastically underestimated the Chechen rebels' resolve to gain independence, while overestimating the superiority of the Russian military. The supposition that control of the capital city of Grozny would end the rebellion, an inadequate command and control structure, and a failure to effectively utilize CMO led to a disastrous campaign.

Operational Background

In October 1991, Dzokhar Dudayev was elected President of Chechnya. Dudayev declared Chechen independence on 1 November 1991 and soon began to develop a power base in the capital city of Grozny, the political core of the region. He ousted the Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputies from Chechnya and began attacking Russian military bases and arms depots in Grozny and seizing large weapons caches.

As Dudayev continued to promote nationalism and consolidate his power throughout Chechnya, Russia began to turn its attention to the breakaway republic. On 11 December 1994, Yeltsin ordered troops to start moving into Chechnya in an attempt to halt the secession of Chechnya by force. The Russian government assumed that subduing Chechnya would prove relatively easy, viewing Dudayev and his army as nothing more than a disorganized band of rebels. With Dudayev's defeat in Grozny, a pro-Russian government could be installed to re-establish Russian political authority in the republic.

Planning Considerations

Due to the hasty decision to subdue Grozny, planning for the operation began only two weeks prior to the assault. This resulted in:

- Confused command and control
- Deployed units untrained in urban combat
- Failure to consider external factors: the Russian Security Council initiated an attack at the worst possible time of year to fully utilize a primary weapon—aircraft; due to the winter conditions, the Russian Air Force was of only limited use
- Inadequate logistics
- The rapid deployment overwhelmed the already fragile logistics system so that it was incapable of supporting the deployed troops

Figure IV-4. Planning Considerations

On 31 December 1994, after only two weeks of planning, 40,000 Russian troops entered Grozny. The military plan called for a three-stage campaign. During the first stage, Russian forces would converge on Grozny from three directions: north, east, and west, leaving the south open for Dudayev to withdraw his forces into the mountains. Russian leadership anticipated that gaining control of the capital would be relatively easy. In the second stage, any remaining Chechen forces would be isolated in the mountains by Russian troops, a pro-Russian government would be re-installed to power in Grozny, and Russian control over the lowlands gradually re-established.

In the final stage, the Russians would eliminate the last pockets of Dudayev's resistance in the mountains. By this time, it was hoped that the population of the highlands would shift their allegiance away from Dudayev in the face of political tranquility and economic stability visible in the country's newly liberated areas. The entire campaign was estimated to take three years, the third stage being the longest.

However, contrary to all expectations, Dudayev, far from deserting Grozny, reinforced his positions in the city, anticipating the imminent attack and

using the gap left by the Russian Army in the south as his main supply route. Rather than the light resistance that they had originally anticipated, Russian forces encountered determined opposition from highly motivated rebels. The three columns of armor and motorized Russian infantry found their advance slowed by crowds of unarmed villagers blocking the roads and by effective resistance from Chechen units. The Russian attack was halted, with many casualties inflicted.

The Urban Area

The political and social aspects of urban areas can affect JUO to a great degree. This was especially true in Grozny. During the Battle of Grozny, the Russian Federation failed to recognize the political and social realities that existed in Chechnya and therefore underestimated the commitment of Chechen rebels to repel the Russians.

Dudayev had fostered the notion of Chechen independence, transforming the region from a semi-autonomous Russian republic into a well-armed state with a committed military. An intense hatred of Russia and a deep-seated nationalism motivated the Chechen rebels to prevent the Russians from occupying the country. As a result, the invading Russian military encountered an organized, well-equipped army.

Fighting in the Urban Area

During the initial attack on Grozny, the Russian military followed old Soviet tactics which specified that tanks would lead the assault followed by infantry fighting vehicles and dismounted infantry. However, the number of infantry used in Grozny was not sufficient to support the operation, and tanks became the main targets for attack. Moreover, Russian tanks could not lower their gun tubes far enough to shoot into basements or high enough to reach the tops of buildings. This allowed the Chechens to systematically destroy the column from above or below with RPGs and grenades. As a result, 105 of 120 Russian tanks deployed to Chechnya were lost during the initial attack. Russian forces eventually overcame this difficulty by attaching mesh wire cages capable of repelling RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, Molotov cocktails, and bundles of antitank grenades.

Figure IV-5. Fighting in the Urban Area

Moreover, Russian leadership overestimated the significance of the capital city in suppressing the nationalistic movement within Chechnya. The Russians believed that control of the city would symbolically reinforce their superiority

and thereby demoralize the rebels. The Russian assumption that control of Grozny would lead to automatic capitulation of the Chechen rebels presumed the importance of the city. While control of Grozny was important, due to the telecommunications and political organs that resided there, the Chechen rebels were committed to continue the fight for independence even without control of the capital. Once Russian forces took Grozny, Chechen rebels continued the fierce fighting in the countryside.

Three-dimensional Aspects of the Urban Area

In addition to understanding the political and social aspects of an opponent, a commander should also be aware of the local urban terrain. The Chechens had a distinct advantage in Grozny. Not only did they know the city's sewer, metro, and tram systems intimately, they also knew the city's back alleys, buildings, and streets. Conversely, inadequate maps and misinformation hampered Russian planning. They had 1:100,000 scale maps, when a scale of 1:25,000 would have proven more useful. Impromptu maps were often made by hand; however, the Chechens took down street signs and repositioned them to confound Russian navigators. Poor roads also limited ground transport, and military convoys were subject to ambush and delays by unarmed Chechen civilians blocking the road. Russian troops found rises and bends in roads turned into fortresses and bridges mined or closed off with reinforced concrete blocks.

Figure IV-6. The Chechen Strategy of Concentric Circles

Command and Control

Command and control is especially important in a JUO when coordination of forces is required to negotiate a multifaceted environment. Russian command and control was convoluted, resulting in poor synchronization of Russian forces during the battle. Russian units had no unity of command; command was scattered between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the successor to the KGB. Commanders did not coordinate with Russian units on their flanks. In fact, they moved in almost autonomous columns along four main routes. The organization and sequencing of force caused many command and control problems for Russian troops. For example, General Anatoly Kvashin commanded the Main Assault Force which entered Grozny from the north. As Kvashin advanced, Chechen rebels focused most of their firepower on his force because, unknown to Kvashin, the Russian commanders from the east and west gave false reports about their whereabouts. It was not until the second day of the operation that Kvashin realized that he was fighting in the city without the help of Groups East and West.

On the other hand, Chechen mobility and innate knowledge of the city exponentially increased their ability to command and control their forces. The Chechens generally did not maintain strongholds, but remained mobile. Hit and run tactics made it very difficult for the Russian force to locate pockets of resistance and impossible to bring its overwhelming firepower to bear against the enemy force. Moreover, high-rise buildings and structures impeded Russian transmissions, especially those in the HF and VHF/UHF ranges, making it difficult to communicate unit locations. The Chechens overcame this problem by using cellular phones and commercial scanner systems, which allowed them to communicate easily with one another and ensured the coordination of their combat operations.

Force Multipliers

Activities, such as PSYOP, CA, and PA, are important force multipliers in any operation. In future JUO, maximizing civilian support and minimizing civilian hostility to friendly forces will be critical. In Grozny, both sides employed PSYOP techniques. The Russians employed leaflets, loudspeakers (to

relay an appeal to the population to lay down their weapons and not provoke the Russian force), and radio interference in Grozny. The Chechens, on the other hand, used human road-blocks, protests, threats ranging from the possession of nuclear weapons to the unleashing of Islamic fundamentalists, and international pressure from organizations such as the Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus (who threatened to turn the whole region into a "raging inferno"). The Chechen intent was to damage the morale of Russian soldiers and mobilize Russian public opinion against the intervention. The Russian goal was to scare the Chechen rebels into submission.

The Battle for Grozny

Russian obstacles:

- Inadequate preparation for the campaign in terms of training, intelligence, reconnaissance, as well as political and propaganda backup
- Shortage of manpower in army units
- Lack of motivation and poor morale among troops
- Lack of current unit training, in general, or urban combat, in particular, of the Army and Air Force, due to inadequate funding (Many commanders complained that their units had no opportunity to conduct military exercises during the last three years. The Air Force pilots had an average of only twenty flying hours per year. The result: an ineffective use of artillery, armor, and air power.)
- Poor quality of communications equipment and a consequent lack of vertical coordination between chains of command and horizontal coordination between units (Sometimes, different Russian units fought against each other for hours without being aware of the fact.)
- Lack of coordination between the Army, the Air Force, and the Internal Troops; inability of many senior officers (up to the rank of general) to command and coordinate the actions of their subordinates

Chechen advantages:

- Better intelligence than the Russian army (Dudayev knew about Russian troop movements, the names of Russian commanding officers, as well as their plans, in advance.)
- A highly motivated, all volunteer force–whoever joined the Chechen Army did so of his own volition
- Knowledge of Russian tactics, weapons, strengths, and deficiencies (Many officers and soldiers of Dudayev's force, including Dudayev himself, served in the Soviet Armed Forces and used the same weapons, uniforms and equipment as the Russian army, which sometimes made it difficult to tell them apart from the Russian troops.)
- Better communication (cell phones, local media, and civilians)
- Tactics of street fighting more effective than those of their Russian counterparts (By using small, mobile units armed with light weapons, Dudayev achieved lower manpower losses and much greater maneuverability.)

Figure IV-7. The Battle for Grozny

Public affairs also can enhance the probability of achieving operational objectives during urban campaigns. PA in an urban environment allows an adversary to engage the active support of noncombatants. The Chechen conflict represents the first time that Russian and foreign correspondents monitored a

Russian intervention. However, the Russian military failed to anticipate the importance of PA in their planning. For example, during the battle, Russian commanders prohibited their troops from speaking with the news media, while the Chechen rebels freely expressed their perspectives to the international press. In fact, the Chechens used mobile TV stations to override Russian TV transmissions and deliver messages from President Dudayev directly to the people. As a result, the Chechens (and many local Russians who were originally supportive of Russian involvement in the region) increasingly viewed the Russian military as an enemy, having received only one perspective of the conflict through the news media. Had the Russian military jammed Chechen broadcasts and employed mobile PA systems, it is possible they could have bolstered the noncombatant support for their efforts that was present at the outset of the campaign.

Major Observations:

- A clear, concise, and well-planned campaign is necessary for success
- The political and social realities that exist in an urban environment need to be recognized
- Intelligence and knowledge of the local terrain is a necessity when operating in an urban environment
- The use of SOF, PSYOP, PA, and CA may be essential in an urban operation
- The command and control structure needs to be able to adapt to the urban environment where communication may be difficult

Panama City, Panama
1989

Timeline: Operation JUST CAUSE

September 1987
- Senate passes resolution urging Panama to reestablish a civilian government; Panama protests alleged US violations of the Canal Treaty

November 1987
- Senate resolution cuts military and economic aid to Panama; Panamanians adopt resolution restricting US military presence

February 1988
- Noriega indicted on drug-related charges; US forces begin planning contingency operations in Panama (OPLAN BLUE SPOON)

14 March 1988
- First of four deployments of US forces begins providing additional security to US installations
- Noriega creates Dignity Battalions (DIGBATs) to augment the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)

16 March 1988
- Select PDF officers attempt a coup against Noriega

9 April 1988
- Joint Task Force Panama activated

7 May 1989
- Civilian elections are held and the results are invalidated two days later by Noriega; DIGBATs assault opposition candidates and crowds during victory parades

11 May 1989
- President Bush orders 1,900 additional combat troops to Panama (Operation NIMROD DANCER)

June-September 1989
- Contingency planning for military operations intensifies
- US begins conducting joint training/freedom of movement exercises (SAND FLEAS and PURPLE STORMS)

3 October 1989
- Noriega defeats second coup attempt; PDF demonstrates ability to quickly move units from Rio Hato and Ft. Cimmarron

15 December 1989
- Noriega proclaims himself supreme leader of Panama and declares a state of war with the US

16 December 1989
- Marine lieutenant shot and killed by PDF; Navy lieutenant and wife detained and assaulted by PDF

17 December 1989
- NCA directs execution of Operation JUST CAUSE

19 December 1989
- US forces alerted, marshaled, and launched

20 December 1989
- Task Force Atlantic secures Colon, Madden Dam, Gamboa, Renacer Prison, and Cerro Tigre
- Task Force Bayonet secures Ft. Amador, Comandancia, and PDF sites throughout Panama City
- Task Force Red secures Torrijos International Airport and Rio Hato
- Task Force Pacific secures Panama Viejo, Tinijitas, Ft. Cimmarron
- Task Force Black secures communications nodes, Pacora River Bridge
- Task Force Semper Fi secures Bridge of the Americas, Howard AFB

21 December 1989
- Panama Canal reopened for daylight operations
- Refugee situation becomes critical
- Task Force Bayonet begins CMO in Panama City

25 December 1989
- Rangers secure David, the last PDF stronghold
- Operations in western Panama continue successfully

3 January 1990
- Noriega surrenders to US forces

31 January 1990
- Operation JUST CAUSE ends and PROMOTE LIBERTY begins

Figure IV-8. Timeline: Operation JUST CAUSE

Figure IV-9. Map of Panama City, Panama

The military invasion of Panama was one of the largest and most complex joint airborne and ground contingency operations in recent history. Using rapid, precise, and overwhelming combat power, the JFC established total control in and around Panama City, isolated the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), and deposed Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. The operation demonstrates how the JFC can leverage meticulous planning, streamline command and control, and effectively use SOF and aerospace forces in future JUO to isolate enemy aggression.

Operational Background

During 1988–1989, following two failed coups, rampant brutality, anti-US demonstrations, and increased political tensions, US relations with Panama began to deteriorate significantly. On 15 December 1989, the National Assembly of Corregimiento declared Panama to be in a state of war with the US. In response to this declaration, on 17 December 1989, the NCA directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to execute Operation JUST CAUSE to protect American citizens, secure the Panama Canal, support democracy for the people of Panama, and apprehend the head of the PDF, Manuel Noriega.

Lieutenant General Stiner, Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF), had identified the critical nodes for the operation beforehand, targeting PDF strongholds, including garrisons, airports, ports, transportation centers, and media locations. On 20 December 1989, five task forces simultaneously attacked twenty-seven major targets and gained operational control in and around Panama City. Every major PDF installation along the Panama City to Colón north-south axis and along the Fort Cimarron to Rio Hato east-west axis was either hit directly or PDF forces were blocked at these points from moving into Panama City. Task Force Bayonet, the major fighting force in Panama City, captured and neutralized La Comandancia—Noriega's headquarters and the PDF's largest weapons cache. With La Comandancia in US hands and reinforcement routes blocked, the possibility of organized resistance by the PDF collapsed. On 3 January 1990, Noriega surrendered to US forces.

After organized resistance in Panama ended, the transition from combat to stability operations required immediate assistance to the local population. Widespread looting and general lawlessness had reduced Panama City to a state of anarchy. No US civilian agencies were prepared to assume responsibility for post-combat nation-building programs, forcing combat units to establish law and order and provide food, water, healthcare, traffic control, and garbage collection to the local population. CA and PSYOP personnel were used to bolster support for the newly installed government of President Endara. By 31 January 1990, the situation had stabilized and the democratic process had begun to take hold. Operation JUST CAUSE ended, and US troops were withdrawn.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Standard intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) did not take into account such factors as civilian population, logistics sustainability, or critical resource and economic areas. These factors are crucial in environments where civilian responses, including massive flight, passive support for the enemy, or overt aggression, must be foreseen and contingency plans prepared.

Figure IV-10. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Despite intensive planning and sound doctrine, US commanders were not able to anticipate some of the tactical challenges of ground maneuver during the urban battle. US forces encountered many unfamiliar obstacles unique to urban terrain.

Force Protection

Light armored vehicles (LAVs) protected soldiers moving through the built-up areas of Panama City. Also, the *Rough Rider* concept of protecting convoys by interspersing armed troops in LAVs among trucks of normal cargo allowed a discreet build-up of forces during Operation JUST CAUSE.

Figure IV-11. Force Protection

For example:

- In the battle for La Comandancia, the PDF built barricades blocking access to the compound using large commercial vehicles and garbage trucks and established firing positions from surrounding apartment buildings. As well, all structures in the compound were reinforced with concrete, limiting the impact of firepower from M-113s.
- During the assault on Renacer Prison, where two American journalists were being held, soldiers had to maneuver through concertina wire, chain link fences, steel doors, and concrete walls.

Pressed for time and under heavy fire in both instances, the task forces' organic weapons were slow to breach these obstacles. In future JUO, the JFC should consider the influence of movement and the ramifications of insufficient or inappropriate firepower in the urban environment.

Specifically, Operation JUST CAUSE revealed the need for increased situational awareness to avoid fratricide during urban battles. During combat operations on, around, or above urban terrain, forces can be fragmented, visibility reduced, and communications limited by physical structures such as buildings, streets, and walls. As a result, in two cases during the operation, soldiers received friendly fire. A helicopter fired on an Army squad and killed two soldiers in a night operation at Rio Hato. Another instance of fratricide occurred during the battle for La Comandancia, when an AC-130 *Spectre* gunship wounded a number of soldiers while they were attacking one of their objectives in the PDF complex.

Operational Planning

Prior to the deployment of JTF South, the US spent two years planning the operation and three months fine tuning it. Numerous trips to Panama were taken to ensure that all targeting and logistical issues were addressed and resolved. Even before receiving command, the CJTF insisted that sufficient forces be massed and committed in the initial assault to overwhelm the PDF in every operational area. There were extensive rehearsals and nearly half of the operational forces were in place in Panama before 16 December.

Intelligence

Prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, military personnel with fluency in Spanish were sent on repeated tours with in-country Army and Marine units to gather intelligence on the PDF

- US forces received excellent information on the size and loyalty of the PDF
- Noriega was watched, listened to, and tracked

This type of HUMINT contributed greatly to the success of Operation JUST CAUSE

Figure IV-12. Intelligence

The contingency plan, code named PRAYER BOOK, was built on maximum surprise, with maximum combat forces using minimum force. This allowed for a concentration of combat power to overwhelm the opposing force and limit collateral damage. The plan was complex, involving both SOF and conventional forces that were carefully synchronized for maximum disruptive effect. Planning and operations were fully integrated across all four Services, while the sequencing of forces took full advantage of land, naval, air, and special operations capabilities.

Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces were involved in Panama throughout the entire campaign. SOF helped to prepare the battlefield and then reinforced the main effort once the airborne attack was over. SOF elements included Army Special Forces, Army Rangers, Army Special Operations Aviation, Naval Special Warfare, and Air Force Special Operations Forces. SOF participated in almost every action during Operation JUST CAUSE including infiltration, special

reconnaissance, precision strike, and underwater demolition. These small, highly skilled units conducted attacks, often supported by AC-130 *Spectre* gunships, and were able to penetrate densely populated operational areas successfully as quick reaction forces. Other uses of SOF included the attachment of PSYOP and CA personnel to various task force units to serve as advisors, translators, liaisons, and assist in refugee control. This proved highly effective and aided in reestablishing law and order, promoting stability, and assisting in the establishment of a new Panamanian government. In future JUO, the JFC should strongly consider the use of SOF capabilities as force multipliers when working in a multifaceted urban environment.

Aerospace Power in the Urban Environment

Operations in Panama highlight the importance of aerospace power in supporting JUO. Throughout Operation JUST CAUSE, aerospace forces played a critical role in protecting US citizens and defeating PDF elements. For example, AC-130 *Spectre* gunships conducted precision strike operations, airlift platforms performed strategic airdrop and airland operations, EC-130s jammed PDF radio and TV stations, and multi-service rotary-wing aviation provided maneuver for ground forces. These operations helped to neutralize PDF units in the urban area and interdicted key reinforcing units at numerous chokepoints throughout the city. In future JUO, the JFC should consider the full range of aerospace options to shape, control, and/or defeat an urban adversary that may contribute to the JFC's overall campaign plan.

Major Observations:

- Meticulous planning and extensive training help overcome many potential obstacles in JUO
- SOF capabilities are force multipliers before, during, and after an urban operation
- Streamlined command and control and identification of critical nodes allow the US to leverage all its capabilities

- Panama highlights the importance of aerospace power in conducting precision strike operations and supporting ground force operations during a JUO

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Port-au-Prince, Haiti
1994

Timeline: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

- December 1990
  - Jean-Bertrand Aristide is elected president
- September 1991
  - Aristide is deposed in a bloody coup and General Raoul Cedras takes control of Haiti
- 3 July 1993
  - Governor's Island Accord is signed, calling for the early retirement of General Cedras, the formation and training of a new civilian police force, and the return of President Aristide on 30 October 1993
- 30 October 1993
  - Cedras refuses to step down as president
- January 1994
  - Joint Task Force 180 established by President Clinton
- 31 July 1994
  - UN Security Council unanimously votes to approve the invasion of Haiti
  - MNF established, UNMIH redesignated
- August 1994
  - Preparations for military action move forward on parallel tracks of OPLANS 2375 and 2380; planning for the Haiti operation is interrupted by Cuban refugee crisis
- 7 September 1994
  - CJCS briefs President Clinton on what will eventually be named Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY
- 12 September 1994
  - US Atlantic Command (USACOM) chairs interagency meeting to brief and plan the Haiti operation
- 13-14 September 1994
  - USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* departs Norfolk with elements of 10th Mountain Division; USS *America* departs Norfolk carrying troops of XVIII Airborne Corps and SOF; fourteen reserve cargo carriers called up
- 15 September 1994
  - President Clinton says US has "exhausted every available alternative;" former President Jimmy Carter, Gen. (Ret.) Colin Powell, and former Senator Sam Nunn depart for Haiti on final diplomatic effort; C-130s already in the air
- 18 September 1994
  - Carter-Powell-Nunn initiative is successful, convincing General Cedras to cede power
- 19 September 1994
  - MNF transitions from forced entry operations plan (OPLAN 2375, Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY) to a permissive entry operations plan (OPLAN 2380, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY)
  - 21,000 US forces disembark at Port-au-Prince uncontested
- 20 September 1994
  - Haitian security forces beat pro-democracy demonstrators in Port-au-Prince
- 22 September 1994
  - A firefight between USMC and Haitian forces in Cap-Haitien leaves 10 Haitians dead
- 15 October 1994
  - President Aristide arrives in Haiti and the reduction in US forces begins immediately
- 31 March 1995:
  - US-led MNF formally turns command of the Haiti operation over to UNMIH

Figure IV-13. Timeline: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY



Figure IV-14. Map of Port-au-Prince, Haiti

During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, US political leaders used the threat of a decisive, immediate invasion to negotiate terms for the reestablishment of peace and democracy in Haiti. Following this diplomatic compromise, US forces permissively entered the capital city of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, as part of a multinational peacekeeping force to ensure civil order so that a stable, democratic Haitian government could return to power. Throughout the operation, US forces dissuaded violent opposition in Haiti by encouraging restraint and cooperation among the Haitian people through extensive civil-military operations that fostered a relationship of trust and cooperation between US forces and Haitian civilians. The US experience in Haiti suggests that well-trained forces can conduct peacekeeping operations in urban areas with low costs and significant benefits.

Operational Background

In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the Haitian presidency in a fair and democratic election. Aristide took office in February 1991,

only to be overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, Commander of the Haitian armed forces. Aristide was forced to leave the country in September of the same year.

In the three years that followed, over 3,000 Haitians were killed; and from 1991 to 1992, more than 40,000 refugees fled the country in a large-scale exodus. The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and *de facto* government sanctioned repression, assassination, torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's condemnation. The failure of diplomatic overtures and limited impact of economic sanctions throughout 1993 swayed the UN to adopt Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Aristide's presidency. Then-Secretary of Defense Perry tasked the US military with developing a plan to forcibly remove the Haitian military and establish a secure environment for democracy (Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY), as well as an alternative plan of permissive entry into Haiti if diplomatic overtures proved effective (Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY).

By the end of 1993, Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY seemed imminent. Between 8 January and 18 September 1994, major US communication exercises were conducted, planning continued, and under JTF direction, the Coast Guard, Navy, Air Force, and Marines participated in rehearsals that simulated the requirements for an invasion of Haiti. On 31 July 1994, after eight months of intensive training and preparation, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the invasion of Haiti.

The day before D-day, former President Jimmy Carter, former Senator Sam Nunn, and General (Ret.) Colin Powell traveled to Haiti in a final effort to resolve the situation diplomatically. The Carter mission ultimately was successful in negotiating the resignation and departure of Haiti's top military leaders. However, it still required the initiation of the deployment of first-echelon invasion units to Haiti to convince the Haitian military that US threats were credible and that force would be used if negotiations failed. On 18 September, the Haitian

military promised to cooperate with a multinational task force in establishing a stable political climate so that Aristide could be reinstated. With the signing of the Carter Accord, the OPLAN for the alternative Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was initiated, and US forces entered Port-au-Prince without resistance. The US military's mission in Haiti had changed from a forced entry to a permissive entry operation focused primarily on nation-building and humanitarian assistance.

Upon arrival in Haiti, the US Army's 10th Mountain Division immediately secured the port, the civilian airport, key roads, and the US Embassy. US forces established civil order in Port-au-Prince and dedicated a special military police force to help curb street violence. Despite these efforts, on 30 September, a group of Aristide's opponents attacked demonstrators marching in Port-au-Prince. An estimated five Haitians were killed and scores were wounded. The day after the massacre, troops moved to arrest members of paramilitary militias—forcibly entering their headquarters and offices and removing all weapons, documents, and people found inside. Following this action by US forces, Emmanuel Constant, leader of the main opposition party, announced that he would accept President Aristide's return and called on militia members to lay down their arms.

The success of these raids reinforced the US policy of dealing aggressively with adversary governments to ensure the protection of unarmed Haitians. The US continued to confirm this policy by dismantling Haiti's main arsenal of heavy weapons, Camp d'Application, as well as other smaller weapon caches, as part of its weapons control and reduction program. Meanwhile, to help ensure the protection of noncombatants, the French, Canadian, and US governments instituted a program to develop a new police force. The project emphasized constitutional procedures, respect for human rights, and legitimate law enforcement practices. International monitors were placed in Haiti to ensure that the new police force maintained ties to the new civilian government and was dedicated to ensuring public order.

While President Aristide remained in exile, US forces had pacified the country and kept order. On 15 October 1994, President Aristide returned to Haiti

and resumed his political activities. In March 1995, an expanded United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), numbering 6,000 troops, replaced the multinational force.

The Urban Area

The dictatorship of the Duvalier family and the continuing mismanagement and oppression of military rule had impoverished Haiti and largely destroyed the fragile civil society. In addition, the international economic embargo had taken its toll and Port-au-Prince was in a state of disrepair. When US forces finally arrived in Port-au-Prince, the great majority of Haiti's citizens welcomed the US military presence in the hope that it would restore civil order.

To help rebuild the country's infrastructure, US forces worked with Haitian contractors and laborers on reconstruction projects. Unfortunately, Haiti's infrastructure required significant improvements. The roads of Port-au-Prince were too narrow to carry heavy truck traffic and there were few functioning traffic lights. The electric supply was uncontrolled and power outages were frequent. Upon arrival, US Army engineers built roads, restored electricity and clean drinking water to the city, helped deliver food and medical supplies, initiated garbage collection, and reopened schools. By the end of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, US forces had worked with Haitian officials to improve public health, sanitation, education, welfare, public administration, justice, transportation, and communication systems. In future JUO, the JFC should keep in mind that providing basic services such as these to displaced or dispersed civilian populations may be an integral part of MOOTW in an urban area.

Civil-Military Operations

The large civilian population in Port-au-Prince and the complexities of the humanitarian mission required the US to interact constantly with other US governmental entities, such as USAID and the State and Justice Departments, along with a variety of NGOs that also supported nation-building in Haiti. To help resolve the cultural and operational differences between the military and

civilian organizations, the JTF created a formal political-military operations plan that included a CMOC. US forces also established a HACC as a part of the CMOC to serve as a clearinghouse for all humanitarian requests for assistance and to prevent NGOs from inundating the headquarters. CA and Army Special Forces personnel were instrumental in manning and facilitating these activities. In retrospect, the relative smoothness of the operation owes much to the intensity of civil-military cooperation that the CMOC helped to foster.

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations in Urban Areas

Intelligence is as critical in MOOTW in urban areas as it is in combat operations in urban areas. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the Joint Staff supported USACOM intelligence needs by setting up the Haiti Intelligence Joint Task Force. The JFC utilized all available resources, drawing on the experience of the Joint Staff J-2, the State Department, and other sources to gain a deeper understanding of the main personalities of the local leaders in Haiti. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System coordinated the flow of tactical intelligence to all levels of command.

Figure IV-15. Intelligence Support to Joint Operations in Urban Areas

In addition to the CMOC, Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) were established in June of 1994 to support US policy to restore Haiti's democratic government, counteract misinformation broadcasts by Haiti's *de facto* military regime, and disseminate messages from Aristide to the Haitians. The MISTs were typically five-person teams composed of a PSYOP officer; a noncommissioned officer; two PSYOP specialists with photography, videography, journalism, or editing skills; and a civilian analyst with linguistic and area specialist skills. The MISTs interacted with both US and host nation militaries and law enforcement agencies to develop appropriate PSYOP missions, information campaigns, and military intelligence support.

Psychological Operations

Even before Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY began, PSYOP provided vital support to the US mission in Haiti and was a valuable force multiplier. Aircraft flew missions into Haiti under the call sign of RADIO

DEMOCRACY to persuade listeners to refrain from violence so the country could restore political legitimacy and to dissuade Haitians from migrating to the US. The radio program also was used to discredit the ruling military junta and convey the US intent to remove the corrupt regime. Prior to the arrival of forces, US aircraft dropped millions of leaflets over Port-au-Prince encouraging the civilian population to increase pressure on the illegal regime to step down.

Immediately following Carter's diplomatic settlement, helicopters flew over the city broadcasting aerial messages announcing that US troops were coming in peace to help restore democracy. By reducing tensions and encouraging supportive behavior, information campaigns helped to promote restraint and enhance military security. Live PSYOP mobile loudspeaker messages promoted noninterference while posters and leaflets emphasized civil order. By advocating reconciliation rather than revenge, PSYOP helped curb violence and facilitated disarmament programs. Additionally, as part of the weapons reduction policy, a Weapons-for-Cash program used radio commercials, mobile and aerial loudspeaker messages, and posters and handbill distributions to convince Haitians to turn in weapons and explosives or information regarding the location of weapons caches.

Major Observations:

- Well-trained forces can conduct peacekeeping operations in urban areas with low costs and significant benefits
- Use of a CMOC and a HACC helped facilitate and coordinate cooperation between the military, US governmental agencies, and NGOs
- SOF can provide vital support to urban operations by helping to foster local support and cooperation

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Mogadishu, Somalia
1991–1993

Timeline: Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II

- January 1991
  - The government of dictator Siad Barre falls and civil war ensues
- Summer 1991
  - Political chaos reigns in Somalia; local warlords control the country and there is constant fighting among militias
  - A long-standing drought destroys farms and livestock, famine is rampant throughout the country
- August 1992
  - President George Bush orders an emergency airlift of food to Somalia
  - CENTCOM activates Operation PROVIDE RELIEF (UNOSOM I)
- November 1992
  - UN ship attempting to deliver food to Mogadishu is attacked
  - The UN Security Council calls for immediate military action
- 3 December 1992
  - US-led UNITAF is authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 794 to establish a secure environment in Somalia to ensure the distribution of relief supplies during Operation RESTORE HOPE
- 7 January 1993
  - In response to persistent sniper fire, 400 Marines raid a compound in Mogadishu headed by Mohammed Farah Aideed, the largest raid during Operation RESTORE HOPE
- February 1993
  - 24 Somalis are killed in a street fight between rival clans, causing increased rioting in Mogadishu
- 3 March 1993
  - UN Security General submits Resolution 814 to UN Security Council proposing the formation of UNOSOM II
- 23 March 1993
  - US forces perform a final withdrawal from participation in Operation RESTORE HOPE
- 26 March 1993
  - UN Security Council Resolution 814 directs formation of UNOSOM II, UN-led operation with expanded enforcement power to disarm Somali factions and establish democratic governance
- 4 May 1993
  - The transition to UNOSOM II is completed
- 5 June 1993
  - The Somali National Alliance (SNA) ambushes Pakistani forces, changing the nature of UNOSOM II operations
  - Operational tempo increases
- 26 August 1993
  - Task Force Ranger, comprised of over 400 special operations personnel and Army Rangers, trained in urban combat, arrives in Somalia to assist in maintaining peace and aid UN efforts to arrest Aideed
- 25 September 1993
  - A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) helicopter is shot down
- 3-4 October 1993
  - 100 Rangers and SOF operators of Task Force Ranger launch raid to capture key SNA officials
  - 18 US soldiers killed in the battle
- 8 October 1993
  - A force augmentation package is deployed
- 9 October 1993
  - President Clinton sets 31 March 1994 as the date for US withdrawal from Somalia
- 20 October 1993
  - JTF-Somalia, made up of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps elements, is stood up to provide force protection during the phased withdrawal
- 1 December 1993
  - US forces begin withdrawal
- 23 March 1994
  - US mission in Somalia ends

Figure IV-16. Timeline: Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II

Figure IV-17. Map of Mogadishu, Somalia

The US military's experience in Mogadishu during Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II offers a number of useful lessons for future commanders planning to execute JUO. In particular, US operations in Mogadishu illustrate the unique challenges posed by Third World urban environments, the importance of HUMINT when dealing with unfamiliar societies and turbulent political conditions in areas populated by noncombatants, and the difficulties of command and control in JUO.

Operational Background

By the early 1990s, a civil war involving more than 14 clans divided Somalia into a nation of hostile social factions held together by weak political alliances. In 1992, drought and famine compounded ethnic tensions and political instability, creating a potentially explosive situation. The UN responded by sending relief supplies and humanitarian aid to Mogadishu, but widespread looting and lawlessness prevented supplies from reaching the hungry and sick. Consequently, on 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council authorized UN member states "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" (Resolution 794, operative para. 10). US forces became significantly involved in the ensuing humanitarian operations: RESTORE HOPE and UNOSOM II.

The objective of Operation RESTORE HOPE, which lasted from 9 December 1992 through 26 March 1993, was to develop and lead a multinational military coalition known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF was tasked with providing a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies to the "famine belt" in southern Somalia. As the largest operating port in the country and prior focus for nongovernmental humanitarian relief activity, Mogadishu became the key logistics hub supporting all operations in Somalia. Consequently, the US designated the city as the entry point for the operational build-up of over 38,000 troops and as the headquarters for the coalition of twenty-one nations aided by over thirty active humanitarian relief organizations.

The coalition force first gained control over the flow of relief supplies into and through the city and stabilized the Somali militia conflict. The operation then expanded to additional ports and airfields throughout the country's interior with key towns throughout Somalia serving as distribution sites for relief suppliers. In less than a month, additional distribution sites were operating in the major towns of Baledogle, Gialalassi, Bardera, Belet Weyn, Oddur, and eventually extended to the southern town of Kismayo.

Figure IV-18. Map of Somalia

With minimal use of force, UNITAF established a secure environment in which relief reached the needy. In March 1993, the US began to pull its forces out of Somalia and hand-off the UNITAF operation to UNOSOM II. The US had successfully provided effective, professional, and unified C2 for the coalition force, enabling UNITAF to fulfill its limited mandate. Despite this success, hostile faction leaders and political chaos remained a problem on the ground in Mogadishu. Maintaining order increasingly proved to be beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM II peacekeepers.

The transition from Operation RESTORE HOPE to UNOSOM II took place in May 1993. UNOSOM II went beyond the limited mandate of Operation RESTORE HOPE to include the advancement of political reconciliation in Somalia. UN Security Council Resolution 814 directed UNOSOM II to disarm Somali factions and to hold accountable Somalis who breached international law. The shift from a peacekeeping mission to a peace enforcement mission was rejected by Somali clan leaders who perceived the UN as having lost its neutral position among rival factions. One of the more powerful clan leaders, General Mohammed Farah Aideed, aggressively turned against the UN operation and began a radio campaign that characterized UN soldiers as an occupation force trying to re-colonize Somalia.

Partially in response to Aideed's call for collective armed resistance, UNOSOM II conducted short-warning inspections of weapons caches. On 5 June 1993, the Pakistani contingent was ordered to inspect an arsenal under the control of Aideed. However, the Pakistani commander was not informed that Aideed had threatened that such an inspection would "lead to war." Unprepared for trouble, the Pakistani brigade went to the inspection in unarmored vehicles. Aideed ordered an ambush to test the UN troops and to shore up his sagging support. The inadequate communication procedures between friendly forces led to a disastrous battle between Pakistani soldiers and Aideed's men, resulting in 24 Pakistani killed and 57 wounded.

In response to the June ambush of the Pakistani unit, UN forces launched attacks against Aideed's home and his command center. The UN also issued a warrant for the arrest of Aideed, but he escaped and went into hiding. Less than a month later, a US helicopter attacked an Aideed stronghold, killing more than a dozen Somalis. Somali mobs retaliated for this action, causing tension and violence in Mogadishu to intensify. The US responded by deploying a contingent of 400 US Army Rangers and other SOF personnel that arrived in Somalia on 26 August 1993.

The new task force was assigned to assist the US Army's 10th Mountain Division units in maintaining the peace in and around Mogadishu and to aid the

UN efforts to arrest Aideed and neutralize his followers. On 3 and 4 October, a group of nearly 100 Rangers and SOF operators executed a raid to capture some of Aideed's closest supporters. Two *Blackhawk* helicopters supporting the raid were shot down, and militia gunmen and hostile mobs surrounded the Americans. It took over ten hours for a relief force, with help from Pakistani and Malaysian troops, to break through and rescue the surrounded troops. Eighteen American soldiers were killed during the battle, resulting in calls by Congress for the withdrawal of American forces from the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Based on these events, US leaders concluded that the objectives of UNOSOM II were not achievable. The main US objective in Somalia then became self-protection until US forces could be withdrawn. In less than 72 hours, US strategic lift brought significant reinforcements to Mogadishu. Over the following months, assets such as AC-130 *Spectre* gunships successfully conducted "air presence" deterrent operations, helped target illegal militia weapon caches, and provided accurate close air support to UN ground forces during the final days of the UN withdrawal in a steadily deteriorating security environment. US forces began their withdrawal on 1 December 1993.

The failure of UNOSOM II must be placed in a historical context. In every previous UN-commanded field operation, success has depended on a high degree of local support for UN objectives. No peacekeeping operation has ever been strong enough to impose its will on warring factions. Although initially successful in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, operations in Somalia, and particularly in its capital city of Mogadishu, ultimately reflected the inherent difficulties of coalition operations and vague missions with multiple, and seemingly contradictory, objectives.

The Urban Area

During operations in Somalia, lack of infrastructure posed significant complications and hazards to the JFC. When US forces first entered the city, Mogadishu's basic infrastructure was in disrepair; air transportation was limited; harbor facilities were underdeveloped; and there was no telephone system. Consequently, the JTF established a temporary base of operations upon arrival in

Mogadishu. Major improvements in roads, warehousing, and other facilities were undertaken by a Naval Construction Regiment. This important engineering work improved the reception sites and enabled more forces and their equipment to join the relief effort.

Intelligence Gathering

Low Technology and Unconventional Defenses

Local clan forces employed numerous low-technology options to report the movement of US forces. The JFC should anticipate these types of unconventional defenses and be prepared to respond to the unique complexities of operating in the urban environment.

Examples of low technology and unconventional defenses:

- Drums were used as a means of communication
- Kites were used to interfere with helicopter operations
- Noncombatant support for rival clans was rallied using radio campaigns; mobs were enticed to attack UN forces
- Militia gunmen intermingled with civilian crowds making it difficult for UN forces to properly identify the enemy

Figure IV-19. Low Technology and Unconventional Defenses

A JFC should recognize that every urban area is defined by a unique set of physical, social, economic, cultural, and historical circumstances. In Mogadishu, Somali social, economic, and political relations are mediated by an unwritten social code dictated by kinship and religious precepts. Even though Somalis share a single ethnic background, a single language, and a single religion (Sunni Islam), clan rivalry and a patrilineal hierarchy divide the country. These cultural cleavages contribute to a volatile political atmosphere in which clan personalities and historical relationships govern decision-making. Understanding this foreign system of government significantly helped the JFC of Operation RESTORE HOPE to make use of local assets and provided him with the situational awareness necessary to achieve mission success. In comparison, during UNOSOM II, US leaders failed to take certain factors of Somali culture into consideration, contributing to the operation's failure.

During Operation RESTORE HOPE, HUMINT gathering took advantage of the humanitarian NGOs that had been working on the ground in Mogadishu prior to the formation of UNITAF. These organizations had developed

relationships with official contacts, observed first-hand the dynamics of Somali politics, and were able to provide significant intelligence on militia activities. This type of HUMINT is essential in urban operations. Continuous monitoring of the local population's disposition and the adversary's intentions ensures that diplomatic and/or military efforts are appropriate to the situation and well received by relevant political leaders.

To track and disperse this type of intelligence, US forces established a CMOC to serve as a clearinghouse for information between the humanitarian agencies and the multinational coalition force. The CMOC communicated daily with State Department Presidential Envoy Robert Oakley, a former US Ambassador to Somalia who knew most of the major Somali political players. Clearing a political path for the US-led relief effort, Oakley and a small staff traveled into southern Somalia explaining to local leaders what to expect as troops arrived at distribution sites.

The importance of understanding local politics and integrating indigenous decision-makers into an urban operation cannot be overstated. Leveraging local support ensured that US-led forces would be welcomed and helped sustain a calm political atmosphere in Somalia throughout the entire relief effort. UNITAF units tried to build on local leadership and reestablish elements of the Somali National Police—one of the few respected national institutions in the country that was not clan-based. The police force staffed checkpoints throughout Mogadishu and provided crowd control at feeding centers. The local police force provided both security and valuable HUMINT to UNITAF.

In contrast, as the mission in Somalia changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement during UNOSOM II, the UN failed to develop a full awareness of the local population's disposition and did not obtain adequate intelligence on the adversary's intentions and capabilities. In-depth intelligence gathering could have helped the JFC to predict the proclivities of adversaries, their method of operation, and the way in which they interacted with their environment. For example, a greater commitment to intelligence during UNOSOM II would have uncovered the fact that many militia officers had extensive training from the

Soviet military academy in Odessa and from Italian military schools and were able to adapt technologies and incorporate unusual tactics. As reflected in the 5 June ambush of Pakistani soldiers, and later during the 3–4 October battle, the JFC underestimated the military capabilities of rival factions, and as a result, UN forces were not adequately prepared for contingency situations.

As this case study suggests, intelligence gathering is essential to developing operational awareness in the urban environment. A JFC planning an urban operation should attempt to understand the social norms and political customs that define the urban area. A range of HUMINT sources exists to assist the JFC in developing an understanding of the adversary in relation to the urban area. It may be necessary for a JFC planning a joint urban operation to call upon a variety of nontraditional human sources, such as NGOs, foreign experts, anthropologists, regional specialists, expatriates, CA personnel, and SOF, for vital information on the urban area.

Command and Control

Maintaining synchronized and efficient command and control is particularly important in an urban operating environment. From a ground perspective, joint forces must be able to maneuver through densely populated, three-dimensional terrain that can complicate communications and fragment units. Joint forces face similar challenges when operating around or over such terrain. An effective chain of command can streamline tactical complications by providing clear and precise operating procedures. On the other hand, a vague or indiscriminate chain of command will hinder the ability of a JFC to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces during urban operations, as was the case during UNOSOM II.

The shift in tactics from peace operations to peace enforcement marked the transition to UNOSOM II and necessitated a change in C2. Throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE, the JFC possessed the elements—a concentration of effort, forces that had trained together, and well coordinated logistics support—to successfully achieve operational and strategic objectives. In contrast, during UNOSOM II, the JFC had a more difficult task. In particular, an unusual

assortment of command relationships made the exercise of authority and unity of effort difficult. UNOSOM II was composed of contingents from different armies and was constrained by linguistic barriers, doctrinal and operational differences, and divergent capabilities. Throughout the UN operation, complex and inefficient command relationships and a lack of standardization and interoperability among the coalition forces resulted in breakdowns in communications and logistics.

All the problems of C2 inherent in a multinational peacekeeping operation (lack of unified doctrine, nonstandard equipment and operating procedures, national checks on contingents' freedom to follow UN orders) were magnified by UNOSOM II's ambitious mandate and the dangers of the operating environment. The breakdown in operational control of Mogadishu during UNOSOM II was characterized by:

- The fragmentation of forces by confining each unit to specific geographic areas
- Inconsistent disarmament and weapons-screening policies that varied according to geographic sector
- Different ROE for the various UNOSOM II contingents, which confused Somali expectations and left coalition soldiers uncertain as to how effectively their foreign commanders might defend them
- Complex command and control arrangements that delayed communications between coalition forces (for example, when the US JFC asked an Italian commander for armored assistance, he had to wait for the Italian unit commander to receive approval from Rome)

From the breakdown in command and control during UNOSOM II, it is clear that the UN did not properly plan for direct or indirect opposition to the peace enforcement mission. In future JUO, the JFC needs to develop the operational awareness and in-depth intelligence necessary to respond to a variety of operations as mission objectives may change. The JFC should also keep in mind that the urban area is a complex and unique operating environment in which

the ramifications of inefficient and unorganized C2 can be immediate and may result in a large number of casualties.

Major Observations:

- Understanding the social, cultural, and political atmosphere is necessary for enhancing situational awareness and force protection
- Good HUMINT and intelligence is invaluable to understanding the local environment
- NGOs may have in-country assets, HUMINT sources, and established relationships that could prove beneficial to the military operation
- In coalition operations, countries must be assigned tasks that correspond to their capabilities
- Any ROE discrepancies need to be resolved prior to, or early in, the operation
- Establishing a robust C2I architecture is critical for rapid dissemination of information and intelligence to the forces engaged in the urban fight

Belfast, Northern Ireland
1969–Present

Timeline: Belfast, Northern Ireland

- 1949: Republic of Ireland declared; Northern Ireland's (NI) six counties remain part of the United Kingdom
- 1968: Civil rights marches and demonstrations begin and continue through the next year
- 1969: Civil unrest leads to the deployment of British Army troops to augment the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
- 1970: First British Army soldier killed
- 1972: Direct Rule established; British Regular Army troop levels reach 22,000 men
- 1974: Northern Ireland Executive collapses; Northern Ireland (Special Provisions) Act instituted
- 1977: Reorganized RUC resumes the lead in security matters; introduction of Special Air Service to Northern Ireland
- 1978: Northern Ireland (Special Provisions) Act refined; Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) declares they are "preparing for a long war"
- August 1979: Lord Mountbatten killed in Ireland; ten days later, 18 soldiers killed by PIRA bomb; worst single-day death toll for 10 years
- May 1981: IRA member Bobby Sands dies after hunger strike; widespread rioting in Belfast
- October 1981: Irish Republican Army (IRA) initiates 2-month bombing campaign in London
- November 1981: Unionist MP killed in Belfast
- May 1983: Direct Rule extended
- October 1984: First British soldier jailed for killing a civilian in Northern Ireland, rejoins his regiment after 26 months in jail
- November 1985: Anglo-Irish Agreement signed giving Ireland a consultative role in NI
- December 1986: Intensive bombing campaign against military targets throughout NI
- March 1988: Loyalist terrorist opens fire at IRA funeral, killing three; during the subsequent IRA funeral, two British soldiers dragged from their car in West Belfast and murdered—covered on TV and Army film
- July 1992: Royal Irish Regiment created as a result of the merger of the Royal Irish Rangers and the Ulster Defense Regiment
- December 1993: Joint Declaration of British and Irish governments that the Irish people in both parts of Ireland have the right to decide their own future
- August 1994: IRA announces cease-fire
- October 1994: Combined Loyalist Military Command announces cease-fire
- December 1994: First British troop reduction
- January 1995: Army ends daylight patrols in Belfast, relaxes security measures
- June 1995: Further British troop reduction
- February 1996: IRA cease-fire ends; Army patrols resume
- July 1997: IRA re-institutes cease-fire
- March 1998: Good Friday Agreement signed, finalizing the multi-party talks

Figure IV-20. Timeline: Belfast, Northern Ireland



Figure IV-21. Map of Belfast, Northern Ireland

The British military's experience in Belfast from 1969 to the present offers a number of useful lessons for conducting operations on urban terrain. Specifically, British operations in Belfast illuminate the challenges of conducting prolonged stability operations in an urban environment and, in particular, the difficulties involved in balancing force protection requirements with the exigencies of noncombatant population control in a diverse and divided city.

Operational Background

In 1921, an Irish Free State was created, granting autonomy to most of the island of Ireland, but leaving the northern six counties (historically known as Ulster) under British control. In 1949, the Irish Free State declared itself the Republic of Ireland, with Ulster remaining part of the United Kingdom.

The "Troubles" of Ulster stem from intense disagreement between the Catholic minority population and the "loyal" Protestant majority over the inclusion of the region within the United Kingdom. Catholics, for the most part, are opposed to British control, while Protestants typically favor it. The disagreement has been exacerbated by real and perceived social, economic, and political inequalities between the two groups. Over the decades, Catholic-

Protestant differences have resulted in an uneasy atmosphere punctuated by episodes of extreme violence from both sides. In 1969, as Catholic and Protestant factions began rioting and violence spread to many neighborhoods in Belfast, British troops were deployed to augment the local Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as a stabilizing force throughout Ulster.

The British operational strategy has remained constant since its initial employment 30 years ago. The British have focused their objectives on three pillars: attrition, deterrence, and reassurance. They have established strongpoint bases in the neighborhoods with the worst violence, maintained a visible, stabilizing presence throughout the city, and implemented an extensive intelligence network to identify and apprehend terrorists in order to stem the violence. This stabilizing presence has assisted the RUC in maintaining law and order throughout the city and has supported stability throughout Ulster.

In Belfast, the British focused on maintaining a continuous presence throughout the city, concentrating in the partisan neighborhoods that were the scene of much of the violence. This presence has fluctuated in response to the level of violence and terrorism in the city. During times of increased violence, the British asserted almost total control of the city by saturating Belfast with a British military presence. During the periods of successful negotiations between the relative calm allowed the British to relax their control of the city and reduce patrolling and operations.

Tactically, the British have perfected stability operations in an urban environment. They have developed special task organizations to provide the greatest mobility, coverage, and reaction throughout the city, relying on a combination of foot, vehicle, and aerial patrols as well as observation platforms. The integration of the Special Air Service (SAS) and other specially trained units to include intelligence, engineering, and aviation assets has greatly enhanced British military effectiveness throughout the operation.

While the British military operation has always been considered relatively successful in achieving its military objectives, only recently have peace negotiations shown promise in bringing about a permanent end to the violence.

In 1994, both the IRA and the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) agreed to a cease-fire and increased their efforts at negotiation. This period of relative calm allowed the British Army to begin troop reductions and relax force protection standards. In February 1996, the IRA renounced the cease-fire and the violence increased. The negotiations continued, however, and in July 1997 the cease-fire was reinstituted. In March 1998, the British, the IRA, and Loyalist factions signed the Good Friday Agreement, finalizing the negotiations and bringing more stability to the province, though not yet ending the conflict.

Belfast's Influence on the Northern Ireland Campaign

As the cultural, political, and population center of Northern Ireland, Belfast is important to the British military campaign to bring stability to the area. However, the capital city of Belfast is not the critical center of gravity for factions seeking to influence the political settlement. Unlike many counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the French in Algeria, where the control of the capital city of Algiers was central to defeating the FLN insurgents, Belfast has never played such a role.

The objective of the British military in Northern Ireland has never been to defeat the military arms of the various factions; it has simply been to deter these forces from violent action until the UK government can implement an agreeable political solution. As such, British strategy has targeted terrorist forces throughout Northern Ireland, as opposed to focusing on more compartmentalized geographic areas. Identifying terrorist cells, providing a stabilizing presence, and responding to violent acts are equally necessary in the countryside and urban areas. The difference between the two environments is not necessarily in their levels of importance, but rather in the tactics used to accomplish these objectives. The modern transportation and communication networks of Northern Ireland make it virtually impossible to isolate the city from the countryside. Consequently, the British have concentrated their efforts on isolating the whole of Northern Ireland from outside interference.

The Urban Area

Like many urban areas, Belfast is divided into major neighborhoods. Over the years, many of these neighborhoods have become divided by the conflict, with each faction retreating into the haven of its own section. Violence erupts when members of one faction cross the neighborhood boundaries to confront and attack other faction members. The infamous neighborhoods of Shankill (99% Protestant) and Falls (97% Catholic) are but two of the many sections of Belfast which have erupted in violence over the past 30 years. The division of these neighborhoods consists of more than just social/cultural cleavages. Over the years, physical barriers have been erected along the most violent fault lines. Today, many neighborhoods have their borders marked by concrete, tin, and barbed wire walls that physically separate combatants and noncombatants.

Two obstacles present in many urban stability operations are not present in Belfast: language and cultural barriers. The British soldiers and the citizens of Belfast, Catholic and Protestant alike, share a common language and heritage. On the one hand, this likeness allows British intelligence and SOF personnel to blend in easily with the local population and has vastly increased the HUMINT network available to the British commander. On the other hand, the fact that the citizens of Belfast are British subjects has made duty in Belfast psychologically troubling for many soldiers, particularly given the indiscriminate nature of the violence, which has resulted in numerous "noncombatant" casualties.

Controlling the Urban Population

While noncombatants are always a factor in urban operations, controlling the civilian population of Belfast is actually the primary focus of the entire operation and is integral to achieving stability. Because the conflict does not have distinguishable uniformed "combatants," but rather draws its combatants from the civilian population, controlling and influencing the populace is key to identifying combatants, pre-empting and deterring violence, and stemming support for terrorist activities. More broadly, although stability can be temporarily created by force, long-term stability is ultimately dependent on changed popular perceptions,

attitudes, and behavior. The task of controlling the civilian population while fighting terrorism has proved challenging for British forces not only because "combatants" are difficult to identify, but also because overly aggressive enforcement to root out combatants risks the danger of provoking the noncombatant populace toward militancy. Moreover, the nature of the mission has required British forces to perform a range of "police" functions that are atypical of normal military duties.

The key to controlling the urban population has been the synchronization of military and police responsibilities within the city. Due to the nature of stability operations, the line normally present between military and police objectives has become blurred. While the RUC is the law enforcement agency within Northern Ireland, it has evolved into more of a paramilitary force in order to deal with the extreme cases of violence in the city. In order to properly support the RUC, British commanders have adapted their military force to accomplish both military and police tasks. For example, British forces have modified their intelligence units to enable tracking of informants, often exploiting typical police tools such as working dogs. SAS, the equivalent of US Special Operations Forces, has adopted many of the functions of a SWAT team to extract terrorists. More generally, British forces have taken on basic policing duties such as street patrolling.

To accomplish their tasks, the military forces in Northern Ireland have been granted special legal and police powers by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, to include the authority to:

- Stop and question any person about his identity and movements
- Stop and search any person for weapons
- Arrest without warrant and detain for four hours
- Enter premises and search with only the permission of a commissioned officer
- Stop vehicles/vessels for search
- Control and restrict highways, rights of way, and access to buildings

Exercise of these powers has been instrumental in enabling the British forces to assist the RUC in maintaining a stable environment. However, in some instances, real or perceived abuses of these powers have incited the local populace. The nationalists (and some loyalists) have always felt these "special powers" were too broad and allowed the soldiers to violate their civil rights. In recognition of these sentiments, British commanders have generally been extremely careful in monitoring the use of these powers and ensuring that their soldiers do not abuse them. The British rules of engagement have allowed their soldiers to use reasonable force to prevent a crime or assist in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders. Violations of ROE by British soldiers have been prosecuted under United Kingdom law, and the offenders have been punished, although too lightly in the eyes of some factions.

Despite some criticism, the British have been generally successful in exercising control of the urban population without provoking popular backlash by their presence. In large part, they have done this by adapting to the exigencies of the mission and by coordinating extensively with their police counterparts. Compared to many US operations, the British performance in Belfast provides a model of both inter-Service and inter-agency cooperation. Militarily, the British have established a solid chain of command based on regional areas in which all members of the armed forces are subordinate. The integration of Regular Army forces with special forces, intelligence, and explosive ordnance disposal units has been seamless. The British have also done a remarkable job interfacing with the local RUC units, and have effectively modified their forces to perform police functions. Given the likelihood that US forces may be called upon in the future to carry out stability operations either abroad or at home, the British experience in Belfast provides insight for the JFC into the challenges and successes of controlling an urban population.

Force Protection

The British success in stabilizing the urban area has created incentives for terrorists to target British forces, giving rise to force protection concerns. Paradoxically, actions taken to enhance force protection have run the

risk of alienating the populace and reducing the force's effectiveness in maintaining stability, thus demonstrating the difficulty in balancing force protection requirements with those of policing an urban population.

Throughout the campaign, British forces in the countryside have been able to use large unit patrols (company-size units), long-range surveillance, and temporary checkpoints to enforce stability, but the urban environment has required the soldiers in Belfast to saturate the area with multiple small patrols, establish permanent observation posts, and maintain strongpoint bases inside the neighborhoods they are patrolling. These tactics have proven extremely effective in denying targets of opportunity to the terrorists in Belfast. The price of British success in protecting Belfast's infrastructure and government facilities from terrorist attacks, however, has been that the soldiers and their garrisons have in turn become the target. In particular, as the terrorist cells of the various factions have been unable to find easy targets within the city, some groups, especially the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), have attempted to solidify their legitimacy as an "army" by attacking predominantly military targets.

In response, British commanders initially instituted extreme force protection measures, running the gamut from ballistic protection vests and helmets to fortress-like operational bases and large unit patrols. These protection measures were very successful in decreasing the violence against British soldiers in Belfast, but the emphasis on force protection decreased the soldiers' ability to stabilize the city. The large unit patrols, while providing a large measure of protection for the soldiers, inhibited effective British saturation of neighborhoods. The fortress-like bases and bulky protective clothing created an "us versus them" mentality among both the civilian population and the soldiers themselves. As the force protection increased and the stabilizing effect decreased, the terrorists were again provided more targets of opportunity among the civilian population and infrastructure.

The British commanders, however, identified this "see-saw" effect and, in many cases, adapted their tactics to strike a better balance between force

protection and effective presence activities. As one of many examples, British forces switched to small unit patrols, consisting of four-man teams, to enable greater mobility. In addition, British soldiers now patrol Belfast wearing berets instead of helmets in order to appear less aggressive, thus reflecting the lowered tension and displaying sensitivity. It is also important to note that the British rely extensively on force protection enhancements that do not detract from presence activities, such as intelligence.

The British experience in Belfast provides insight into the challenges of conducting prolonged stability operations in an urban environment. In particular, it demonstrates the tension between urban population control and force protection requirements. It also illustrates how difficult it is for a stabilizing force to maintain impartiality in a highly charged political environment. For future stability operations in urban areas, the British experience provides the JFC with an example of a force's ability to learn from experience and achieve relative success in balancing the competing demands of force safety and effectiveness in a complicated and protracted stability operation.

Major Observations:

- Specialized task organizations provide the greatest mobility, coverage, and reaction throughout the city, enhanced by a combination of foot, vehicle, and aerial patrols
- The integration of SAS, intelligence, engineers, and other specially trained units has enhanced British military effectiveness throughout the operation and streamlined the chain of command
- Stability operations often include military and police responsibilities requiring extensive coordination between the two
- Saturating the area with multiple small patrols, establishing permanent observation posts, and maintaining strongpoint bases inside the

patrolled neighborhoods have proven effective in denying targets of opportunity to terrorists

- British commanders have adapted military tactics to strike a better balance between force protection and effective presence activities to minimize the “us versus them” mentality

Sarajevo, Bosnia
1992–1995

Timeline: Operations in Sarajevo

- 3 July 1992
  - Operation PROVIDE PROMISE begins
- 14 September 1992
  - Increased shelling in Sarajevo
- 5 February 1994
  - 68 civilians killed in the shelling of a market in Sarajevo
- 9 February 1994
  - NATO issues an ultimatum to the Serbs warning them to withdraw all heavy weapons or face air strikes
- 20 February 1994
  - NATO declares that there has been virtual compliance
- 28 August 1995
  - A mortar attack on Sarajevo kills 38 civilians
  - Operation DELIBERATE FORCE is launched
- 20 September 1995
  - UN and NATO leaders agree that operational objectives have been met

Figure IV-22. Timeline: Operations in Sarajevo



Figure IV-23. Map of Sarajevo, Bosnia

During operations in Bosnia, UN, NATO, and US forces performed urban relief operations and force protection in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and reinforced a simultaneous Croatian ground offensive to deter aggressive Serbian behavior and bring diplomatic efforts to a successful conclusion. NATO operations in Bosnia highlight the importance of urban relief and protection during major peace enforcement operations.

Operational Background

In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the former Yugoslavia, followed by Bosnia and Macedonia in the winter of 1991–92. As a result, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was composed of only Montenegro and Serbia (including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina). Under the manipulation of FRY political elites and with the support of provincial politicians, the Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA), the Serbian minority of the FRY, fought to gain control of the four provinces to maintain a unified Yugoslavia. Failing to do this, the Bosnian Serbs began to forcefully carve out Serbian enclaves in the other provinces under the banner of a "Greater Serbia."

By 1992, NATO and the US had committed to preserving the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and DELIBERATE FORCE were both a part of the overall multinational campaign to secure peace in Bosnia. The coalition placed significant emphasis on ensuring that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other prominent urban areas remained viable and capable of sustaining their inhabitants. To that end, NATO devoted significant resources to providing relief to Bosnia and protecting its major cities from Serb aggression.

Relief efforts centered on Operation PROVIDE PROMISE (1992–1995) and consisted of an airlift/drop of humanitarian relief supplies into Sarajevo and other key cities throughout Bosnia. The airlift began on 3 July 1992 and was an ongoing effort for four years to protect the city of Sarajevo and maintain an air bridge into Bosnia to deliver humanitarian assistance. UN officials ended the operation after concluding that access to Sarajevo no longer was blocked. The operation, which came to surpass the Berlin Airlift in duration, flew a total of

12,895 missions and transported 160,677 metric tons of food, medicine, and other supplies into Sarajevo and other safe areas.

As part of the larger effort to deny Bosnian Serb aircraft the ability to operate over Bosnia, the NATO/UN partnership alliance provided close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and conducted authorized air strikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and other threatened safe areas. These NATO air strikes compelled the Serbs to pull back their heavy weapons around Sarajevo into NATO/UN-monitored storage sites in 1994. Aerial ISR assets were used to monitor events in and around UN Safe Areas to ensure that the Serbs were complying with UN and NATO mandates. For example, UAVs conducted reconnaissance—detecting, monitoring, and reporting activities on the border of Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in support of relief operations.

However, by the Fall of 1994, the warring factions' disregard for UN mandates regarding Safe Areas and heavy weapons exclusion zones (EZs), targeting of NATO and UN aircraft and ground forces, and increased factional fighting dictated a more prudent military contingency plan. Operation DELIBERATE FORCE was an air attack planned to reduce Serbian military capabilities to threaten or attack safe areas and UN forces. On 28 August 1995, a mortar attack on Sarajevo, killing 38, triggered the launch of DELIBERATE FORCE. The majority of targets attacked during the operation were Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) nodes, ammunition depots, and equipment storage and maintenance facilities. By 20 September 1995, UN and NATO leaders agreed that operational objectives had been met, the mission had been accomplished, and end states achieved. The operational effect of DELIBERATE FORCE was to end the Bosnian Serb military efforts to either take the Safe Areas or render them unlivable.

The Urban Area

The ultimate success of NATO in Bosnia was dependent on NATO's ability to provide relief to Bosnia's civilian population and to protect key urban areas throughout the country. Safe areas assumed particular importance, as the

fall of just one of the Safe Areas would have signified failure on the part of NATO and the UN to ensure the viability of Bosnia's key cities, possibly undermining the credibility of the UN and NATO in future negotiation efforts. It is likely that if NATO had failed to re-supply Sarajevo and protect it from Serbian military aggression, this might have emboldened the Bosnian Serbs, caused great suffering among noncombatants, and undermined NATO and UN efforts to bring relief to Bosnia.

Minimizing Collateral Damage

Precision Guided Munitions

Precision guided munitions proved particularly effective in Sarajevo given NATO's strong desire to avoid collateral damage. Such munitions constituted roughly 70% of the 1,150 air-delivered munitions dropped by NATO aircraft; the vast majority (88%) were delivered by US aircraft.

Many of the weapons and target acquisition systems that supported these munitions worked well, but the need to enhance their effectiveness in adverse weather and in foliage-covered terrain was apparent.

Figure IV-24. Precision Guided Munitions

The focus of the international media was so concentrated in Sarajevo that the Commander in Chief AFSOUTH stated, "Every bomb was a political bomb." If Serbian forces had the opportunity to exploit public opinion in a manner that influenced diplomatic efforts, the military's credibility and support could have suffered. Accordingly, the intent was to preserve as much of the infrastructure of Sarajevo as possible, while destroying the military foundations of Serbian power. To this end, NATO employed precision guided munitions during air strikes to minimize collateral damage. The minimal collateral damage resulting from air strikes relieved political pressure on NATO, and NATO was able to sustain the intensity of the operation and increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a diplomatic settlement to the conflict.

Command and Control

During operations in Bosnia, a wide range of operational constraints were imposed on NATO forces. These constraints developed from concerns regarding the political implications of military action in Bosnia and from a keen desire to avoid both casualties within NATO or UN forces and unnecessary loss of life or damage to property within the urban area of Sarajevo. The UN viewed the operations as peacekeeping efforts, implying that force should be used only for self-defense; while NATO perceived them as peace enforcement efforts, implying that force could be used to coerce one side or another toward a diplomatic solution.

Many of the nations involved in the air operations also had committed ground forces and had legitimate concerns with regards to target selection, ROE, and air cover. To help ensure the safety of both ground and air forces and limit collateral damage and civilian casualties, the UN insisted that both the UN and NATO reach consensus before military force could be applied. The UN implemented a "dual key" system of authorization in which decisions had to be processed through two command structures.

While ensuring agreement, this system limited the commanders' ability to respond effectively to threats. Both commanders and US diplomats considered this arrangement overly restrictive, resulting in extreme delays that often jeopardized the effectiveness of action. In future operations, the US should expect that diplomatic and political requirements associated with urban MOOTW may impose command arrangements that complicate unity of command. To accommodate these complexities, commanders need to effect liaison and coordination at each echelon of the command chain, as well as among the various aviation units and command centers involved in the operation.

Major Observations:

- Minimizing collateral damage can help relieve political pressure, help sustain support for an operation, and increase pressure to negotiate a settlement
- Dual C2 structures (UN and NATO) can be overly restrictive and limit the commander's ability to respond effectively

Monrovia, Liberia
1996

Timeline: Monrovia, Liberia

- June–September 1990
  - Liberian rebels lay siege to Monrovia to oust President Samuel K. Doe
  - Economic Community of West Africa Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force enters Liberia to end siege; rebels break up into ethnic warlord militias; seven years of civil war begin
- August 1995
  - Peace plan (13th since 1989) is signed establishing a Ruling Council and mandating that the presidency rotate among Council members until elections can be held
- 6 April 1996
  - Fighting erupts between warlord factions in and around Monrovia after Ruling Council attempts to oust Roosevelt Johnson
- 9 April 1996
  - Europe-based Navy and Army SOF security elements secure US Embassy
  - Air Force SOF helicopters begin evacuation of the first of 2,200 personnel to Freetown, Sierra Leone
- 11 April 1996
  - Elements of an Army airborne company based in Italy augment SOF and Marine Embassy guards
- 12 April 1996
  - CONUS-based Army SOF elements begin air evacuation from Monrovia
  - Air refueling operations underway
- 19 April 1996
  - Cease-fire declared, but sporadic fighting continues; ECOMOG leaders meet to get the peace process back on track
- 20 April 1996
  - 250 Marines from 22nd MEU relieve SOF security and air evacuation elements as well as Army airborne company security forces at Embassy
  - 22nd MEU begins evacuation of remaining 750 civilians
  - CDR, 22d MEU, assumes command of ASSURED RESPONSE JTF

Figure IV-25. Timeline: Monrovia, Liberia

Figure IV-26. Map of Monrovia, Liberia

NEOs are conducted to assist the US Department of State in the evacuation of noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host nation citizens, and third country nationals whose lives are in danger, from locations in a host foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. They usually involve a swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an urban objective, such as a US Embassy, and a planned withdrawal after mission completion. NEOs are usually planned and executed by a JTF under an ambassador's authority. The NEO performed in Monrovia, Liberia in 1996 is an example of an operation that has become an increasingly frequent feature in the landscape of US military actions in the post-Cold War era.

Operational Background

The flare-up of fighting among Liberia's warlord factions in April 1996 was the latest of many disruptions to the fragile peace plan of August 1995 that temporarily ended Liberia's brutal civil war. By late March 1996, factions of Liberia's Ruling Council had expelled one of its own members, Roosevelt Johnson. This action provoked hostilities, and beginning on 5 April in Monrovia, members of Johnson's militia rampaged against suspected supporters

of the Ruling Council action, blowing up helicopters and seizing hundreds of hostages. By 6 April, gangs of heavily armed youths were engaged in sporadic, intense exchanges of small arms and heavy weapons fire throughout the city as a West African peacekeeping element, known as ECOMOG, stood by. This situation, along with the closure of Monrovia's international airport on 8 April, led to a presidential order to evacuate US citizens and certain categories of third country nationals. The relative suddenness of the deteriorating situation precluded the pre-positioning of an Amphibious Task Force off Liberia's coast. Consequently, the nearest element afloat—the 6th Fleet Landing Force with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) aboard—was seven days away. The J-3, in coordination with CINCEUCOM and CINCSOC, elected to deploy CONUS- and European-based SOF and an Army Airborne Battalion Combat Team from Italy to begin Operation ASSURED RESPONSE on 9 April in advance of the 20 April arrival of the 22nd MEU.

The Urban Setting

Monrovia has some 450,000 inhabitants spread over an area the size of Washington, D.C. There are few high-rise buildings in this port city. The US Embassy is located on a point of land on the Atlantic Ocean several miles to the south of Monrovia's center. Much of the fighting occurred in the area of a military barracks inhabited by Roosevelt Johnson's militia, located some two miles from the US Embassy. The Embassy grounds possessed a helicopter landing pad, and the adjacent housing compound was large enough to accommodate the approximately 15,000 civilians seeking sanctuary.

NEO planning sought to establish total control of the Embassy grounds using a security force to augment existing Marine guards and sustain the Embassy as an operational US diplomatic facility and as the primary air evacuation point. The street fighting between militia gangs occasionally deterred the movement of groups of evacuees who requested military forces to escort them to the Embassy. The most significant challenge was twofold: locating evacuees in Monrovia unable or unwilling to come to the Embassy and then transporting them from air/ground pick-up points. Several sites in the city that afforded security forces

partial control from militia interference during the pick-ups that occurred outside the US Embassy were selected.

The Operation

The objective of the NEO in Monrovia was to conduct the safe, rapid evacuation of US and eligible third country nationals from the urban departure area to a designated safe haven. The departure area was the US Embassy compound. There were two alternate sites: the ECOMOG compound four miles from the Embassy and the International Trust Company compound some three miles from the Embassy. Inherent in an NEO is the need to provide security to the evacuation departure area. The NEO must also provide security to personnel during the air transit phase from the departure area to the safe haven. Evacuations are most susceptible to fire from small arms, RPGs, and other weapons during the first moments of transit over the urban areas.

Mission Analysis: Critical Questions for an Urban NEO

- Where is the embassy/evacuation point in the city and what are its physical characteristics?
- What is the overall urban military/diplomatic/social situation that will impact the NEO?
- Who are the indigenous leaders and what is their C2 structure that will influence the urban situation?
- What are the ground, air, and sea threats that may impact the securing of the evacuation point and the routes transiting the urban area?
- What type and how many evacuees and refugees are anticipated; and what is the weather in the area?

Figure IV-27. Mission Analysis: Critical Questions for an Urban NEO

NEOs are often executed in an urban area in which little intelligence or area familiarity is available through military channels. As a result, much information must be provided by diplomatic and non-government organizations familiar with the situation in order to answer the JFC's critical operational questions. The answers are not always provided with complete certainty and detail. They will, however, influence the concept of operation, security force composition and numbers, evacuation response times, air/sea evacuation resources and routes, logistics support requirements, intermediate and final safe haven designations, and any adjustments to standard rules of engagement.

Mission Planning and Execution

Based on the initial mission analysis conducted by the Joint Staff, and then by the designated JFC and senior US diplomat in-country, a concept of operations and supporting force structure was developed in order to plan the NEO.

In view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Monrovia and the time required for the 6th Fleet Landing Force to arrive off the coast of Liberia, CINCEUCOM deployed SOF elements to first secure the Embassy grounds and then initiate the evacuation. Synchronization of the operation was coordinated by an Army Special Forces Brigadier General who, as the JTF commander, established his base in the US Embassy in Monrovia subsequent to the arrival of Europe-based Navy SEAL and Army Special Forces on 9 April. Once security of the Embassy compound was assured, the JFC coordinated the arrival of evacuation helicopters from Army Special Forces units from CONUS and Europe-based Air Force SOF units staging out of Freetown, Sierra Leone, to airlift US citizens and other eligible personnel.

Several issues impacted the evacuation operation. The first was that not all US citizens could get to the Embassy as a result of the urban hostilities. Second, engagements between heavily-armed gangs, often under the influence of drugs and alcohol, were occurring within several blocks of the US Embassy. Arriving and departing evacuation helicopters made tempting targets to undisciplined militia gangs. Third, the sheer number (an estimated 15,000) of refugees in the Embassy grounds, most of whom were ineligible for evacuation, created substantial food, water, medicine, and sanitation requirements. The JFC had to ensure that there was sufficient logistics support at the Freetown international airport transload site, 235 miles northwest of Monrovia, to accommodate the health and sanitation needs of the evacuees and to support evacuation aircraft logistics requirements. This was critical to rapidly moving evacuees from the Embassy through Freetown to their final destination of Dakar, Senegal.

The JFC responded by coordinating with the Embassy to determine the location and identity of US civilians in Monrovia who were unable to reach the

Embassy. Subsequently, decisions were made to use SOF elements as escorts for US nationals who lived near the Embassy. Other civilians were directed to an air pick-up point three miles from the Embassy in the International Trust Company compound. Simultaneously, forces from an Italy-based US Airborne Battalion Combat Team deployed to the Embassy to free up SOF elements to provide ground security escorts.

The Embassy also coordinated with ECOMOG to use its compound as an air evacuation point. ECOMOG agreed to transport US and third country civilians in armored personnel carriers from locations in Monrovia to the US Embassy or ECOMOG compounds. The concern for the security of helicopters arriving and departing the Embassy and ECOMOG compounds led to a decision to conduct the majority of evacuations at night when hostilities were less intense and the threat of gunfire less predominant. Air security for the evacuation consisted of close air support and reconnaissance provided by SOF AC-130 *Spectre* gunships. The evacuation and its air support required a substantial aerial-refueling effort using tanker aircraft deployed from the United Kingdom. Evacuation helicopters on their return flights from Freetown airlifted supplies to the refugees and the Embassy staff in the Embassy compound. Over 2,100 evacuees were airlifted to Freetown and on to Dakar during the 10-day SOF operation. Marines from the 22nd MEU evacuated another 750 personnel upon their arrival on 20 April and assumed command of the operation.

Rules of Engagement in the Urban Setting

NEO rules of engagement are standard ROE governing the conduct of US military forces in a potentially hostile MOOTW situation. They are combined with other ROE that respond to the unique characteristics and objectives of the largely urban setting of these operations. There are two cornerstone ROE: the first is that if US forces are threatened, all necessary measures including lethal force may be employed. As a corollary to this, forces will not return fire unless they have a reasonable certainty of the source of the fire. The second is that US forces will observe strict neutrality in hostilities between belligerents.

Accordingly, US forces in imminent danger will cease NEO activities until the source and cause of the hostile fire is determined and responded to appropriately.

The JFC must ensure that these ROE are fully understood by all military personnel participating in the NEO since decisions to respond to hostile situations are normally delegated to the lowest level of the security force. In Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, SOF personnel escorting US citizens to the Embassy frequently had sudden encounters with militia members on Monrovia's streets and had to take necessary measures to avoid conflict while being prepared to respond with appropriate force. Marine security augmentation forces were often challenged at the Embassy gates by heavily armed youths in encounters that required an unequivocal demonstration of a willingness to use lethal force to deter threats of militia gunfire directed at the Embassy.

Planning and Execution Issues

Operation ASSURED RESPONSE involved SOF elements from all the Services in addition to the employment of a MEU, which arrived for the NEO's final phase. No matter what the force composition, the JFC will be confronted with a unique operating environment. Unlike other operations in which the military may attempt to shape the situation to its advantage, NEOs generally require a response to the situation as it exists. This requires adjusting to the changing conditions presented by the urban setting, by the predominantly paramilitary/civilian character of the threat, and by the actions of the evacuees themselves.

The many dynamics of the urban operating environment and its human components provide an inherent unpredictability in NEOs. The JFC must work with the Embassy team to develop an operational concept that can respond to unpredictability. NEO forces must have substantial experience in operating in urban settings and interacting with civilian populations to increase the probability that ROE will be adhered to flawlessly. Evacuation helicopters will frequently operate in the middle of cities, requiring pilot experience in urban flying and in operating at night with night vision goggles. Behavior of adversary elements is unpredictable and marked by a fractured urban command and control

environment. Consequently, current information on weapons capabilities, identities, intent, and attitudes of the indigenous factions and their leaders toward the US and the US military performing the NEO is vital. Communications with the factions involved should convey US intent. Obtaining commitments of non-interference also is critical to achieving an unopposed evacuation.

Major Observations:

- NEOs are generally a response to a particular situation and may provide less opportunity to shape the urban setting
- Situational intelligence necessary for military preparation is often difficult to acquire during NEOs
- NEOs are generally more unpredictable than other types of operation

APPENDIX A: REFERENCES

Case Study References

BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND:

BBC. Northern Ireland: The Search for Peace, Paramilitaries- Website. 1999. http://news1.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/northern_ireland/paramilitaries

BBC. Northern Ireland:The Search for Peace, History- Website. 1999. http://news1.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/northern_ireland/history

The British Army in Northern Ireland. "The Armed Forces in Northern Ireland." 1999. http://www.army.mod.uk/army/world/nireland/n_armf.htm

The British Army in Northern Ireland. "Northern Ireland Military Operations." 1999. http://www.army.mod.uk/army/world/nireland/n_mil_ops.htm

The British Army in Northern Ireland. "The Role of the Armed Forces in Northern Ireland." http://www.army.mod.uk/army/world/index.htm

The British Army in Northern Ireland. "Rule of Law." http://www.army.mod.uk/army/world/index.htm

Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN). "Background Information on Northern Ireland Society—Security Forces." http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm

Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN). "The Deployment of British Troops – Summary of Main Events." http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/troops/sum.htm

Murray, Raymond. State Violence: Northern Ireland 1969-1997. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/murray.htm

GROZNY, CHECHNYA:

"Military Aspects of Chechnya War." *COMMERSANT-DAILY* (10.1.1995) from Russian Newspapers on Russia-Chechnya War. http://www.amina.com/chechens/article/rus_newsp.html

Finch, Major Raymond C., III, USA. "Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya." Foreign Military Studies Office. http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm

Geibel, Adam. "The Battle for Grozny – New Year's Eve Day 1994." http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/grozny.html

Grau, Lester W. "Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny." *National Defense University's Strategic Forum.* Institute for National Strategic Studies. http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/grozny.htm

Haque, Mohammad Zahirul. "Chechnya in Turmoil." http://www.amina.com/chechens/article/chech_turnoil.html

Lieven, Anatol. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998.

Payin, Emil A. and Arkady A. Popov. "Chechnya—From Past to Present." http://www.amina.com/chechens/article/history.html

Reed, First Lieutenant James. "The Chechen War: Part II." *Red Thrust Star.* Foreign Military Studies Office. PB-30-96-3. July 1996.

Steele, General. "Russia's War in Chechnya: Urban Warfare Lessons Learned 1994–96." *Marine Corps Intelligence Activity* (MCIA).

"The Chechen War: Part III." *Red Thrust Star.* Foreign Military Studies Office. http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/RED-Star/ISSUES/96OCT/ chechwar.htm

Thomas, Timothy L. "Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict: The Case of Chechnya." http://www.amina.com/chechens/article/thomas_mili.html

MOGADISHU, SOMALIA:

Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Ft. McNair: National Defense University Press. 1995.

Bowden, Mark. Blackhawk Down. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 1999. http://www.philly.com/packages/somalia/sitemap.asp

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). US Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II: Lessons Learned Report. Fort Leavenworth: US Army Combined Arms Center. 1994.

Crary, Major John. "Targeting in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT): The Somalia Perspective." 1994. http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/jun94/jun94-1.htm

Durch, William, ed. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1996.

McGrady, Katherine. The Joint Task Force in Operation Restore Hope. CRM 93-144. Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses. March 1994.

10th Mountain Division (LI), Somalia. US Army Forces: After Action Report: Summary. Fort Drum: 10th Mountain Division, Headquarters. June 1993.

Parker, Captain Phillip. "Somalia Update: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)." 1993. http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/nftf1293/prt5.htm

Rosenau, William, McDonald, John and Martsching, Brad. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). SAIC: Strategy and Policy Analysis Division. 18 August 1997.

Siegel, Adam. Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia in January 1991. CRM 91-211. Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses. October 1991.

Stevenson, Jonathan. Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 1995.

United Nations, Department of Public Information, "Somalia-UNOSOM II (United Nations Operations in Somalia I)." 1996. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm

United Nations, Department of Public Information, "Somalia-UNOSOM II (United Nations Operations in Somalia II)." 1996. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm

The MOUT Homepage Somalia Website.
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/somalia.html.

PANAMA CITY, PANAMA:

Cole, Ronald. Operation Just Cause: Panama. Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1995.

Durch, William, ed. UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1996.

"Operation Just Cause: Lessons Learned–Volume II, Operations Bulletin No. 90-9."
http://call.army.mil/call/ctc_bull/90-9/9092toc.htm.

"Operation Just Cause: Introduction."
http://call.army.mil/call/ctc_bull/90-9/9091int.htm.

Taw, Jennifer Morrison. Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other Than War. Santa Monica: RAND. 1996.

Tsouras, Peter and Watson, Bruce, editors. Operation Just Cause: The US Intervention in Panama. Boulder: Westview Press. 1991.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI:

Adams, Thomas. "Intervention in Haiti: Lessons Relearned." *Military Review*. September/October 1996: pp. 45–56.

Brown, Stephen D. "PSYOP in Operation Uphold Democracy." *Military Review*. September/October 1996: pp. 57–76.

Costello, Patrick. "Haiti: Prospects for Democracy." *REFWORLD*. September 1995.

Dobbins, Amb. James F. "Haiti: A Case Study in Post-Cold War Peacekeeping." *Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Report*. Remarks at the ISD Conference on Diplomacy and the Use of Force. 21 Sept 1995.

Doerrer, Eric A. "Civil Affairs in Haiti." *Military Review*. March/April 1996: pp. 73–79.

Hayes, Margaret D. and Gary F. Wheatley, eds. Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study. Washington: National Defense University. 1996.

McClure, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. "The United Nations Mission in Haiti." Originally published in *Engineer Professional Bulletin*. August 1995. http://call.army.mil/call/trngqtr/b4fy96/haiti.htm

Naylor, Sean. "The Invasion That Never Was." *Army Times,* Vol. 56, No. 31. 26 Feb 1996.

Oakley, Robert and Michael Dziedzic. "Sustaining Success in Haiti." *Strategic Forum No. 77* for National Strategic Studies. Washington: National Defense University. 1996.

Shelton, Lieutenant General H. Hugh and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy D. Vane. "Winning the Information War in Haiti." *Military Review*, November/December 1995: pp. 3–9.

Wilkins, Aaron L. "The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti)." Air University, Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College. 1997.

SARAJEVO, BOSNIA:

Azrael, Jeremy R. and Payin, Emil A. *US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*. RAND. 1996.

Cigar, Norman. "How Wars End: War Termination and Serbian Decision-making in the Case of Bosnia." *South East European Monitor*. January 1996.

Holbrooke, Richard. "Annals of Diplomacy: The Road to Sarajevo." *The New Yorker.* 21 and 28 November 1996.

"Operation Deliberate Force." Allied Forces Southern Europe Fact Sheet. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm

Owen, Robert C., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF. "The Balkan Air Campaign Study: Part I." *Air Power Journal.* Vol. XI, No. 2, Summer 1997: pp. 4–24.

"The Balkan Air Campaign Study: Part II." *Air Power Journal.* Vol. XI, No. 3, Fall 1997: pp. 4–24.

Simmons, Dean, Phillip Gould, Verena, Vomastic, and Walsh, Philip. "Air Operations over Bosnia." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* May 1997.

Wentz, Larry, ed. Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience. Naval Defense University: Institute for National Strategic Studies. 1997.

Congressional Testimony and Speeches

Clapper, Lieutenant General James R. Jr., USAF. "The Worldwide Threats to US Interests." Prepared Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee. 17 January 1995. *DefenseLink*. Vol. 10, no. 5. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/di1005.html

Cohen, William S. "DoD's Fundamental Challenges in an Uncertain Future." Text of a letter from Secretary of Defense Cohen to Sen. Strom Thurmond, Armed Services Committee. 15 December 1997. *DefenseLink*. Vol. 13, no. 4. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1998/di1304.html

Holmes, Allen. "Looking into DoD's Geopolitical Future." Prepared Remarks to the 42nd Annual National Security Forum, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 30 May 1995. *DefenseLink*. Vol. 10, no. 74. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/di1074.html

Hughes, Lieutenant General Patrick M., USA. "Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead." Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 28 January 1998. http://140.47.5.4/dr_ssciu.html

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

CJCS Handbook 5260, "Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness." 1 January 1997.

Joint Military Operations Historical Collection. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, DC. 15 July 1997. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/hist_pubs.htm

Joint Publications

JP 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States." 11 November 1991. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/personnel.htm

JP 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," 23 March 1994 as amended through 24 January 2000. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel

JP 1-07, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations."

JP 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations." 05 May 1995. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf

JP 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations." 20 November 1996. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf

JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations." 28 September 1998. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_02.pdf

JP 2-03, "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Geospacial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations." 31 March 1999. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_03.pdf

JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations." 01 February 1995. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs2.htm

JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations." 01 February 1995. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf

JP 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations." 17 April 1998. http://ww.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf

JP 3-05.3, "Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures." 25 August 1993. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_3.pdf

JP 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures." 10 August 1993. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_5.pdf

JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War." 16 June 1995. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs2.htm

JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War." 16 June 1995. http://160.149.101.23/djco/Pubs/jp3-07/index.htm

JP 3-07.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism." 17 March 1998. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_2.pdf

JP 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations." 12 February 1999. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_3.pdf

JP 3-07.4, "Joint Counterdrug Operations." 17 February 1998. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_4.pdf

JP 3-07.5, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations." 30 September 1997. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_5.pdf

JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operation: Vol. I." 09 October 1996. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs2.htm

JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operation Vol. I." 09 October 1996. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_08v1.pdf

JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operation Vol. II." 09 October 1996. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_08v2.pdf

JP 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense." 10 July 1995. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_11.pdf

JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations."

JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations." 10 July 1996. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs2.htm

JP 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations." 10 July 1996. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_53.pdf

JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations." 14 November 1994. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_56_1.pdf

JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs." 21 June 1995. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs2.htm

JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs." 21 June 1995.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf

JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations." 14 May 1997.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs2.htm

JP 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations." 14 May 1997.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_61.pdf

JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations." 27 January 1995.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf

JP 4-01.1, "JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations." 20 July 1996.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_0_1.pdf

JP 4-01.2, "JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations." 09 October 1996.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_0_2.pdf

JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations." 13 April 1995.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/planning.htm

JP 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."
13 January 1999.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_00_2.pdf

JP 6-0, "Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations."
30 May 1995.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf

JP 6-0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations." 30 May 1995.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf

JP 6-02, "Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operations/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems."
01 October 1996.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp6_02.pdf

Service Publications

Air Force

AFDD 2, "Organization and Employment Of Aerospace Power." 28 September 1998.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/dd-pubs.stm

AFDD 2-3, "Military Operations Other Than War." 05 October 1996.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/dd-pubs.stm

AFDD 2-5.2, "Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Operations." 21 April 1999.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/dd-pubs.stm

AFDD 2-5.3, "Psychological Operations." 27 August 1999.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/dd-pubs.stm

AFDD 2-5.5, "Psychological Operations." 22 February 1997.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/dd-pubs.stm

AFDD 10-22, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning and Operations." 01 December 1998.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/10-pubs.stm

AFDD 35, "Special Operations." 16 January 1995.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/dd-pubs.stm

AFDD 40, "Logistics." 11 May 1994.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/elec-products/pubpages/dd-pubs.stm

Army

FM 1-100, "Army Aviation Operations." 21 February 1997.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/1-100/toc.htm

FM 1-108, "Doctrine for Army Special Operations Aviation Forces." 03 November 1993.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/1-108/fm1108.htm

FM 3-4, "NBC Protection." 29 May 1992.

FM 5-232, "Topographic Surveying." 27 September 1989.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/5-232/toc.htm

FM 27-1, "Legal Guide For Commanders." 13 January 1992.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-1/toc.htm

FM 27-10, "The Law Of Land Warfare." 18 July 1956.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-10/toc.htm

FM 31-20, "Doctrine for Special Forces Operations." 20 April 1990.

FM 33-1, "Psychological Operations." 18 February 1993.

FM 33-1-1, "Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures." 05 May 1994.

FM 34-8, "Combat Commander's Handbook On Intelligence." 28 September 1992.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-8/toc.htm

FM 34-36, "Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare." 30 September 1991.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-36/toc.htm

FM 34-60, "Counterintelligence." 03 October 1995.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-60/toc.htm

FM 34-130, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield." 08 July 1994.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-130/toc.htm

FM 41-10, "Civil Affairs Operations." 11 January 1993.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm

FM 46-1, "Public Affairs Operations." 30 May 1997.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/46-1/toc.htm

FM 63-11, “Logistics Support Element Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures.” 8 October 1996.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/63-11/tocfin.htm

TC 90-1, “Training for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain.”
http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/90-1/toc.htm

FM 90-10, “Military Operations On Urbanized Terrain.” 15 August 1979.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-10/toc.htm

FM 90-10-1, “An Infantryman's Guide To Combat In Built-Up Areas.” 12 May 1993.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-10-01/default.htm

FM 90-29, “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.” 17 October 1994.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-29/toc.htm

FM 100-8, “The Army in Multinational Operations.” 24 November 1997.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-8/toc.htm

FM 100-20, “Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict.” 05 December 1990.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-20/toc.htm

FM 100-23, “Peace Operations.” 30 December 1994.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-23/fm100-23.htm

FM 100-23-1, “Multiservice Procedures For Humanitarian Assistance Operations.” 31 October 1994.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-23-1/toc.htm

FM 700-80, “Logistics.” 15 August 1985.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/700-80/toc.htm

FM 701-58, “Planning Logistics Support For Military Operations.” 27 May 1987.
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/701-58/toc.htm

Marine Corps

MCDP 1, "Warfighting." June 1997.
http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/index.html

MCDP 2, "Intelligence." June 1997.

MCDP 3, "Expeditionary Operations." April 1998.
http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/index.html

MCDP 4, "Logistics." February 1997.
http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/index.html

MCRP 3-33.1A, "Civil Affairs Operations." January 1993.

MCWP 0-1, "Marine Corps Operations." Coordinating Draft August 1999.
http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/index.html

MCWP 3-33, "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)."
Coordinating Draft Pending.
http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/index.html

MCWP 3-33.1, "MAGTF Civil Affairs." Coordinating Draft Pending.

MCWP 3-33.3, "Marine Corps Public Affairs."
Coordinating Draft Pending.

MCWP 3-33.6, "Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Joint and Multi-Service Environments." October 1994.

MCWP 3-35.3, "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain."
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/doctrinea.html

MCWP 3-37.5, "NBC Defense for Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields."
Dual Designate Publication.

Marine Weapons and Tactics Squadron, "Aviation Combat Element Military Operations on Urban Terrain Manual (MAWTS-1 ACE MOUT Man)." CD-ROM. 24 August 1998.

Navy

NDP 1, "Naval Warfare." 28 March 1994.
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/navagation1/doctrine8.htm

NDP 2, "Naval Intelligence." 03 September 1994.
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/navagation1/doctrine8.htm

NDP 4, "Naval Logistics." 10 January 1995.
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/navagation1/doctrine8.htm

NDP 5, "Naval Planning." 15 January 1996.
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/navagation1/doctrine8.htm

Other Publications/References

"Assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review." The National Defense Panel.
http://www.defenselink.mil/topstory/ndp_assess.html

Contingency C4ISR Handbook for Integrated Planning. Department of Defense. August 1998.

Dupont, Daniel G. "Inner-City Violence." *Scientific America.* October 1998.
http://www.sciam.com/1998/1098issue/1098techbus3.html

Ellefsen, Richard and Liu, Jack. "Urban Terrain Zone Based GIS for MOUT."
http://wwwsge.ursus.maine.edu/gisweb/spatdb/gis-lis/gi94033.html

Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. 2nd ed. April 1995.

Ethiel, Nancy, ed. The Military and the Media: Facing the Future. *Cantigny Conference Series*. Wheaton: The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation. 1998.

"Final Report Of The Military Operations In Built-Up Areas (MOBA) - Terrain Database (TDB) Project." NIMA, 1995.
http://www.tmpo.nima.mil/news/exesum.htm

Gizewski, Peter and Thomas Homer-Dixon. "Urban Growth and Violence: Will the Future Resemble the Past?" *Occasional Paper, Project on Environment, Population and Security*. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science and the University of Toronto.
http://ut11.library.utoronto.ca/www/pcs/eps/urban/urban1.htm

Hewish, Mark and Rupert Pengelly. "Warfare in the Global City." *Jane's International Defense Review.* June 1998.

Hinson, David R. Military Interaction With Humanitarian Assistance Organizations. Air University. http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/research/ay1998/acsc/98-119.htm

"Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations." Joint Warfighting Center. 16 June 1997.

"Joint Warfighter S&T Plan Chapter IV—Achieving Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives." http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/97_jwstp/jw4e.htm

The Military in Peace Operations. US Army War College. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/org/pki/military/frame.htm

The MOUT Homepage: Operations in Built Up Areas (OBUA). http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/

"Operations Other Than War Overview." Marine Corps University briefing slides—PDF. http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/doctrinea.html

Peters, Ralph. "The Future of Armed Warfare." *Parameters.* US Army War College Quarterly. Autumn 1997: pp. 50–59.

Sapolsky, Harvey M. and Shapiro, Jeremy. "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future in Wars." *Parameters.* US Army War College Quarterly. Summer 1996: pp. 119–127.

Stofft, William A. and Gary L. Guertner. "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention." *Parameters.* US Army War College Quarterly. Spring 1995: pp. 30–32.

"Revision of the World Populations Estimates and Projections." United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. http://www.popin.org/pop1998/

"Urban Growth Dimensions." http://www.soc.titech.ac.jp/uem/stat-urban1.html

Verton, Daniel M. "IT Warfare Tests Start." *Federal Computer Week.* 20 July 1998. http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1998/0720/fcw-agittest-7-20-98.html

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

APPENDIX B

Example Rules of Engagement

UNOSOM II ROE

Taken from *US Army Operations in Support of Somalia: Lessons Learned*

NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT.

2. Use all necessary force, including deadly force;

    a. To defend yourself, other UN personnel, or persons and areas under your protection against the use of force or clear evidence of intent to use force.
    b. To confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons.
    c. To disarm and demilitarize individuals in areas under UNOSOM control.

3. Always use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.

4. If the tactical situation permits, give a challenge before using deadly force. Challenge by:

    a. Shouting in English, "UN, stop or I'll fire."
    b. Shouting in Somali, "UN, KA HANAGA JOOGA AMA WAA GUBAN," or
    c. Firing warning shots in the air.

5. Unattended weapons, such as booby traps, mines, and trip guns, are prohibited.

6. Detain individuals who interfere with your mission, who use or clearly threaten deadly force, or who commit criminal acts under UNOSOM control. Evacuate detainees to a designated location for turnover to military police. Treat all detainees humanely.

7. Do not seize civilian property without your commander's authorization.

8. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

9. Organized, armed militia, technicals and other crew-served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM forces and may be engaged without provocation.

APPENDIX C

Media Survival Guide

"Generally, it is in the institution's best interest to deal honestly and in a timely manner with the media. If you do not play, you surrender to your critics who will be eagerly at hand.

Understand the media's obsession with speed and, through daily contact, keep working to win the battle of the first media perception.

Leaders must learn to take time to articulate their positions to the media. They must use short, simple language that the media will use and the public will understand.

Use the media to inform the public proactively, not just to react to critics.

Understand that the news is almost always skewed toward the side of those willing to talk to the media, and against those who say "No Comment."

Remember that CNN will correct the television record, while other networks rarely will do that because of time constraints.

Realize that there are reporters who do want to be accurate and have balanced stories. Too often editors or television producers get in the way and interject the political or budget spin on an otherwise positive story about our people. Getting reporters out to the fleet, field, or factory floor is a beginning.

Play the media game. Understand there are times for a low profile, but more often, a media opportunity to tell your story should not be lost

because of fear. We need to tell people, through the media, what we are about.

Do not be thin-skinned. We will not win every media engagement, but we must continue to communicate to our people and to the public."

Rear Admiral Brent Baker,
USN (RET)
Taken from *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, VIII-6*

GLOSSARY

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
BDA	battle damage assessment
C2	command and control
C2W	command and control warfare
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CA	civil affairs
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	commander in chief of a combatant command
CIT	combat intelligence team
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CONUS	continental United States
CSS	combat service support
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
ESG	Executive Steering Group

EW	electronic warfare
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
GPS	global positioning system
HA	humanitarian assistance
HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center
HAST	humanitarian assistance survey team
HUMINT	human intelligence
IADS	integrated air defense system
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IFOR	International Forces
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IO	international organization, information operation
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff
J-3	Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff
J-4	Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Systems Directorate of the Joint Staff
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JFC	joint force commander
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JISE	joint intelligence support element

JOA	joint operations area
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTF	joint task force
JUO	joint urban operations
LOC	lines of communications
LOGCAP	logistics civilian augmentation program
LZ	landing zone
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MCWP	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIST	military information support team
MLRS	Multiple-Launch Rocket System
MNF	multinational force
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MSCA	military support to civil authorities
MTW	major theater war
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDP	Naval Doctrinal Publication
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team

NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NSA	National Security Agency
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operations order
OPSEC	operations security
OSINT	open source intelligence
PA	public affairs
PDF	Panamanian Defense Force
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKO	peacekeeping operations
POLAD	political advisor
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
QRF	Quick Response Force
RC	Reserve Component
ROE	rules of engagement
RPG	rocket propelled grenade
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SAS	Special Air Service
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	special operations forces

SROE	standing rules of engagement
TECHINT	technical intelligence
TTP	tactics, techniques, procedures
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	UN protection force
USACAPOC	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VTC	video teleconferencing
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II–TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP 1-02).

arms control. A concept that connotes: (1) any plan, arrangement, or process resting on explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types and performance characteristics of weapons systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and (2) on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment. (JP 1-02).

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02).

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to achieve strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02).

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (JP 1-02).

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02).

civil affairs. Designated Active Component or Reserve Component civil affairs forces organized, equipped, and trained to carry out missions that specifically include the conduct or support of civil affairs activities (Upon approval of revised JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, this term and its definition will replace the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02).

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs forces that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and populations in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, which enhance conduct of civil-military operations (Upon approval of revised JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02).

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil-military operations may include activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Upon approval of revised JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, this term and its definition will replace the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02).

civil-military operations center. An *ad hoc* organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called **CMOC.** (JP 1-02).

coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02).

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. (JP 1-02).

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02).

combat camera. Visual information documentation covering air, sea, and ground actions of the Armed Forces of the United States in combat or combat support operations and in related peacetime training activities such as exercises, war games, and operations. (JP 1-02).

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
Also called **C2**. (JP 1-02).

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information operations in military operations. Also called **C2W**. C2W is both offensive and defensive: (1) C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. (2) C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (JP 1-02).

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. (JP 1-02).

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02).

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (JP 1-02).

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. (JP 1-02).

Country Team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission, and comprised of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02).

critical node. An element, position, or communications entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat operations. (JP 1-02).

economy of force theater. Theater in which risk is accepted to allow a concentration of sufficient force in the theater of focus. (JP 1-02).

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called **EW.** The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons

to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: (1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and (2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition.

Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, both communications intelligence and electronics intelligence. (JP 1-02).

exclusion zone. A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. (JP 1-02).

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all

locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02).

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02).

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02).

human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called **HUMINT**. (JP 1-02).

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02).

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called **IMINT**. (JP 1-02).

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called **IO**. See also defensive information

operations; information; information system; offensive information operations; operation. (JP 1-02).

intelligence. (1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (2) Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02).

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. (JP 1-02).

interoperability. (1) The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (DOD) (2) The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02).

joint intelligence center. The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called **JIC**. (JP 1-02).

joint intelligence support element. A subordinate joint force forms a joint intelligence support element as the focus for intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called **JISE.** (JP 1-02).

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02).

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. (JP 1-02).

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02).

joint urban operations. All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. (JP 3-0).

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (2) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02).

maneuver. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02).

mass. The concentration of combat power. (JP 1-02).

measurement and signature intelligence. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydro-magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also called **MASINT.** (JP 1-02).

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision-makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. There are five categories of military deception. (1) Strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. (2) Operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. (3) Tactical military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. (4) Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. (5) Military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise

of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (JP 1-02).

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called **MOOTW**. (JP 1-02).

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02).

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called **NCA.** (JP 1-02).

National Intelligence Support Team. A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called **NIST**. (JP 1-02).

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called **NEO.** (JP 1-02).

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called **NGOs.** (JP 1-02).

non-lethal weapons. Weapons that are designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. (DoD Directive 3000.3).

open source intelligence. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called **OSINT**. (JP 1-02).

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. (JP 1-02).

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-02).

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: (1) Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. (2) Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. (3) Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called **OPSEC.** (JP 1-02).

peace operations. The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, or non-military action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process. (JP 1-02).

private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organizations." Also called **PVOs.** (JP 1-02).

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02).

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA**. (JP 1-02).

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02).

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (JP 1-02).

safe area. A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until that person can be evacuated. (JP 1-02).

signals intelligence. (1) A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. (2) Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called **SIGINT**. (JP 1-02).

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02).

strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (JP 1-02).

strike. An attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (JP 1-02).

support. (1) The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (2) A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. (3) A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. (4) An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02).

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02).

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02).

technical intelligence. Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign materiel, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary's technical advantage. Also called **TECHINT**. (JP 1-02).

theater strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (JP 1-02).

weapons of mass destruction. In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02).

INTENTIONALLY BLANK


JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF